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Abstract: Minor Parties in English Local Government 
By Luke Samuel Sloan 
This thesis examines the electoral performance of minor parties in English local 
government from 1973 to 2008, a period that has seen a sharp increase in the 
numbers of candidates from such parties. Beginning with an overall 
assessment of the extent to which candidates from minor parties have 
contested local elections and the level of success in being elected, the thesis 
then explores the spatial distribution of minor party candidates, the types of 
people that become candidates and, considering the relative lack of electoral 
success, their motivations for standing. 
Traditional studies of party systems frequently exclude parties that do not win a 
relatively large share of votes and seats or are incapable of forming part of a 
subsequent government or administration. However broader definitions of what 
constitutes a party allow that small political parties can influence policy and the 
behaviour of mainstream parties simply because they are present in an 
electoral contest. Using the concept of presence, this thesis demonstrates that 
there has been an unprecedented increase in contestation by minor parties over 
the past 10 years that has not been proportionally matched by vote share and 
electoral success. Examination of patterns of contestation reveals that the 
growth in minor party contestation is uneven across England but is not 
apparently related to the different electoral systems used by local authorities. 
Furthermore, it becomes clearer that minor party contestation appears to be 
primarily a function of temporal local factors and is not necessarily influenced by 
electoral history, thus making it difficult to predict beforehand where and when 
such parties may begin to contest local elections and the relative level of 
electoral support they might subsequently enjoy. 
Having examined at a general level the electoral nature of minor party activity 
the thesis offers a new typology, an analytical framework within which to locate 
the vahous types of minor parties that feature in modem English local 
government. Using individual level data we examine whether it is possible to 
ill 
distinguish between candidates based on their party's location within this 
typology, thus testing whether the recent increase in minor party activity is due 
to the rise of a new political class. 
Initial survey observations subsequently inform the development of a 
multinomial logistic regression model that seeks to identify similarities and 
differences between candidates standing for the range of parties cun-ently 
contesting English local elections. This modelling suggests that candidates 
from across the range of minor parties are rather similar to each other and, 
moreover, similar to candidates from major parties. There does not, therefore, 
appear to be any association between the rise in the frequency of minor party 
candidates and the existence of a new political class of candidates that are 
different to those already located within the party political mainstream. 
Consequently, the value of the typology as a heuristic for establishing a better 
understanding of minor party activity is brought into question and further 
research into the phenomenon of minor party contestation in English local 
government is recommended. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background & Context 
In the May 2007 English local government elections no fewer than 141 different 
political parties fielded candidates. Although the total aggregate vote share 
achieved by these candidates was only 7.8%, they contested 42.1% of the 
wards up for election. This was not an aberration - in 2008 minor party 
candidates contested 59.6% of the wards. More than thirty years before, shortly 
after English local government was reorganised in the early 1970s, the electoral 
landscape looked rather different (Railings et al. 2003). Then, individuals 
rejecting the party political mainstream probably stood as Independents, 
eschewing party labels in favour of a broad appeal to local voters based on their 
standing in the local community. For example, in 1973 37.3% of district wards 
that elect by thirds were contested by Independents (and only 11.5% by minor 
parties) compared to 9.7% in 2008. Effectively, therefore, the whole dynamic of 
party competition at local elections in England has been transfomied over the 
past thirty-five years. 
One possible explanation for the rather dramatic rise in minor party candidates 
could be the introduction of mandatory registration for political parties (part of 
the Local Government Act 2000). This legislation may have resulted in some 
candidates who were previously standing as an Independent being forced to 
join a formal party group. Although there is some evidence that the Act has 
contributed to the proliferation of small parties there is by no means a clear 
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cause and effect. For example, in the Metropolitan Boroughs Independents 
contest 13.8% of wards in 1999 which drops to 10.7% in 2000, but then 
increases again in 2002 to 13.4% (all percentages refer to % points). In contrast 
minor party contestation increases from 34.1% in 1999 to 45.9% in 2002. In the 
London Boroughs independent contestation actually rises by 3.1% between 
1998 and 2002 in comparison to a rise of 27.0% for minor parties. In districts 
with all-out elections Independents contestation drops from 30.7% in 1999 to 
28.7% in 2003 whilst minor parties increase their proportion of contested wards 
during this period by 10.5%. Districts that elect by thirds see a small reduction in 
Independent contestation of 0.4% between 1999 and 2002 compared to an 
increase of 11.1% for minor parties. In all these authorities the change in 
contestation levels of Independents is small compared to the increase for minor 
parties. In short, it is apparent that the respective changes in the patterns of 
party competition are more than a function simply of former Independents 
suddenly deciding to register as candidates for official parties. However, 
although levels of contestation since the 2000 Act have reached unprecedented 
levels, minor party activity was prominent previous to this with 44.6% of wards 
contested in 1990 and 36.5% in 1978. This suggests that it would be an over-
simplification to claim that the compulsory registration of political parties is 
solely responsible for the increase in minor party activity. 
Thus minor parties are currently competing more widely than ever before 
regardless, it seems, of a voting system that systematically penalises small 
parties in the translation of votes into seats. This puzzle attracts little attention 
and consequently there is little or no systematic examination of the nature of the 
growth of minor parties - where are these parties contesting, how many 
candidates are they finding to contest seats on their behalf, what success are 
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they having at the ballot box and whether there are trends developing across 
successive electoral cycles. Part of the explanation for the current lack of 
understanding of minor parties is that the research literature on parties and 
party systems has largely if not exclusively focused on parties that are capable 
of winning elections. Classic studies, such as those of Sartori (1976) and 
Downs (1957), exclude parties that are not viable partners in coalitions or are 
unable to gain enough popular support to influence policy; a political party is de 
facto defined as an organisation with the potential to form a government. 
However, not all scholars agree with such a narrow definition (for examples see 
Duverger 1972 and Janda 1993), preferring to define a party as any 
organisation that competes at elections and seeks electoral success for its 
candidates. This latter approach critiques the narrow definition of political 
parties as it excludes so many organisations they are present in the electoral 
fray. 
Using this broader definition, recent studies have argued for the relevance of 
minor parties, specifically in English local government, by developing the 
understanding that the simple presence of such groups in electoral contests 
influences the policies and actions of the major parties {Conservative, Labour 
and Liberal Democrat), The importance of presence is compounded by the 
observation that the number of minor party candidates contesting elections is 
increasing, although as noted above this has not been systematically quantified 
in the existing literature. The paucity of studies using reliable time series 
electoral data, coupled with the limited research on patterns of contestation and 
a lack of information on the individuals who stand for minor parties leaves a gap 
in our knowledge of the local electoral process and the influence of party 
competition on electoral outcomes. It is the aim of this thesis to address this gap 
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and to add substantively to the rather limited evidence currently available about 
minor parlies in English local government. 
Accordingly, the following research questions are addressed in the course of 
this research: 
• What is the nature of minor party support and contestation over time? 
• Are there general trends in minor party activity in English local 
government, pointing to the contribution made by exogenous factors, or 
rather is the pattern relatively heterogeneous, thus more a result of local 
factors? 
• Can minor parties and their candidates be distinguished apart from one 
another by using a typology, a means of classifying parties, based on 
patterns of party contestation? 
• Are candidates from minor parties different to each other and to 
candidates from major parties? 
• Can the phenomenon of minor parties be explained through electoral and 
candidate level data? 
The research findings will be of interest to a number of different groups. 
Academics interested in minor parties will, for the first time, be able to view the 
disaggregation of the 'Others' category from 'Independents' since 1973. They 
will also be able to view data on the proportion of wards contested, the vote 
share obtained and the level of electoral success, which has not been 
comprehensively presented before. It is hoped that these findings will provide a 
starting point for subsequent studies of minor parties. The analysis of whether 
minor party activity is due to exogenous or local factors, and whether presence 
is indeed increasing, will also be relevant to studies on political apathy and the 
4 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
relationship between vote share and contestation. Finally, the examination of 
the differences between minor and major party candidates will reveal whether 
minor party activity is related to the emergence of a new political class and 
whether the proposed typology is a useful tool for other scholars and their future 
research. 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
The literature review in chapter 2 discusses the body of work on small political 
parties and party systems generally. Staring with a summary of how parties 
have been defined in the past it becomes clear why traditional studies on party 
systems have excluded small and minor political parties from analysis. Using 
broader definitions of what constitutes a party, the case is made for the 
importance of minor parties in English local government due to their presence in 
electoral contests. Using the notion of presence a new typology aimed at 
increasing our understanding of minor parties is constructed and justified. 
Chapter 3 establishes the nature of minor party support and presence in English 
local government between 1973 and 2008. Unlike in previous studies. 
Independents are identified and removed from the catch-all party category of 
'others' allowing analysis of minor parties only. The analysis argues that the 
increase in minor party activity over the past 10 years Is unprecedented and is 
not proportionally related to an increase in vote share. The national trend is then 
disaggregated as differences between authority-types and electoral systems are 
explored. 
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Chapter 4 explores the differences in patterns of minor party contestation in 
three London Boroughs. The electoral histories of the authorities are compared 
in an attempt to ascertain whether minor parties build on previous success and 
use past electoral data strategically. Particular attention is paid to between and 
within authority variance to establish whether minor party presence is a function 
of authority or ward level factors. 
Having established the nature of minor party activity in English local 
government, chapter 5 tests the appropriateness of the typology constructed in 
chapter 2 through the characterisation of candidates from different typological 
groups. Using secondary individual level data from the Local Government 
Candidate Survey njn by The Elections Centre at the University of Plymouth 
and a series of bivahate tests, the hypothesis that candidates from specific 
typological groups are similar demographically and have shared experiences is 
tested. 
In chapter 6 an additional survey is conducted to address questions that were 
not asked in the Local Government Candidate Survey. Using a method of 
primary online data collection with further bivariate tests, a Follow-Up Survey 
concentrating on concepts such as policy positions and ideological position 
allows further characterisation of typological groups. Following from the work of 
other scholars (Laver and Hunt 1992, Laver and Benoit 2007) the ideological 
positions of candidates on the left-right dimension is compared with their 
responses to a series of policy statement, thus testing for ideological 
coherence. 
Chapter 7 uses the bivariate relationships established in chapters 5 and 6 to 
construct a multinomial logistic regression model that predicts party group 
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membership. A justification is given for specifying different models for the paper 
Local Government Candidate Survey and the online Follow-Up Survey. 
Adjustments to the modelling process to increase predictive capability are also 
discussed and evaluated. 
Chapter 8 concludes by restating the research aims and evaluating the success 
of the approach taken by this thesis. A summary of the findings is offered 
alongside a progressive account of how the typology was modified due to new 
findings and data constraints. Finally the contribution of this thesis to the wider 
research literature is identified. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Traditional studies of party systems tend to treat small or minor political parties 
as an inconvenience. Parties are of interest if they are involved in government 
formation and thus can influence policy and many small political parties do not 
qualify. Yet small parties do exist and continue as a feature on the political 
landscape despite their apparent lack of importance. This thesis maintains that 
minor parties are relevant, have a role to play in explaining the political dynamic 
of party systems and that locating them within a more finely nuanced 
classification system will aid understanding of this role. The purpose of this 
chapter is to identify how these parties have been treated in the past, why they 
have been neglected and how new approaches to classification might overcome 
this problem. 
Accordingly, section 2.2 considers whether small parties are relevant to political 
science. Particular attention is given to why they have been neglected in 
traditional studies into party systems. Section 2.3 reviews attempts to classify 
minor parties based on ideology and organisational structure. A new typology 
based on geographical relevance that is to be the basis for this thesis is 
presented as addressing a gap in the literature. Section 2.4 looks in more detail 
at the interaction between minor parties and locality, thus developing the 
rationale for the new typology based on geography. 
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2.2 The Relevance of Minor Parties 
Traditional studies into parties and party systems have historically marginalised 
small political parties from being considered in the mainstream political science 
literature, largely due to the contested notion of relevance (Copus et al. 2008). 
Sartori's seminal work on parties and party systems, for example, understood 
political parties to be relevant at the national level if they had sufficient coalition 
potential (Sartori 1976). Within this framework smaller political parties can be 
considered relevant if they have the option of fomning a coalition with different 
parties to achieve a majority government. In essence, small parties are only of 
interest if their bargaining potential allows them to tip the balance of 
government. Downs argued a similar case as Sartori by defining a party as "a 
team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a 
duly constituted election" (Downs 1957:25), thus parties that were not serious 
contenders for office were largely ignored. In contrast Duverger avoided using 
such a narrow definition of party and defined parties as having "their primary 
goal [in] the conquest of power or a share in its exercise" (1972:1), suggesting 
that parties can exist without winning elections, but nevertheless they must be 
office-seekers. 
Some scholars are critical of such broad definitions of political parties that aim 
to be more inclusive. Schlesinger criticised those who "want to define party to 
include all the numerous political organisations that call themselves by the 
name" and went on to claim that party theories should only be concerned with 
"parties that contest in free elections, and primahly those parties that are able to 
win elections over time" (1991:6). However, Janda (1993:165) points out that 
focusing on electoral competition excludes militant religious, ethnic, regional 
and anti-system parties that operate on the political fringe and makes reference 
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to a study by McDonald and Ruhl (1989) that identifies only a handful of more 
than 125 parties in Latin America as being important when using the electoral 
competition model. 
Pederson (1982) offers a more specific definition of a political party and 
specifies four thresholds that should be reached. Firstly, a party must declare 
that they wish to contest an election. Here, 'contest' is understood to mean 
entering the territory of the main parties' electoral space (Copus et al. 2008). 
Parties must also receive formal recognition of their political party status by a 
national body. Thirdly, there must be support for this party In the constituencies 
where it fields candidates - which Pederson acknowledges is largely a function 
of the electoral system. Finally when all these criteria have been fulfilled, the 
party in question must be able to show the ability or potential to impact on 
govemment policy decisions. 
However, Pederson's approach still excludes parties that cannot challenge the 
existing policy of the main parties. Herzog (1987) counters this by maintaining 
that small parties can have a different fomi of relevance that does not require 
direct policy impact, but could result in an indirect effect. For example, by 
standing for election a small party might influence the electoral behaviour of 
main party candidates who will need to react to a new competitor. Even if the 
small party is lacking in organisation and support, the presence of a new 
political contender can increase its relevance (Panebianco 1988, Huntington 
1968). 
Herzog (1987) also discusses how national and official recognition of a small 
party can affect the political landscape, depending on the nature of the party. 
Rochon (1985) explains this by identifying two distinct party groups: those who 
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are interested in 'traditional polities' and those who are interested in 'new 
polities'. The 'traditionally-focused' parties are challengers formed from party 
splits that directly compete with the main party from which they are a splinter. 
They do not change the political landscape as they are simply interested in 
minor differences in policy positions - they are the parties that, for Pederson 
(1982), are entering the electoral territory of their existing competitors. 
Alternatively, parties that are concerned with 'new politics' create paradigms 
that do not fit within the traditional left-right policy spectrum, thus creating new 
patterns of behaviour and a new mandate for political parties (Herzog 1987, 
Arian and Shamir 1983). Copus et al. argue that these mobillsers "represent 
more a split in an ideological location than in a party" (Copus et al. 2008: 261). 
This detachment from the traditional left-right paradigm is problematic for 
scholars such as Taylor and Laver (1973), de Swaan (1973), Dodd (1976), 
Castle and Mair (1984), Budge, Robertson and Heart (1987) and Laver and 
Schofield (1990) - all of whom explore the classification of political parties using 
the left-right dimension. Indeed, the large amount of literature that focuses on 
ideology and the fact that minor parties do not always 'fit' may partly explain 
why they have been neglected in many major studies of party systems. 
Pederson's argument for the importance of local support and electoral success 
in assessing relevance (Pederson 1982) is weakened somewhat by Herzog and 
Rochon's notion of mobilising small parties. Muir (2005) discusses how the 
Labour Party came to demonise the BNP when they started to see them as a 
potential rival, and Copus et al. (2008: 259) Identifies this as proof that small 
parties can have an effect on main party policy. Conversely, Thranhardt (1995) 
argues that by addressing the policy gaps highlighted by the presence and 
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success of far-right parties, main parties can instigate a decline in support for 
relevant small parties. Thranhardt's study suggests that the existence of small 
parties is due to a deficiency in the main parties' ability to formulate relevant 
policy. This supports Herzog's point that small parties are vehicles for widening 
political debate (Herzog 1987), and that this in itself is a form of relevance. 
The idea that small parties are the product of unsatisfactory behaviour from the 
main parties has been addressed by other scholars. Copus et al. argue that "the 
gradual disconnection of the citizen from the major parties acts as a spur to 
small party and non-party activity, as well as growth (see Wolinetz 1990. 
Flanagan and Dalton 1990)" (quoted and cited in Copus et al. 2008: 254). In 
addition to this. Lawson and Merkl (1988) attribute the proliferation of 
'alternative organisations' to main party convergence in the centre of the policy 
spectrum, whilst Katz and Mair (1995) claim that a preoccupation with 
governing results in the main parties being "removed from the concerns of civil 
society" (Copus et al. 2008: 259). This links to Thranhardt's idea that main 
parties can undercut small party support by 'stealing' the offending policy 
positions. 
Clearly, there has been a significant response to the traditional concept of 
relevance as formulated by Sartori, Downs and Pederson. Much of this 
response focuses not on electoral success and bargaining power in government 
but on the reaction to small parties - whether by existing parties or existing 
ideological boundaries. Small parties are relevant because they address the 
policy deficiencies of main parties and open up political debate beyond the 
archaic left-right spectrum. It is this notion of relevance that makes small parties 
worth studying. 
12 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.3 Classifying Minor Parties 
Minor parties have remained largely unclassified by the literature either because 
they are deemed unimportant eiectorally or they do not appear to fit within 
traditional frameworks such as the left-right dimension. However, Smith (1991) 
argues that it is possible to classify small parties using the left-right policy 
spectrum as a reference point. The first category is the detached party which 
does not operate on the traditional left-right axis. In effect, these are Rochon's 
mobilisers that were identified by Herzog as wideners of political debate 
(Rochon 1985, Herzog 1987). They are defined as existing outside of the 
traditional policy ground of the main parties. The second group are the marginal 
parties that operate at the far left and far right of the political spectrum. These 
might well take the form of splinter groups, which Rochon identified as 
challengers to existing mainstream parties (Rochon 1985). The final category 
Smith identified is the hinge parties that hold the centre ground on the left-right 
spectrum. It is the hinge parties that Sartori and Pederson would have 
considered relevant as they have the maximum potential to form coalitions and 
to negotiate with other potential coalition partners (Sarton 1976, Pederson 
1982). 
However, Copus et al. are critical of Smith's taxonomy in understanding political 
parties. They argue that such classifications do not adequately account for the 
role of parties such as the Greens, the BNP, Respect and UKIP. These parties 
are nationally organised and cut across the cleavages advocated by Smith, and 
thus there is still a need to generate "a framework to assess and explore the 
contribution to local politics of different types of organisations... which allows us 
to understand the significance of local conditions and issues as motivators to 
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the development of local alternatives to the main parties" (Copus et al. 2008: 
261). 
Because of the issues associated with Smith's 'top-down' taxonomy, Copus et 
al. {2008} make the case for a *bottom-up' approach that builds a typology 
based on the political organisations that enter the electoral fray. In essent^ the 
focus has been shifted from classification based on ideology and policy to 
classification based on the small parties themselves as operational units. This 
approach leads to the identification of three groups of parties: branch parties, 
local parties and political associatior}s. 
Branch parties are the local party organisations of the small national political 
parties such as the Greens, BNP, UKIP and Respect (Copus 2008; 261). To be 
relevant locally, branch parties must periodically become active when a 
particular issue or policy becomes salient. They only truly define themselves 
when they react to this issue as it provides a platform on which they can fight 
(see Copus 2004). Traditional theories of party relevance (Sartori 1976, 
Pederson 1982) would be quick to dismiss branch parties as they are seldom in 
a position to join coalitions or practice bargaining power (see Muir 2005 for an 
account of how such 'pariah' parties are marginalised despite representation). 
However Copus et al. point out that what these parties can achieve is the status 
of 'local opinion former', and if they are successful then the main parties have to 
respond: 
"... [small parties] galvanise popular discontent with the ruling political 
elite in such a way, or to such an extent, that the galvanising party 
cannot be Ignored." 
Copus etal. 2008:261 
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The reaction by the main parties vi/ho are forced to recognise the presence of 
small parties can cause incumbent political institutions to reconsider both their 
policies and electoral strategies, often resulting in a disproportionate response 
to what would normally be considered a minimal threat: 
"Two things occur when such pariah parties, as the BNP, announce 
their presence: the main parties react disproportionately to the 
perceived threat; and, the small party (pariah or otherwise) cause 
introspective policy reassessment by the main parties, seeking to 
address the issues raised, and to assure voters that their concerns 
are recognised, that they need not support the small party." 
Copus et al. 2008: 262 
Therefore relevance is not about seats or even about votes, but about 
engagement with the public and whether the small party can capitalise on the 
policy deficiencies of the incumbent main parties. It has even been suggested 
that relevance Is not an appropriate criterion to measure small parties against, 
rather that it is "a fluctuating part of the party life-cycle" (Copus et al. 2008: 262). 
This is in marked contrast to Pederson's view that relevance must be a constant 
facet in small parties (Pederson 1982). 
The next category is local parties. Such parties are specific to particular locales 
and this is often evident in their names e.g. Kidderminster Health Concern, 
Better Bedford Party and the One London Party. Local parties do not always 
operate on the traditional left-right axis, opting instead for a wide ranging 
manifesto with a broad based local agenda (Copus et al. 2008: 262). These 
groups can play the local card' very effectively as they tend to arise purely out 
of contentious local issues, and in this sense they are opportunistic in nature 
(Berry 2008: 142). 
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Local parties are very closely linked to the final group - political associations. 
Both of these classifications play the role of bridging the gap between local civil 
society and party politics (Copus 2008: 262), and they both may concern 
themselves with local issues. The key difference is that political associations are 
decidedly non-partisan and reject traditional notions of party politics: 
"... political associations will often make appeals to good government, 
open decision-making, and the general well-being - factors which 
they see as being anti-political, or more accurately, anti-party 
political." 
Copus et al. 2008: 263 
In this sense political associations are paradoxical. On the one hand they reject 
the notion of party politics and partisanship, but at the same time they take the 
form of residents or tenants associations and compete for office. This apparent 
contradiction stems from the fact that the origin of such groups exists outside of 
the party-political world. Common local interests will have formed in 
neighbourhoods and towns, but for these interests to be recognised it is 
necessary for the group to formalise themselves into a format that is compatible 
with the existing political system. Political associations presumably see this 
process as begrudgingly necessary, but once their goaf is complete they might 
well exit the political sphere and return to their original local apolitical roots 
{Copus etal. 2008:263). 
Game welcomes this typology as a valid contribution to "a topic that is widely 
acknowledged as being of increasing significance and yet about which we still 
have little authoritative knowledge or serious understanding" {Game 2007: 3). 
However, whilst the 'bottom-up' approach that has been taken has much to add 
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from an empirical perspective, there are several concerns that need to be 
addressed. 
Firstly, it is questionable whether such small groups can even be classified as a 
'party'. Duverger's comparatively broad definition of a group whose goal is the 
"cxinquest of power or a share in its exercise" (1972:1) does not apply to political 
associations who are not interested in power but in a specific cause or policy. 
Rochon's concept of 'traditional' and 'new' politics (1985) is difficult to reconcile 
with single issue groups. Indeed, the single issue nature of some minor parties 
is problematic in the sense that it does not necessarily offer a reference point to 
which the party can be related to the left-right policy spectrum (advocated by 
Pederson 1982). It is therefore necessary to use a definition of 'party' that is 
indeed very broad when discussing minor parties, and many scholars would 
dispute the value and rigour of this eclectic approach (Schlesinger 1991). 
Another problem with this typology becomes apparent when trying to classify 
local parties using this typology. Without detailed knowledge of any given local 
political organisation, how can we distinguish between local parties and political 
associations! It is possible to access information from the Electoral Commission 
(the body responsible for responsible for supervising and implementing the 
regulatory framework for elections in the United Kingdom -
WAVw.electoralcommission.orq.uk) that lists all the registered parties in England, 
but the database is limited and minimally helpful for research purposes (Game 
2007: 4), and although Copus et al. maintain that political associations will reject 
using the term 'party', it is possible that there are local parties that choose not to 
use the term as well. 
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There is also a question over to what extent this typology increases our 
understanding of small parties. Classification seems to be on the basis of 
attitudes towards party politics or associations with national parties, but we 
would expect considerable variance between attitudes, approaches and 
stnjctures within any of the three categories advocated. Berry (2008) refers to 
the sheer variety of backgrounds from which small parties arise, and highlights 
the problem of classifying parties based on their background, history and policy 
aims. 
It seems that both Smith's ideology based classification (Smith 1991) and the 
alternative motive and structural classification (Copus et al. 2008) have 
weaknesses. However there is another approach to classification that has been 
discussed implicitly throughout the literature. Many of the studies arguing for 
alternative definitions to relevance with reference to small parties have identified 
the importance of presence (see Herzog 1987, Muir 2005). Simply by competing 
in an election a small party can cause disproportionate reactions from the 
established main parties or widen the political debate (Copus et al. 2008), thus 
the presence of a party in a given electoral contest is the key determinant of 
relevance. A logical step would be to look at where a given small party is 
present (i.e. contesting an election) and derive a new typology from this. 
For example, small national parties such as Respect, BNP, UKIP and Greens 
contest across England. They are present in electoral contests that span 
authorities, and the cleavages on which they operate are not limited to particular 
geographical areas. These nationally present small parties are very different to 
parties such as ratepayers groups which contest within local authorities. Such 
local parties aim to influence council-level decisions for policies that affect the 
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whole area, thus candidates are locally present throughout the areas that the 
local authority administers. Scaling down again to a lower level still there are the 
ultra-localist parties such as neighbourhood associations. These very small 
political parties are only interested in influencing policy that directly affects the 
area in which they operate, thus candidates will only be present at individual 
ward level. The interests of ultra-localist parties do not spill into the local 
authority as a whole, as with the standard local parties. Table 2.1 describes a 
potential typology based on this reasoning. 
Table 2.1 - Classifying minor parties based on geographical presence 
Type of Party: 
Small National 
Parties 
Local (Micro) 
Parties 
Ultra-Local (Nano) 
Parties 
Example: 
BNP, UKIP, Greens, 
Respect 
Ratepayers 
Associations 
Neighbourhood 
Associations 
Level of Presence: 
National {Small) 
Local Authority 
(Micro) 
Street, 
Neighbourhood, 
Ward {Nano) 
Policy Remit: 
Cleavages not 
specific to 
geographical areas 
Authority wide 
issues specific to 
geographical area 
Neighbourhood 
wide issues (e.g. 
local park land) 
In this definition a 'party' is not defined by its ideological position or desire for 
power but by the very fact that it has registered as a party with the Electoral 
Commission. As this is a legal requirement, any group competing for election 
without registering is classified as an Independent. This approach is rather 
prosaic, but it avoids the subjective judgement of the researcher over the 
interpretation of a definition of party and whilst it is broad, the very act of 
registering a party can be read as an indication and intention to contest an 
election - the first of the thresholds defined by Pederson (1982). Registration 
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also requires key members of the party to be assigned official roles (a party 
leader, nominating officer and treasurer), thus it enforces the creation of an 
organisation designed to interact with the existing party political world. This 
'formalisation process' is common to all parties and thus remains constant 
across all groups in this new typology. 
Through this simplification, all that is required to apply this typology is to know 
where political parlies are present, etectoratly speaking. Fig. 2.1 explains this in 
more detail. Towards the bottom of the diagram are parties only contesting a 
single ward in a single authority - these are ultra-localist parties, typified by 
issues concerning small geographical areas. Because of the localised nature of 
these parties' policy remit, they do not contest other wards in the authority and 
certainly not wards in different authorities. The iocal party can be seen 
occupying the wards 1 and 2 in Authority A. These parties are concerned with 
addressing authonty-wide issues and are therefore not limited to a single ward 
but a single authority. Finally the aforementioned small national parties can be 
seen occupying a single ward in all four authorities. These parties are organised 
nationally and their policies are not exclusively local - the number of wards they 
contest is somewhat irrelevant as long as they are present in more than one 
local authority. 
The advantage of this typology is that it avoids the danger of inaccuracy in 
applying a more empirical typological framework that must take into account the 
complex history and organisational structure of individual small parties (Berry 
2008), thus it maintains a degree of objectivity akin to Pederson's approach 
(Pederson 1982) whilst taking into account country-specific factors (Smith 
1991). It also offers different conceptual approaches, or thresholds, at each 
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geographical level (as suggested by Deschouwer 1991). The hypothesis that 
there are actual, measurable differences between these three subgroups of 
minor parties and the major parties is tested in chapters 5, 6 and 7 after first 
quantifying and describing minor party contestation in chapters 3 and 4. 
Fig. 2.1 - Diagrammatic classification of minor parties based on geographical 
presence 
lOCAL (MICRO) PARTIES' 
' / 
\ e.g. Ratepayers , 
Authority A 
Ward 3 ..a.d4 
Wardl Ward 2 
Authority C 
Ward 3 
^ iMALL NATIONAL PART)E^\ 
e.g. ewP, VK\P. Greens ' 
Ward 4 
Ward 1 Ward 2 
Authority B^br^— 
Wards -' ULTRA LOCAL "^  
(NANO) PARTIES 
\ e.g. Neighbourhood J 
^ ^ Associations^ * 
Ward 1 Ward 2 
Authority D 
Wards Ward 4 
2.4 Minor Parties at the Local Level 
Small parties are much more numerous and successful at the local government 
level than at national parliamentary level and there are several reasons for this. 
Railings and Thrasher {1997, 2004) point out that the three main political parties 
in England (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) are dominant at both 
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the local and national government levels. However, an increasing number of 
smaller political parties are contesting elections and whilst at parliamentary level 
this only amounts to an increase in votes, at the local level this is more likely to 
lead to an increase in votes and seats. Although the first-past-the-post electoral 
system functionally favours larger parties and creates a barrier against small 
party representation (Railings, Thrasher and Denver 2005), small parties can 
capitalise on their ability to address local issues and focus protest votes to 
overcome this institutional hurdle. 
Copus et al. explain why local government provides a more fertile environment 
for small parties: 
"Small parties in local politics provide new channels of citizen 
engagement, political activism, participation, and new avenues for 
political accountability. Moreover, they fill a gap in local political 
representation, as mainstream parties increasingly fail to reflect the 
diverse range of views and interests that make up the local political 
dynamic." 
(Copus et al. 2008: 254} 
The idea that small parties can address the policy deficiencies of the 
mainstream parties is not new (see above Thranhardt 1995, Wolinetz 1990. 
Flanagan and Dalton 1990, Lawson and MerkI 1988), but what is interesting is 
Copus' focus on the ability of small parties to represent the specific needs of 
geographic areas. Grant (1971) developed this point by identifying the 
proliferation of local parties as a symptom of the major parties failure to react 
sufficiently to local issues. 
Within the wider literature on political parties this 'localist' aspect has largely 
been ignored. A majority of the studies carried on parties have been conducted 
at the national level, an arena in which small parties are marginalised due to 
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their low national vote share (Muller-Rommel and Pridham 1991). Also, Copus 
points out that typical vote-share definitions at the national level underestimate 
the impact that small parties have in specific geographic areas (Copus et al. 
2008:261). 
The problem is one of aggregation. Small parties do not enjoy constant support 
across England - they have a tendency to be prevalent in some areas, but not in 
others (see Railings and Thrasher 2003 for a discussion). The problem of only 
dealing with small parties at the national level was addressed by Deschouwer 
who suggested that size (as in 'small' parties) is relative to each country, and 
that different methodological approaches should be considered for studying 
such parties at the national and local levels (Deschouwer 1991). 
Research into small parties has also tended to take the form of case studies on 
particular organisations (see Renton 2003 for parties on the far-right, Griffiths 
2004 for a study on the Greens). However, as Copus et al. point out, whilst 
these insights are valuable and enrich our understanding they do not provide a 
wider "conceptual framework through which the organisation, activity, and the 
impact of small political organisations can be understood" (Copus et al. 2008: 
261). 
Therefore, rather than studying small parties individually, there is clearly a need 
to think more widely about how a rigorous study inclusive of all small parties 
coutd be conducted, Muller-Rommel and Pridham (1991) advocate that such an 
approach should take into account the operational environment of small parties 
and the local context within which they operate. Berry (2008) argues that local 
political parties, and indeed independent candidates, can benefit from local 
context' at the expense of the major parties explaining that: 
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"...they do not belong to an overarching organisation that see/fs to 
represent a targe number of different areas: therefore they can be 
solely concerned with issues within their own area." 
(Berry 2008: 133) 
Berry also suggests that by not being subject to a party whip, non-aligned 
politicians "appear more intuitively in line with our fundamental principles of 
representative democracy, and therefore have some claim to the moral high 
ground" (Berry 2008; 134). Although Berry considers non-aligned politicians to 
primarily refer to independents, the study by Copus et al. (2008) shows that 
small local parties may also be considered as non-aligned if they are not 'branch 
parties' of larger national organisations (such as local Conservative and Labour 
parties). 
However, little is known about small parties precisely because of their local 
nature. The fact that they are relative to particular geographical spaces (local 
authorities, neighbourhoods and even individual streets) makes them difficult to 
observe. Some researchers have dealt with this problem by conducting in-depth 
case studies of single authorities, or comparisons between a handful (see Birch 
1959, Jones 1969, Hampton 1970, Glassberg 1981). Despite these differing 
approaches, the focus of the studies themselves is "overwhelmingly [based on] 
the three major parties (see Newton 1976, Green 1981)" with "minor pari:ies, or 
Independents, by contrast... largely ignored (see Lee 1963, Bealey et al. 1965)" 
(quoted from and cited in Copus et al. 2008: 257). 
Part of the reason for this lack of research into small parties is not solely down 
to a lack of interest in the topic, but rather an inability to study it as the data 
widely available on the fortunes of parties other than the Conservatives, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats does not adequately account for small parties. The 
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convention for published election results in England at the local government 
level is to include information on the three main parties and an 'other' category 
(Railings and Thrasher 1997, 2003). This 'other' grouping is an aggregate of all 
data relating to small parties and independent candidates - what Game refers to 
as "the ubiquitous 10%" (Game 2007). 
The justification for this is rational. 141 parties stood in the May 2007 local 
government elections (The Elections Centre Database 2008), and to present 
data on all of these parties individually is both unfeasible and of little interest to a 
majority of spectators. Recent high profile wins on the far-right have resulted in 
new research into specific parties such as UKIP and the BNP (see Renton 
2003), and the increasing salience of environmental issues has caused more 
concentration on the Greens (see Griffiths 2004), but smaller parties have been 
marginalised. 
However, it is the small national parties that have warranted attention in recent 
years precisely because they react to the cross-cutting salient cleavages and 
become bastions of 'public opinion' and 'galvanises' of public support (Copus et 
al. 2008: 261). The disproportionate reaction of the main parties to these smalt 
national groups as threats has undoubtedly had a hand in raising their 
previously low-key profiles. In contrast, the local and ultra-localist parties are too 
geographically contained and by definition are only interested in policy formation 
within a relatively small geographical area. Local politics is rarely an issue of 
national interest as the candidates that stand often have no motive other than 
the "sole ambition [of] the betterment of the area they live in" (Ben^ 2008: 112). 
Yet in spite of being largely overlooked, these local parties stand and contest 
elections - in some cases they are even successful. Game's "ubiquitous 10%" 
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{Game 2007) suggests that there is electoral support for such groups, perhaps 
not too surprising when we consider that a total of 139 small parties contested 
the May 2007 local elections. 
Our contention is that the lack of any comprehensive study of these small 
parties at the local level potentially exposes a deficiency in the existing research 
literature. In response, the aim of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of 
small political parties in England using quantitative data to describe the 
phenomena and to test the appropriateness of classifying minor parties 
geographically. The data and observations generated during this process will 
result in new and original contributions to the existing research literature. 
2.5 Discussion 
A review of the research literature reveals that minor parties have largely been 
neglected from eariy studies of party systems. More recent attempts to study 
these groups have addressed this lack through empirical case-study 
approaches, but whilst these accounts are enlightening, they are relative to both 
the obsen/er and the party being studied leading to a lack of objectivity and 
generalisability. For example, typologies based on ideology and organisational 
structure are advocated, but substantial knowledge of every small party is 
required to apply these classifications. 
The typology advocated in this thesis Is therefore unique. It can be applied 
based on a single factor derived from where parties contest elections and 
requires no in-depth knowledge of organisational structure or policy stances. It is 
also universally and objectively applicable because typological group 
membership is a clear function of a pattern of electoral contestation - there are 
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no relative judgements from the researcher. However, for the typology to be of 
any use there must be commonalities within the hypothesised groups. 
Candidates from local (micro) parties should share characteristics that are less 
frequently observed among, for example, small national party candidates. If 
group membership can be characterised then the concept of geographical 
relevance and the typology itself does add to our understanding or minor 
parties. The objective of this thesis is to investigate these differences and 
similanties and thus accept or reject this new method of classification for minor 
parties. However the first task is to describe the recent increase in contestation 
of minor parties to quantify the related observations made in the recent literature 
and this is dealt with in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Minor Party Contestation in English Local 
Government 
3.1 Introduction 
Minor parties in English local government have largely been neglected by the 
research literature because of their lack of electoral success. The three main 
political parties (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats) are dominant at 
the national and local level (Railings and Thrasher 1997, 2004) and the first-
past-the-post electoral system disadvantages small parties (Railings, Thrasher 
and Denver 2005). This results in a lack of electoral success for minor parties 
nationally but as Copus et al. (2008:261) point out, this underestimates the 
effect that small parties have in specific geographical areas. Minor parties are 
relevant because of the effect that they have on local areas and the reaction 
they may illicit from the major parties (see section 2.3 for further discussion), 
thus the conceptual approach toward studying them must take this into account 
(Deschouwer 1991). 
The idea of measuring minor parties by their presence rather than electoral 
success is not new (for examples see Herzog 1987, Muir 2005), but the 
research literature has not yet approached the problem quantitatively due to 
problems with data availability. Thus the purpose of this chapter is to 
disaggregate minor party activity from the electoral statistics to establish 
patterns of electoral contestation for the first time. Using the notion of presence 
rather than electoral success (see section 2.3), the following analysis examines 
the proportion of wards contested by minor parties from 1973 and 2008. 1973 
has been chosen as a starting point as this was the first year of elections after 
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the reorganisation of local government enacted by the Local Government Act 
1972, which saw the introduction of the new counties and districts. Historical 
trends are discussed and the unprecedented increase in the presence of minor 
parties since the late 1990s illustrates why the phenomena is becoming more 
salient and why it should be the subject of further study. 
Accordingly, section 3.2 identifies the data source and procedure for extracting 
information on minor party contestation. Section 3.3 compares minor party 
success in England in terms of vote share against minor party presence and 
discusses why minor parties have traditionally been seen as unimportant 
electorally. Section 3.4 tests for the effect of the electoral cycle in determining 
patterns of minor party contestation by dividing the dataset into local authority 
types - London Boroughs (section 3.4.1), Metropolitan Boroughs (section 
3.4.2), Districts (section 3.4.3), Shire Counties (section 3.4.4) and Unitary 
Authorities (section 3.4.5). A summary of the findings relating to the relationship 
between minor parties and electoral cycles is given in section 3.4.6. Section 3.5 
investigates the homogeneity of authority groupings by comparing the 
aggregate trend with patterns of minor party contestation in individual 
authorities. Section 3.5.1 discusses the methodology behind the analysis whilst 
each authority group is dealt with separately (London Boroughs in section 3.5.2, 
Metropolitan Boroughs in 3.5.3, Districts in 3.5.4, Shire Counties in 3.5.5 and 
Unitary Authorities in 3.5.6). A summary of the findings and a rationale for the 
subsequent focus of analysis is given in section 3.5.7. 
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3.2 Data 
The source for all electoral data in this thesis is The Elections Centre Database 
at the University of Plymouth. The aim of the Centre is to provide a 
"comprehensive record of local elections in Britain" (Railings and Thrasher 
2003:vi), and since the local government reorganisation In 1973 the details and 
results of every local electoral contest has been recorded and archived. The 
database holds the details of every candidate that contests an election, 
including their name, party affiliation and vote share which results in 144,833 
individual candidate records between 1973 and 2008. This includes seats that 
are unopposed (i.e. the number of candidates is equal to the number of seat). 
To measure the proportion of wards contested by minor parties a binary 
variable is created (labelled 'PRESENCE') which indicates whether a candidate 
was present in each individual ward from any party other than the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. Typically Independent candidates have 
been included in this 'Other' category (for example, see Railings and Thrasher 
2003), but for this analysis they have been removed. The ability to disaggregate 
minor parties and Independents from 'others' is a weal<ness in the current 
literature that this thesis addresses. By-elections were removed from the 
dataset since these occur at irregular intervals and might skew the findings. 
Once the variable 'PRESENCE' is computed it is possible to calculate the 
proportion of wards contested over time by dividing the number of wards where 
'PRESENCE' equals 1 by the total number of wards up for election each year. It 
is Important to note that this method will not reveal how many minor party 
candidates were contesting elections as the computation process will treat 
wards with any number of minor party candidates the same. Neither will it make 
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any adjustments for multimember wards (which are discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter), however it will offer an indication of how widespread minor 
party presence is in English local government. 
3.3 Success & Presence 
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the relationship between minor party vote share and the 
proportion of wards contested by minor parties in England between 1973 and 
2008 (General Election years are indicated by dotted lines). Minor party vote 
share has been calculated by aggregating the proportion of votes received by 
minor parties in each ward contest In each year across England. Vote share has 
been changeable since 1973 with minor parties performing their best in 2006 
with 10.0% and their worst in 1985 with 1.2%. There is a discemable trend from 
the late 1990's onwards that suggests an increase in popular support, although 
it is interesting to note that this support notably drops in 2005 (a general 
election year). However, apart from in 2005 there is no clear relationship 
between minor party vote share and General Election years. 
In contrast, the proportion of wards contested by minor parties is highly volatile 
ranging from 10.4% in 1983 to 59.6% in 2008. It appears to bear no relationship 
to vote share other than that there is an overall rise in minor party contestation 
from the late 1990's onwards. The peaks and troughs are not explained when 
controlling for General Elections, although there is a slight tendency for the 
proportion of wards contested to drop in these years (exceptions to this are in 
1974 and 1992), thus the reason for this variance must lie elsewhere. One 
possible explanation could be contextual factors, for example the 1990 dramatic 
increase in minor party contestation rates to 44.6% might be a reaction to the 
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introduction of the Poll Tax by the incumbent Conservative government. This 
would suggest that the pattern of party contestation in local government is 
influenced by national, exogenous, factors. An additional explanation could be 
that the local government electoral cycle has an effect on minor party 
contestation rates. Fig. 3.2 plots the same data as fig. 3.1 but the dotted lines 
identify years in which all-out district elections occurred. There is a clear drop in 
minor party contestation rates when these elections occur that suggests that 
this trend is not nationally homogenous but to some extent dependent on local 
authority types and electoral systems. 
Fig. 3.1 - Comparing Minor Party Vote Share with Contestation Rates at the 
Ward Level (General Election Years Indicated): 
Proportion of Wards Contested and Vote Share of Minor Parties 1973-2008 
(General Elections Indicated): 
-1D0 0 
S S S S I S 
Year of Etoctkm: 
Source: Elections Centra Databese 2008 
Looking at fig.3.1 and fig. 3.2 it is clear why minor parties have been viewed as 
electorally unimportant with regards to vote share, but if the concept of 
presence is introduced then it becomes obvious that minor parties affect the 
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local political dynamic in a large number of wards. If major parties react to these 
contenders (as Herzog 1987 advocates) then minor parties potentially 
influenced electoral contests in 59.6% of wards in the 2008 local elections 
alone, thus justifying their importance for further study. What Is not clear is why 
the proportion of wards contested is so variable - are patterns of contestation a 
function of contextual factors or reactions to the local electoral system? English 
local authorities come in several forms (London Boroughs, Metropolitan 
Boroughs etc.) with different organisational structures and different electoral 
arrangements (see Railings and Thrasher 1997 for a comprehensive review). 
As they provide different operating environments and different rules for parties, 
these differences may be responsible for much of the variance in contestation 
rates. 
Fig. 3.2 - Comparing Minor Party Vote Share with Contestation Rates at the 
Ward Level (District All-Out Election Years Indicated): 
Proportion of Wards Contested and Vote Share of Minor Parties 1973-2008 
(District All-Out Elections Indicated): 
Year of Election: 
Source: Elections CenliB Dslabsse 2006 
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To lest this, patterns of minor party contestation will be divided by local authority 
type to observe whether the variation is constant (thus the result of contextual 
factors) or variable (thus the result of the electoral system and possibly 
contextual factors). 
3.4 Local Authority Comparisons 
3.4.1 London Boroughs 
Table 3.1 compares the proportion of wards contested and vote share of minor 
parties in the London Boroughs and nationally. The 32 London Boroughs have 
full council elections every four years with between two and three seats 
available in each ward - the few single member wards were abolished by the 
2002 electoral review. The number of wards has varied between 1973 and 2008 
with a rise from 660 in 1974 to 754 in 1978 and 757 in 1982. The number 
increased again to 759 in 1994 but dropped markedly in 2002 to 624. Looking at 
the trend for minor party contestation it appears that the reduction in the number 
of wards in 2002 does correspond with a sudden increase in minor party 
activity. However, historically London has seen several large changes in the 
nature of minor party contestation which questions the relationship between the 
number of wards and electoral participation. 
Compared to the aggregate data for the whole of England the London Boroughs 
have much higher levels of minor party contestation which are disproportionate 
to the increase in minor party vote share (5.22% in 1998, 9.59% In 2002 and 
13.67% in 2006). Considering that the London Borough data is part of this 
aggregate dataset, this suggests that other authority types are responsible for 
skewing the data. There is also a significant difference between minor parly 
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vote share at the national level and in the London Boroughs in 2002 and 2006, 
indicating that the higher levels of minor party contestation may be related to 
electoral success, or vica-versa. Section 2.4 discusses how the first-past-the-
post electoral system disadvantages small parties (Railings, Thrasher and 
Denver 2005), so the more proportional method of seat allocation in London 
(achieved through increasing the district magnitude - see Taagapera and 
Shugart 1989) could be expected to be more favorable to minor parties. This 
might explain why all minor party vote shares since 1974 exceed the national 
average, however the gap widens from 2002 onwards suggesting the influence 
of some additional contextual factor. 
Table 3.1 - Comparing Minor Party Presence and Support in the London 
Boroughs and Nationally: 
Proportion of Wards ,, ^ ,,. 
^_ ^ ^ , Vote Share 
Contested London ., .^ „ London ., .^ ,, 
D . Nationally „ u Nationally 
Boroughs ' Boroughs ' 
Year 1974 
1978 
1982 
1986 
1990 
1994 
1998 
2002 
2006 
33.9 
54.8 
29.2 
30.9 
61.3 
34.3 
40.3 
67.3 
73.1 
33.9 
36.5 
16.5 
17.9 
44.6 
24.4 
27.9 
37.9 
56.0 
4,0 
4.9 
2.2 
2.7 
8.7 
4.0 
5.2 
9.6 
13.7 
4.0 
4.0 
1.8 
1.9 
5.4 
2.6 
3.7 
5.1 
10.0 
3.4.2 Metropolitan Boroughs 
Table 3.2 compares the proportion of wards contested and vote share of minor 
parties in the Metropolitan Boroughs and nationally. There are 36 Metropolitan 
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Boroughs all with three-member wards; however unlike the London Boroughs 
councilors are elected by thirds, meaning a single councilor is elected to a ward 
each year (by elections excepted) rather than all three seats being allocated in 
the same election. This operates on a four year cycle with one year remaining 
'fallow' in which a county election generally takes place. 
Therefore the elections are more frequent than in London, but the system is 
less proportional as the district magnitude equals 1 (Taagapera and Shugart 
1989), and these lower levels of proportionality might explain why the proportion 
of wards contested in the Metropolitan Boroughs is generally lower than in the 
London Boroughs, with vote share also remaining lower from 1982 onwards. 
Another possibility could be that more frequent elections result in more 
contests, and minor parties may not have the resources consistently to fight 
these battles for every three out of four years. The method of analysis may also 
underestimate the presence of minor parties in comparison to London. Only a 
single minor party candidate needs to compete in a ward in the London 
Boroughs (despite there being two or three seats available) to be reported in 
this analysis. In the Metropolitan Boroughs a minor party candidate may stand 
for election in a ward for only one of the three possible years in an electoral 
cycle. In both the London Boroughs and the Metropolitan Boroughs the number 
of minor party candidates in the ward is one over a four year period. 
Despite the problems inherent in the comparison, minor party contestation is 
generally higher than the national average although similar trends are reflected 
- such as the drop between 1978-1984 and the peak in 1990 (previously seen 
in the London Boroughs) although General Elections appear to have little 
impact (1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992), suggesting that there is some evidence of 
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exogeneity. The recent increase in minor party contestation shown in the 
aggregate data begins in the Metropolitan Boroughs in 1999 when the 
proportion of wards contested more than doubled from 34.1% to 77.2% in 2008. 
Table 3.2 - Comparing Minor Party Presence and Support in the Metropolitan 
Boroughs and Nationally: 
Proportion of Wards 
Contested Vote Share 
Metropolitan 
Boroughs Nationally 
Metropolitan 
Boroughs Nationally 
Year 1973 
1975 
1976 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2006 
2007 
2008 
32.4 
33.9 
36.4 
37,5 
29.6 
28.0 
18,6 
16.1 
12.0 
18.3 
19.8 
32.5 
46.3 
38.3 
39.9 
30.8 
31.8 
30.7 
35.1 
34.1 
37.5 
45.9 
52.5 
59.9 
62.9 
78.4 
77.2 
11.4 
33.9 
14.6 
36.5 
12.8 
18.2 
16.5 
10.4 
11.6 
17.9 
11.6 
26.4 
44.6 
21.7 
27.3 
24.4 
16.3 
20.4 
27.9 
13.2 
23.8 
37.9 
26.6 
45.8 
56.0 
42.1 
59,6 
4.7 
6.3 
6.2 
4.4 
4.3 
4.0 
1.9 
1.6 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
2.6 
4.1 
3.7 
3.6 
2.8 
2.9 
3.2 
4.1 
3.2 
4.0 
5.0 
7.3 
10.8 
12.0 
13.5 
13.0 
2.4 
6.3 
3.7 
4.0 
3.0 
3.2 
1.8 
2.1 
1.5 
1.9 
2.0 
2.9 
5.4 
3.3 
2.6 
2.6 
2.4 
2.1 
3.2 
1.8 
3.2 
5.1 
4.4 
8.6 
10.0 
7.8 
9.8 
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3.4.3 Districts 
A comparison between the proportion of wards contested and vote share of 
minor parties in the districts and nationally is offered in Table 3.3. There are two 
types of district councils - those that elect by whole council every four years {as 
in the London Boroughs) and those the elect by thirds on a four year cycle (like 
the Metropolitan Boroughs). Comparing vote share, there is very little difference 
between the two types of district authority and the national picture other than a 
slight tendency for districts that elect by thirds to have higher values from 1999 
onwards. 
However, there are significant differences in patterns of minor party 
contestation. In every year in which elections coincide in both authority types, 
the districts that elect by thirds show a higher proportion of wards contested by 
minor parties. Previous discussion of the Metropolitan Boroughs (which also 
elect by thirds) hypothesised that frequent elections may discourage minor 
parties from contesting whilst all out elections, such as those in London, may be 
more amenable to minor party candidates standing. This relationship with the 
electoral system is the converse of what is happening in the districts, where 
minor parties contest a higher proportion of wards in authorities that elect by 
thirds than those the elect by whole council. The fact that similar electoral 
systems across different authorities result in different patterns of minor party 
contestation questions the importance of the electoral system in understanding 
minor party activity. 
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Table 3.3-
Nationally: 
Year 1973 
1976 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Comparing Minor Party Presence 
Proportion 
Districts 
{Elect by 
Thirds) 
11.5 
12.6 
14.6 
11.4 
13.4 
9.7 
10.9 
11.4 
12.6 
12.3 
23.6 
35.9 
25.6 
20.8 
16.8 
15.5 
13.0 
15.9 
12.4 
18.4 
23.5 
30.4 
36.6 
42.3 
50.3 
51.8 
of Wards Contested 
Districts 
Elect All 
Dut) 
7.9 
11.5 
10.4 
9.1 
3.9 
17.3 
13.6 
7.5 
18.0 
28.0 
and Support in the Districts and 
Districts 
Nationally (Elect by 
Thirds) 
11.4 
14.6 
36.5 
12.8 
18.2 
16.5 
10.4 
11.6 
17.9 
11.6 
26.4 
44.6 
21.7 
27.3 
24.4 
16.3 
20.4 
27.9 
13.2 
23.8 
37.9 
26.6 
45.8 
56.0 
42.1 
59.6 
2.9 
3.5 
2.7 
2.7 
2.8 
1.7 
2.1 
1.7 
1.8 
1.5 
3.0 
4.5 
2.9 
2.2 
1.8 
1.7 
1.9 
2.6 
1.9 
3.15 
3.8 
4.6 
7.1 
7.4 
8.6 
8.5 
Vote Share 
Districts 
(Elect All 
Out) 
2.2 
3.4 
_ 
3.0 
2.3 
2.3 
3.4 
2.5 
1.4 
3.7 
6.0 
Nationally 
2.4 
3.7 
4.0 
3.0 
3.2 
1.8 
2.1 
1.5 
1.9 
2.0 
2. 9 
5.4 
3.3 
2.6 
2.6 
2.45 
2.4 
3.7 
1.8 
3.2 
5.1 
4.4 
8.6 
10.0 
7.8 
9.8 
There is no sharp decline in minor party contestation between 1978-1984 as 
seen in the national data and the London and Metropolitan Boroughs, but there 
is a peak in 1990 in both district types (as already seen in both the London and 
Metropolitan Boroughs). Again General election years are not characterized by 
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any particular trend (1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992), but the idea that contextual 
effects have a temporal dimension is further supported by the increase in the 
proportion of v^ a^rds contested by minor parties from 1999 onwards, which has 
characterized all authority types so far. This increase is larger in districts that 
elect by thirds where the proportion of wards contested increase from 12.4% in 
1999 to 51.8% in 2008, but the increase in both types of district is still lower 
than in the London and Metropolitan Boroughs. It is also important to take into 
account the migration of districts from 1995 onwards as an increasing number 
of these authorities opted for unitary status (dealt with in 3.4.5), thus any post 
1995 observations may be influenced by this. 
3.4,4 Shire Counties 
7ab/e 3.4 compares the proportion of wards contested by and vote share of 
minor parties in the shire counties and nationally. County authorities have all out 
elections once every four years that coincide with the 'fallow' year in the 
districts. County councils are also higher-tier authorities with different 
responsibilities to the districts (see Railings and Thrasher 1997 for specific 
details). There is remarkable similarity between the vote shares received by 
minor parties in the counties and nationally, and from 1985 onwards the 
proportion of wards contested are also very similar. One explanation for this 
may be that the area covered by a single county authority will contain several 
district authorities, of which there may be a mix of all-out and by-third elections 
that have differing effects on minor party activity. Counties are thus an 
aggregate of districts which may have both high and low levels of minor party 
contestation, and since district elections make up the majority of ward contests 
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in England it is unsurprising that national trends are reflected in county 
authonties. This explains why there is no suggestion that all-out electoral 
system encourages (such as in London) or discourages (such as in the districts) 
minor parties specifically in the counties. The increase in minor party activity 
since the late 1990's is less pronounced than in other authority types and this is 
likely to be influenced by the low levels of minor party activity in districts that 
elect by whole council, although the proportion of wards contested does more 
than double from 18.38% in 1997 to 42.69% in 2005. 
Table 3.4- Comparing Minor Party Presence and Support in the Shire Counties 
and Nationally: 
Proportion of Wards 
Contested Vote Share 
Shire 
Counties Nationally 
Shire 
Counties Nationally 
Year 1973 
1977 
1981 
1985 
1989 
1993 
1997 
2001 
2005 
6.6 
15.4 
16.5 
11.7 
29.8 
24.0 
18.4 
22.6 
42.7 
11.4 
21.7 
20.2 
11.7 
29.8 
24.0 
19.0 
22.5 
42.4 
1.5 
2.4 
2.6 
1.2 
4.3 
1.9 
1.5 
1.8 
4.2 
2.4 
2.8 
2.6 
1.2 
4.3 
1.9 
1.9 
1.9 
4.2 
3.4.5 Unitary Authorities 
A comparison between the proportion of wards contested and vote share of 
minor parties in unitary authorities and nationally is offered in Table 3.5. There 
are two types of unitary authority (those that elect by thirds and those that elect 
by whole council), but as they are recent creations and the number of them is 
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growing each year the electoral cycles are not harmonized. Generally 
authorities that elect by thirds see higher levels of minor party contestation 
compared to those that elect by whole council (apart from in 1996) and 
nationally (apart from 2000 and 2002). Authorities that elect by thirds also show 
higher vote shares for minor parties consistently since 2000. 
Table 3.5 - Comparing Minor Party Presence and Support in the Unitary 
Authorities and Nationally: 
Year 1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Proportion of Wards Contested 
Unitaries Unitaries 
(Elected (Elected 
by Thirds) All Out) 
25.9 
24.2 
24.2 
36.5 
25.4 
19.3 
25.4 
28.2 
43.9 
49.4 
82.6 
59.8 
65.5 
59.5 
13.5 
35.0 
17.1 
16.7 
17.1 
13.0 
8.3 
27.9 
21.6 
48.7 
33.7 
Nationally 
16.3 
20.4 
19.0 
27.9 
13.2 
23.8 
22.5 
37.9 
26.6 
45.8 
42.4 
56.0 
42.1 
59.6 
Unitaries 
(Elected 
by Thirds 
2.7 
2.0 
2.9 
3.9 
2.2 
2.5 
2.7 
2.6 
4.9 
9.3 
8.1 
9.3 
9.7 
8.8 
Vote Share 
Unitaries 
(Elected 
) All Out) 
2.2 
3.4 
2.9 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
1.6 
. 
3.9 
5.0 
8.7 
5.6 
Nationally 
2.4 
2.4 
1.9 
3.7 
1.8 
3.2 
1.9 
5.1 
4.4 
8.6 
4.2 
10.0 
7.8 
9.8 
Despite these differences the increase in minor party contestation in the past 
decade is clear. Of those authorities that elect by thirds the proportion of wards 
contested by minor parties more than doubled from 25.4% in 1999 to 65.5% in 
2007. A similar increase can be seen in authorities that have all out elections 
where the increase is from 17.10% in 1999 to 48.70% in 2007. There is then a 
marked decrease in contestation of 6% points in authorities that elect by thirds 
whilst whole council election authorities show a drop in contestation of 15% 
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points. However, this notable drop in minor party activity in the latter group has 
not been uniform as authorities that had all out elections in 2007 are different 
authorities to those that had all out elections the next year in 2008 - a result of 
unsynchronized four-year election cycles. The situation is similar for earlier in 
the period and further complicated by the conversion of existing districts into 
unitaries and the migration of unitaries between all-out and by-thirds elections. 
However, although trends over time are hard to establish as it is not possible to 
make consistent ramparisons, there appears to be significant variance between 
unitary authorities that elect by whole council regarding levels of minor party 
contestation. 
3.4.6 Summary 
Patterns of minor party contestation differ between local authority types, but this 
is not a function of the electoral system. Whilst a comparison between minor 
party activity in the London and Metropolitan Boroughs suggests that whole 
council elections encourage minor party candidates to stand more than contests 
that elect by thirds (perhaps due to resource limitations), the relationship is 
reversed in the districts whilst the shire counties remain remarkably consistent 
with the national picture due to their aggregate nature (as discussed in section 
3.4.4). 
There appears to be some relationship between the proportion of wards 
contested by minor parties and vote share, as can be seen by the increase in 
both measures in 1990 for authorities that had elections that year. Clearly the 
presence of more minor party candidates is associated with an increase in vote 
share at this election, but this does not explain why minor party activity has 
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risen to unprecedented levels since 1998/1999 despite vote share remaining 
comparatively low. Minor party candidates are contesting more elections across 
all authority types regardless of popular support or the electoral system, but the 
rate of increase in contestation does appear to be mediated by authority type. 
However, it may be misleading to assume homogeneity within authority types. If 
the pattern of minor party contestation is not a function of the electoral system, 
then why should it be the function of the authority type? Is it appropriate to 
understand minor parties at this level? 
3.5 Patterns of Minor Party Contestation Within Authority Types 
3.5.1 Testing For Homogeneity 
Having identified differences in minor party competition based on authority type, 
the next logical step is to consider the homogeneity of these groups. This is 
particularly salient as currently there is no explanation as to why these group 
differences should exist, suggesting that patterns of minor party contestation 
are more complex than they first appear. 
To test the validity of the authority type groups, patterns of minor party 
contestation between authorities of the same type will be compared. If the 
groups are homogenous then the proportion of wards contested by minor 
parties will be similar across all authorities. For example, if all the Metropolitan 
Boroughs show similar levels of minor party competition then there is cleariy 
something specific to this authority type that influences minor party activity. If 
heterogeneity is observed and authorities of the same type show high levels of 
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variance regarding the proportion of w/ards contested by minor parties, then the 
explanation for minor party activity must lay deeper - perhaps at the local 
authohty and/or ward level itself. 
The data transformation process is similar to that outlined in section 3.2 except 
that the proportion of wards contested by minor parties is aggregated to the 
individual authority level, not to the authority-type level. This allows the 
comparison of levels of minor party competition between authorities of the same 
type. The data will be presented over the same time period (1973-2008) and the 
aggregate trend for each authority type will also be displayed for comparative 
purposes. The proportion of wards contested by minor parties in each individual 
authority is presented as a probability rather than a percentage (measured on 
the left-hand vertical axis). Thus a probability of 0.5 on the y axis indicates that 
there is a 50% chance of a minor parly candidate contesting any ward selected 
at random in a single authority - alternatively the authority can be said to have 
minor party candidates in 50% of its wards. To clarify, each plot on the graph 
represents a single authority and the value on the y axis gives the probability of 
choosing a ward at random from this authority and finding that a minor party 
candidate is present. In some authorities the probability is 1 or 0, indicating that 
minor party candidates contested all or no wards respectively. 
3.5.2 London Boroughs 
Fig. 3.3 plots the aggregate trend of minor party contestation in the London 
Boroughs against the probability in each individual authority of a minor party 
candidate contesting a ward chosen at random. The peaks in the aggregate 
trend in 1978 and 1990 appear to be associated with a higher number of 
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individual authorities displaying higher probabilities, and conversely the low 
points in 1982 and 1994 are a function of a tendency for a high number of 
individual authorities to display lower probabilities - a logical observation 
considering that the aggregate trend is the sum of individual cases. However 
what the aggregate data fails to reveal is the amount of variance in minor party 
contestation rates between London Boroughs, which is illustrated by the widely 
differing probabilities of individual authorities. 
Fig. 3.3 - Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the London Boroughs 1974-2006: 
London Boroui^s. Compirfris <h< A v c n g i PrDportJon of W a r d i Conte i t id by Minot P i r t i i i vilth the Indlvidud AuthOfRy 
Prabatill it i i i at M r o t Partlaa ConncDng W a n l i (1S73-20C») 
y w « ( B « I l a n 
SSUH ffeCtOH Ca«> QMMSC SffiW 
Not only do authorities differ significantly in levels of minor party competition 
and presence, there are particular boroughs that consistently display high or low 
levels of minor party activity. The data show that Islington has a probability 
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above 0.8 in six of the nine elections whilst six other boroughs (Bexley, 
Bromley, Croydon, Hammersmith and Fulham, Redbhdge and Richmond on 
Thames) have probabilities lower than 0.2 in five. Therefore, treating all 32 
London Boroughs as a homogenous group ignores the internal variation 
between individual authorities. Indeed, it appears that the initial observation that 
minor parties are more active in this type of authority is due to very high levels 
of contestation in some councils (and tower levels in others) which has shaped 
the aggregate trend. 
3.5,3 Metropolitan Boroughs 
Fig. 3.4 plots the aggregate trend of minor party contestation in the Metropolitan 
Boroughs against the probability in each individual authority of a minor party 
candidate contesting a ward chosen at random. The drop in the aggregate trend 
between 1978 and 1988 is mirrored by a clear reduction in ttie number of 
individual authorities with high probabilities, whilst the recent increase since 
1999 has seen the opposite with a reduction In the number of authorities with 
low probabilities. 
However as with the London councils there is substantial vahation between the 
boroughs themselves, with one particular authority (Kirklees) revealing 
probabilities in excess of 0.8 in 15 out of the 27 elections. At the other end of 
the scale the data show that Bury has probabilities of less than 0.2 in 21 of the 
27 elections. Both authorities are Metropolitan Boroughs but Kirkless is fertile 
ground for minor parties whilst Bury is not. 
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Fig. 3.4 — Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the Metropolitan Boroughs 1973-2008: 
bMropoHUn B o r o u i ^ : Comp«1r>g th« Avarag* ProptfKOR oFWvdt Contcitad by Minn PvtiM wflh ttw ImllvMuiJ Authonly 
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3.5-4 Districts 
Fig. 3.5 plots the aggregate trend of minor party contestation in the Districts 
(elections by thirds) against the probability in each individual authority of a 
minor party candidate contesting a vizard chosen at random. The proportion of 
minor parties contesting wards in this authority type (according to the aggregate 
data) is lower than in the London and Metropolitan Boroughs, and this is 
illustrated at the individual authority level by the dense clusters in the low 
probabilities. When the aggregate trend rises the density reduces and individual 
authorities become increasingly spread out on the y axis. This is most evident 
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from 1999 onwards where a fanning-out effect can be seen as the variability in 
minor party contestation rates increases significantly during this period. 
Fig. 3.5 - Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the Districts (by thirds) 1973-2008: 
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1 
o 
> * 
a. 
£ ^^ 
I 
I-
a D O O O a O D D O O D O D O D 
- T T T f T T T r T T T T T T T T T f T T f T T T T T 
i j?3 i S n Mm \SfV l«BLl 1H2 IVa 1EB4 1909 106? IBG -HO 1»1 ^ H : ?»> IBK I M IRH IBH 3XK 331= ZXQ ^OIH J^DB ZJC7 a » 
r«v »f BKtiaii 
"I 
1 
a 
• 
» I 
I 
i 
s 
• 
-••ff* "B 
Hovifever the increase is not uniform with some districts, such as Oxford, 
experiencing high levels of minor party contestation throughout the period 
(probability in excess of 0.8 in 13 of the 26 elections). By contrast, the rise in 
minor parties has not occurred in Three Rivers (Hertfordshire), Daventry 
(Northamptonshire) or Bassetlaw (North Nottinghamshire) which have all had 
probabilities of less than 0.2 in 25 out of 26 elections. 
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Fig. 3.6 - Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation In the Districts (all out) 1973-2007: 
DMiicU (AIXXJQ: Comparlna the Av tng t Ptoporlkm oT Wardt Conttfted by Minor Partld wHh th* hdMdui f A u t h o r 
Prob»Oilitlet ol Minor Pwlies Contestino W»ras (1973-2008} 
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Fig. 3-6 plots the same variables as flg.3-5 but for districts w/ith all out elections-
As suggested by the aggregate data the individual authorities are heavily 
clustered in the low probabilities, but peaks in the overall trend are mirrored by 
an increase in variability of minor party contestation rates. From 1973-1999 
there is reasonable justification for grouping these authorities due to the 
overwhelming number of individual authorities residing within the lower 
probabilities. Compared to the all out districts and the London and Metropolitan 
Boroughs these authorities are fairly homogenous with only a few outliers. In 
2003 and 2007 this changes as a non-unifoim increase in minor party 
contestation rates results in greater inter-authortty variability. This pattern 
indicates that minor parties became more numerous in a subsection of districts 
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with all out elections, although authohties such as Forest Heath had 
experienced high levels of minor party activity before this, with probabilities in 
excess of 0.8 in seven out of ten elections. In contrast, 28 authorities were 
consistently little affected by the increase in minor party activity with 
probabilities less than 0.2 in all ten elections. 
3.5.5 Shire Counties 
Fig. 3.7 plots the aggregate trend of minor party contestation in the shire 
counties. The data for the individual authorities is generally homogenous with 
very few authorities displaying high probabilities, however 1989 and 2005 
provide exceptions to this. The increase in minor party contestation in 1989 
could be part of the same trend seen in 1990 in other authorities and the 
unprecedented shift upwards in 2005 corresponds to the recent rise in minor 
parties generally. Of particular interest in the shire counties is the fact that there 
are only two authorities with probabilities higher than 0.8 before 2001, and the 
level of minor party contestation in these authorities peaks only for a single 
election in 1989 (Avon) and 1993 (Lancashire). The latter election in Lancashire 
saw 98 out of 99 wards contested by minor party candidates, an observation 
that can be understood better through analysis at the individual authority leveL 
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Fig. 3.7 - Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the Shire Counties 1973-2005: 
Sttire Countlet: Comparing the Av«rsge Proportion of Wards Contested by Minor Parties 
the Individual Authority Probabilities of Minor Parties Contesting Wards (1973-200G) 
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3.5.6 Unitary Authorities 
Fig. 3.8 plots the aggregate trend of minor party contestation in the unitary 
authorities {elect by thirds) against the probability in each individual authority of 
a minor party candidate contesting a ward chosen at random. It should be noted 
that as an increasing number of council are gaining unitary status, and these 
authorities can choose to change between by thirds and all out elections, 
interpretation of trends should be treated with caution. This approach results in 
inconsistent trends e.g. in 1995 there were three authorities with elections whilst 
in 2008 there were 19 and the peak in minor party contestation in 2005 is due to 
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only a single council (Bristol) holding elections in this year. However, to exclude 
unitaries that came into existence after 1995 would result in authorities being 
lost in the dataset (they would no longer be included in the district analysis), 
thus they have been retained. 
Fig. 3.8 - Compan'ng Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the Unitary Authorities (by thirds) 1995-2008: 
Unitary AuTherities (By Thirds)* Compar ing th« Av*r3Q* Proport ion of Wards Contested by Minor 
Parties with the tnd'vidual Autt tor i ty Probabi l i t ies of Minor Parties Contest ing Wards (1996-2008) 
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Despite this there is clearly an upward trend between 1995 and 2008 
associated with more individual authorities showing higher levels of minor party 
contestation, however the increase has been more substantial for some 
authorities than others. Wokingham saw minor party contestation rates rise from 
0%-100% between 1999 and 2006, as did Southend-On-Sea between 1999 and 
2008. Conversely Slough saw a drop in minor party activity from 92.9% in 1997 
to 14.3% in 2007. Thus the trend is not uniform across all unitary authorities that 
elect by thirds. 
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Fig. 3.9 - Comparing Aggregate and Individual Measures of Minor Party 
Contestation in the Unitary Authorities (all out) 1995-2008: 
Unitwy Aifthorit)«s(AI[Out): Comparing th« Average Proportion of Wards Contested by Minor 
Parties with the Individual Authority Probabilities of Mnor Pvties Contesting Wards (1995-200S 
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Fig. 3.9 plots the same variables as fig. 3.8 for unitary authorities with all out 
elections. Again the fluctuation in the number of authorities over the time period 
(from one in 1998 to 25 in 2003 and 2007) means that careful interpretation is 
needed. 2003 and 2007 show an increase in minor party contestation relative to 
previous years, but this is ignoring 2005 and 2008 due to a low number of 
cases. There are also instances of authorities which have always had high 
levels of minor party contestation, such as Brighton and Hove which has had 
minor party candidates present in 100% of its wards at all four elections, and 
authorities in which minor party activity has decreased, such as Rutland with a 
probability of 0.4 in 1999 and 0.3 in 2007. 
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3.5.7 Summary 
Looking at patterns of minor party contestation In individual authorities reveals 
that there are high levels of heterogeneity within authority groupings and where 
the groups were once arguably homogenous (such as in the districts with all out 
elections and the shire counties) the recent increase in minor party activity 
across the board has altered this. The implication of this is that the traditional 
approach of dealing with English local government through grouping authorities 
of the same type has implicitly hidden the rise of minor parties by ignoring the 
variance in presence and success between individual authorities. Whilst it is 
common in the local government literature to discuss the 'London Boroughs' or 
the 'shire districts' as homogenous groups due to their shared electoral cycles 
and arrangements (e.g. Railings and Thrasher 1997, 2004), patterns of minor 
party contestation are not a function these common factors. Rather, there 
appears to be something much more local about the phenomenon that is not 
explicable at this higher level of aggregation. 
This is further evidenced by the fact that the aggregate data can offer no 
explanation for this divergence in minor party activity within authority types and 
by implication it is clear that minor party presence is not a direct consequence 
of the electoral system. Within the general trend of an increase in minor party 
contestation since 1998/1999 there are plenty of authorities that have not 
experienced this rise and there are even some that have experienced the 
opposite with minor party presence falling. Alternatively there are authorities 
that have always had high levels and others that have always had low levels of 
minor party activity. Through the process of aggregation these hotspots of minor 
party activity are lost, even though it is possible that in such authorities minor 
parties are major players not just in terms of presence but in terms of vote 
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share. Indeed, minor parties may actually be so prominent in particular areas 
that they would be classified as parties by traditional definitions of 'party' that 
marginalise minor parties at the national and authority type level (e.g. Sartori 
1976, Down 1957, Schlesinger 1991). 
This complex lack of unifomiity in minor party activity regarding authority types 
and electoral systems indicates that any explanation for the phenomenon exists 
at a lower level, such as individual local authorities. It is this observation that 
provides the framework of analysis developed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Electoral History & Minor Party Contestation 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 illustrated the rise in minor parties contesting elections in England 
between 1973 and 2008. The country-wide trends were erratic and peaked 
every four years, suggesting that the local government electoral cycle may be 
related to venation in contestation rates. Breaking down the aggregate data 
revealed that although all authority types showed a notable increase in minor 
party activity over the past decade, this increase was not uniform. It appeared 
that authority type, and by implication the electoral system, could help to explain 
patterns of minor party contestation. However, analysis explored the differences 
between similar authorities and found much in-group variation. This suggests 
that explanations for minor party activity largely reside with the individual 
authority rather than higher levels of aggregation. This hypothesis was partially 
rejected on the grounds of notable variance in minor party activity between 
wards in the same authority, although it was observed that some authorities are 
more homogenous than others. 
There is cleariy a need to move beyond the national and authority-type picture 
to investigate why minor parties stand in one area but not another. The 
research literature highlights this problem of investigating small political parties 
using this level of aggregate data and advocates an alternative approach. 
Copus et al. (2008: 261) argue that typical vote share definitions at the national 
level (see Mair 1990) underestimate the impact the small parties have in 
specific geographical areas, and any study of minor parties should 
consequently take into account the operational environment and local context 
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within which they operate {Muller-Rommel and Pridham 1991). Thus a case 
study approach may help us to understand better why minor party candidates 
are more numerous in some places than others. 
This chapter will conduct a comparative case study of three authorities with 
differing patterns of minor party contestation - Kensington and Chelsea, Barnet 
and Southwark, The analysis will focus on three London Boroughs to confirm or 
refute the influence of administrative and electoral commonalities between 
authorities of the same type on patterns of minor party contestation. Maps are 
used to aid the identification of these authorities and to express the apparent 
random nature of minor party activity that was suggested in the previous 
chapter. To test for the effects of the 'operational environment' on minor party 
activity (Muller-Rommel and Pridham 1991), a comparative review of recent 
electoral histories is conducted to establish whether minor parties appear in 
areas with particular party systems and whether they establish themselves over 
time or spontaneously appear in large numbers. If the electoral history of an 
authority cannot be used a priori to predict minor party activity, then the 'local 
context' (Muller-Rommel and Pridham 1991) is a key explanatory factor. 
Accordingly, section 4.2 explains how mapping minor party contestation can aid 
understanding and section 4.3 discusses the problem of matching geographical 
and electoral data. There is a discussion over the choice of the three case study 
authorities based on data constraints and continuity in section 4.3.3. The three 
London Boroughs are then analysed on a case study basis: Kensington and 
Chelsea (section 4.4.1). Barnet (section 4.4.2) and Southwark (section 4.4.3). A 
discussion of the findings and merits of this analysis is presented in section 4.5. 
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4.2 Mapping As A Tool 
Electoral data is essentially geographical In nature. In chapter 2 the aggregate 
data was explored by gradually deconstructing larger geographies into smaller 
ones, from country-wide to local authorities and even to wards. Thus patterns of 
minor party contestation are derived from the geographical unit that is the focus 
of analysis. Mapping this data is simply a different approach to visualisation, but 
it has specific advantages. 
Numeric data does not convey a sense of geographical proximity. The 
identification of an authority with notable variance in minor party activity 
between wards can be further explored through visual spatial analysis. Wards 
with similar levels of minor party contestation may be geographically clustered 
or dispersed within an authority and either scenario adds to our knowledge. The 
information regarding ward positioning can be best expressed in geo-visual 
form. 
Also, Johnson and Pattie (2006) discuss the importance of spatial context in 
understanding party systems. They argue that although there are sociological 
factors that explain the tendencies of voters towards specific political parties, 
these tendencies are stronger in some places than others, thus geographical 
context is important (Johnson and Pattie 2006:40). This is particularly salient 
when considering that vote share and electoral success are not strongly 
correlated with minor party contestation (see chapter 2). There must therefore 
be a series of preconditions that exist in one ward but not another that have a 
causal effect on minor party contestation. This might be the electoral history of 
an area, or a different and less measurable factors such as a local issue (see 
Copus et al. 2008, Ben7 2008). 
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To summarise, maps are an excellent way of displaying electoral data and 
allowing identification of geographical patterns. Once these trends have been 
established, case studies can be employed to explore further the geographical 
context in which they operate. 
4.3 Building The Dataset 
Plotting electoral data in a geo-visual format brings additional skills, data and 
software to the aggregate analysis and requires some further manipulation of 
the data- The task will be approached in three stages - the transformation of the 
existing database into a suitable format, the sourcing and creation of the 
appropriate mapping (shape) files and the linking of the two components to 
express the electoral data in the required format. The choice of London 
Boroughs as the focus of analysis is also justified. 
4.3.1 Transforming Individual-Level Electoral Data 
The focus of this analysis is initially on the presence of minor parties, thus the 
maps must show how many minor party candidates stood in a given ward. 
Unlike the dataset used in chapter 3, which simply identified whether any minor 
party candidate was present in a ward contest with a binary yes/no variable, the 
analysis in this chapter will take into account the number of minor party 
candidates contesting in each ward. A binary variable is created in the individual 
level electoral dataset (described in section 3.2) in which a value of 1 
represents a minor party candidate, and a vaiue of 0 represents a major party or 
Independent candidate. When aggregating to the ward level the sum of all 
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values per ward is calculated and corresponds to the number of minor party 
candidates. 
4.3,2 Sourcing Map Data 
The ArcGIS suite of programmes is designed to allow the manipulation of maps 
based on related datasets and will accommodate the combination of electoral 
data with geospatial visualisation, but the actual maps themselves require 
sourcing. The website UKBORDERS (http://edina.ac.uk/ukborders/) is a central 
online depository of geographical data specifically for mapping or shape' files. 
A 'shape' file provides an outline of an area, the properties of which can be 
manipulated in ArcMap (a component of ArcGIS) and all individual components 
of the whole file (in this case wards) have a corresponding record in a linked 
database to which properties can be assigned and new variables computed. To 
create such a file requires extensive knowledge and time, therefore it is 
preferential to download an existing file. This analysis will use the most recent 
map of the 2001 English electoral wards. 
The date that the shape file refers to is important when considering what data is 
to be plotted. In this case the most up to date map available was correct in 
2001, meaning that any changes to electoral boundaries up until this year have 
been accounted for. Therefore changes in boundaries that might be present in 
the electoral dataset for subsequent elections will not necessarily be reflected in 
the map. The implications of this are discussed in section 4.3.3-
As the focus of the analysis is on minor parties at the authority as well as ward 
level it is important to be able to group wards by authority. This allows the 
addition of a layer' to the map that outlines the respective administrative unit. 
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The file downloaded from UKBORDERS contains an authority ID variable on 
which it is possible to aggregate (or "dissolve') the wards to this higher 
geography. Usefully this procedure retains both the original and resulting file 
allowing the representation of both ward and authority boundaries on the same 
map. 
4.3.3 Linking Datasets & Selecting Case Studies 
Reconciling the two datasets is not without problems. Although the wards in the 
shape file all have unique IDs (as do the authorities), these identifiers use a 
national standard of identification that is different to that used in the electoral 
dataset. It is therefore necessary to create a look-up table that can act as a link 
between the two datasets. This is achieved by matching all the names of the 
vi/ards in the shape file with the electoral data in a large spreadsheet, listing 
both identification schemes alongside each other. 
However there are discrepancies between the electoral and geo-spatial data 
due to changes in ward boundaries and the creation of new local authorities. 
Because the most recent map of English wards was correct in 2001, any 
subsequent alterations to electoral geography will be present in the electoral 
data only. These changes are part of an ongoing process constantly to re-draw 
local government ward boundaries to ensure that they are of approximately 
similar size in terms of the population of voters (see Railings et al. 2002 for a 
comprehensive review). This can involve the merging and splitting of existing 
wards or the creation of new ones. In addition to this, the formation of nine new 
unitary authorities since 2001 has involved extensive boundary changes in 
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Bedford, Central Bedfordshire, Cheshire East, Cheshire West and Chester, 
Cornwall, Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire and Wiltshire. 
To minimise these discrepancies the analysis will focus on electoral data from 
the London Borough elections in 2002 and 2006 as these authorities have seen 
little change in electoral geography and the two datasets reconcile well. The 
London Boroughs are also the most geographically clustered and 
administratively aligned group of authorities, with the presence of the Greater 
London Authority demonstrating an over-arching strategic agenda common 
across all boroughs. This indicates the existence of shared administrative goals 
across all authohties in addition to similar electoral structures, thus suggesting 
that of all the authority types the London Boroughs could be considered the 
most homogenous. These authorities are also geographically clustered allowing 
observations over patterns of minor party contestation 'spilling over' authority 
boundaries. Therefore if grouping authorities by type (Metropolitan Boroughs, 
districts, unitaries etc.) can offer any higher explanation of minor party activity 
then it will be in London that such a phenomenon is apparent. By looking at 
authority and ward level differences in minor party contestation and success 
between and within the most homogenous authority-type group we can 
accurately assess whether authority level grouping is useful for understanding 
minor parties, or whether the variance indicated in the previous chapter 
prevents this. 
In the London Boroughs all-out elections are held every four years in multi-
member wards of two or three seats therefore, unlike authorities that elects by 
thirds, all electoral activity can be accounted for in one year of the four-yearly 
cycle (see chapter 3 for details). 
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4.4 Results 
Fig.4.1 and fig. 4.2 plot the 2002 and 2006 election data on a map of London at 
the ward level with local authority boundaries layered on top. The differences in 
colour refer to the number of minor party candidates standing in each ward. 
Where a ward has been coloured grey no minor party candidate contested. 
Data are not available for the City of London (the authority at the centre of the 
map) where elections are often not contested along party political lines, thus it 
will not be discussed in the analysis. 
Clearly there is extensive variability in minor party contestation rates within and 
between local authorities; at the type level the London Boroughs are not 
homogenous. There appears to be little consistency across the whole area, thus 
justifying the decision to reject this traditional approach to grouping authorities 
for the purposes of electoral analysis. The difference in patterns of minor party 
contestation between authorities is also striking, suggesting that factors at the 
local-level mediate the phenomena. There is also large variance within some 
authorities at the ward level, perhaps indicating the influence of highly localised 
factors. Yet in some authorities (such as Barnet) there are completely unifomi 
trends of one minor party candidate par ward. Does this mean that highly 
localised factors are not present in this authority? 
The pattern is complex and both fig. 4.1 and fig.4.2 demonstrate why it is 
inappropriate to research minor parties at the higher authority-type level, also 
identified by the research literature (see section 2.2). 
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Fig.4.1 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in the 2002 
Election 
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Fig.4.2 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in the 2006 
Election 
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Therefore to understand why minor party contestation is so variable in London, 
three boroughs will be subject to a comparative case study in an attempt to 
understand the differences in local dynamics that affect minor party activity -
Kensington and Chelsea, Barnet and Southwark. Each authority has a different 
experience of minor party activity and should provide interesting comparisons. 
Historical electoral data has been taken from Railings and Thrasher 1994, 1998, 
2002, 2003 and 2006. Pre-1994 ward level data was sourced from the Greater 
London Council and London Research Centre council election result reports 
(1990. 1986, 1982, 1978 and 1974). 
4.4.1 Kensington & Chelsea 
Kensington and Chelsea is the borough with the lowest total number of minor 
party candidates with only two standing for election in 2002 (see Fig. 4.3), an 
increase from none standing in 1998. All elections since 1974 have seen a 
Conservative administration returned, although the borough is extremely 
polarised. In 1994, 1998 and 2002 no party shared power with another in any 
single ward, with all seats in any individual ward won by candidates from the 
same party. This pattern is consistent despite boundary changes and alterations 
in the number of seats per ward, and the seats are always shared by 
Conservative or Labour candidates. In fact, in the past 38 years only two seats 
have ever been won by candidates from neither of these two dominant parties 
and they were both in the same ward - Golborne Ward, won by two candidates 
from the Goldborne Community Hundred Party in 1978. 
It appears that the borough is in stasis with wards consistently represented by 
the same parties - even the Liberal Democrats have never won a seat despite 
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contesting every ward in 1994, 1998 and 2002. This lack of alternation between 
Labour and Conservative at the ward level suggests that it would be hard for 
any party to break the pattern and this may explain why so few minor party 
candidates compete here. The two candidates that did stand in 2002 were both 
from the Green Party and received between 10-11% of the vote each, thus they 
also failed to break the hegemony of Conservative and Labour. 
Fig.4.3 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Kensington 
and Chelsea (2002 Election) 
Kensmgion & Ch«f£ea 2003 Election 
Number o1 Minoi Party Candidates 
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However, 2006 {fig. 4.4) saw an increase in minor party activity with nine Green 
candidates and a different two parties entering the fray with one candidate each 
- the Christian People's Alliance (CPA) and the Alliance for Green Socialism 
(AGS). In three wards the Green candidate came fourth (only one place away 
from a seat) indicating that they are starting to make progress despite the 
polarity of the party system. The increase in success and the number of 
candidates being fielded is not explained by the previously poor performance of 
Green candidates or the earlier electoral history. In fact, there were no Green 
candidates in 2006 in the two wards contested in 2002, thus the party is not 
trying to gradually build support over time in the same areas. 
Fig.4.4 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Kensington 
and Chelsea (2006 Election) 
Kctisingion & Chelsea 2006 Election 
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There is also no trend for contesting wards controlled by particular political 
parties as in 2006 they targeted Conservative and Labour wards alike. The AGS 
only contested two London Boroughs in 2006, the other being in Lewisham, and 
the CPA contested across several authorities in London. Why they both decided 
to contest in Kensington and Chelsea where there was no evidence of 
significant minor party support in 2002 is unclear. 
Despite this, there was a salient local issue in the borough around the 2006 
local election that provided a platform for the Green Party. According to an 
article published in The London Evening Standard (April 5'^  2006 - source: 
www.lexisnexis.com) a Green candidate in the Holland Park ward was 
campaigning against the decision of the council to sell the local school playing 
fields for housing developments. As there was no candidate standing in this 
ward in 2002. this suggests that minor party candidates react to local issues 
rather than electoral success. Perhaps a similar explanation might explain why 
the CPA and AGS also competed in 2006, although there is no reference to 
them in the media. 
4.4.2 Bamet 
Barnet is the most homogenous borough regarding minor party activity at the 
ward level, with a single Green candidate contesting every three-seat ward in 
2002 (Fig. 4.5). The number of wards contested by Green candidates has 
grown over the years from 9 out of 20 in 1994, to 15 out of 20 in 1998 and 
finally to 21 out of 21 in 2002. This increase in contestation has also seen an 
increase in vote share across the borough of 3.2% in 1994, to 5.1% in 1998 and 
to 8.3% in 2002. Green candidates are increasing in numbers and popularity, 
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although why this should be the case is not clear. No Green Party candidate 
has ever won a seat, or more precisely has never come any higher than 
seventh place in 1994, 1989 and 2002 suggesting that electoral success is not 
a precursor to minor party contestation (as identified in chapter 3). 
Fig.4.5 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Bamet (2002 
Election) 
Bamet 2002 Election 
N u n be r ol Minor Patly Candidalss 
However unlike in Kensington and Chelsea, party political control does change. 
The Liberal Democrats won all six seats across two wards in 1994 and retained 
them in 1998 and 2002, resulting in an administration with no overall control 
(NOC) in 1994 and 1998 after decades of Conservative rule. This returned to a 
Conservative administration In 2002, but only as a result of gaining two seats 
from Labour and winning a new three seat ward - thus the Liberal Democrats 
held their seats. These changes in party fortunes are indicative of a different 
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party system to that of Kensington and Chelsea. Perhaps this explains the 
optimism of Green candidates. 
In 2006 {fig. 4.6) the total number of Green candidates increased by three, with 
one ward fielding three and one ward fielding two (all other wards consistently 
fielded a single Green candidate). This increase was not a function of previous 
Green success - in 2002 the Green candidate came last in the ward with three 
candidates in 2006 and seventh in the ward contested by two candidates in 
2006. The comparative surge in minor party candidates in Kensington and 
Chelsea was not min-ored here possibly because all wards were already 
contested, yet despite this history of a Green presence no candidate polled 
better than sixth place across the borough. This suggests that a history of 
standing in a ward does not correlate with increased popularity. UKIP also 
contested a ward in Barnet for the firet time 2006, but this was not on the basis 
of any previous minor party success as the Green candidate came last there in 
2002, a position which was tai<en by UKIP candidates in 2006. Minor parties 
seem to operate without any reference to the previous electoral history of the 
borough. 
However, The Daily Telegraph (May 3'^  2006 - source: www.lexisnexis.com) 
reports a battle between Barnet Football Club fans and the incumbent council. 
In response to the inability of the Conservative-led administration to provide 
new accommodation for the dub, fans joined together to form the Keep Barnet 
Alive (KBA) group with the single goal of using strategic voting to "eject the 
Conservatives and elect a more football-friendly regime." KBA analysed recent 
council election voting patterns and devised a strategy that would weaken the 
Conservatives, it then proceeded to disseminate voting advice on a ward-by-
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ward basis via its website (now offline). The organisation also coordinated 
rallies and marches to highlight their cause. Although KBA is not a political 
party, its determination to break the major party hegemony might have resulted 
in minor parties fielding more candidates - an example of an interest group 
providing an opportunity for political parties. 
Fig.4.6 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Barnet (2006 
Election) 
Bamet 2006 Eiectiwi 
Number of Minof Party Candidjiles 
4.4.3 Southwark 
Southwark is different to the previously discussed authorities in that it sees high 
levels of small party activity - with multiple minor party candidates contesting 
the same wards. F/g.4.7 presents this in more detail. 
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Apart from the one ward with only a single minor party candidate, all the other 
wards see at least three such candidates standing. This is partly a function of 
the fact that there are three seats available for each ward, but why should this 
affect the number of minor party candidates contesting particularly in this 
authority? In Kensington and Chelsea multi-seat wards did not encourage minor 
party activity and in Barnet the Green Party merely stood a single candidate in 
each ward in 2002 regardless of the actual number of available seats. Clearly 
the electoral system does not provide a complete explanation of minor party 
activity - other factors are at play. 
Fig.4.7 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Southwark 
(2002 Election) 
Soulhwark 2002 Election 
NmlMt ol MliHr Pny CindidaH 
^ 
\ I 
Southwark has only a recent history of minor party activity, in 1994 there were 
seven minor party candidates and this increased to 24 in 1998 and 71 in 2002. 
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None of these candidates ever won a seat, but the total vote share for minor 
parties has been consistently rising from 1.0% in 1994, to 7,8% in 1998 to 9.3% 
in 2002. Although the borough has returned Labour administrations since at 
least 1964, the Liberal Democrat presence is extensive with candidates 
contesting all wards in the past four elections and winning 27 seats in 1994, and 
1998, and 30 in 2002 - enough to put the authority under no overall control in 
2002. The party system is clearly in flux, a situation which minor parties might 
see as opportunistic. 
Unlike in the other two authorities discussed, the Conservatives do not do well 
in Southwark and are limited to a handful of wards. College ward has 
consistently returned Conservative candidates since 1974, but support in other 
wards is variable with only 3 seats won in 1994, 4 in 1998 and 5 in 2002. The 
borough is similar to Kensington in that it is polarised between two parties but in 
Southwark it is Labour and the Liberal Democrats that are dominant. Whether 
this different party dynamic is responsible for the positive effect on minor party 
activity is unclear. Table 4.1 looks in greater detail at the number of candidates 
standing for each party across the whole borough. 
The three main parties contest every seat, but the Green Party follow closely 
with only four seats uncontested. The next largest party in terms of candidates 
contesting, the Socialist Alliance, had not contested an election here before 
2002 but fielded candidates in five wards of which none were successful. The 
party is not exclusive to Southwark and fielded 83 candidates across 15 London 
Boroughs - many of these wards were also contested for the first time in 2002 
with no seats won. Clearly the number of candidates standing for this party 
increased significantly in 2002, but why target Southwark? Only Haringey and 
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Hackney, each with 13 candidates, saw higher levels of contestation from this 
party. 
Ta£i/e 4.1 - Number of Candidates Standing in Southwark by Party (2002 
Election) 
Party: Number Of Cands. 
Communist 1 
Conservative 63 
Christian Peoples' Alliance 2 
Green 59 
Independent 6 
Labour 63 
Liberal Democrat 63 
National Front 1 
Socialist Alliance 9 
Total: 267 
Clearly some areas are more attractive to minor parties than others, a prime 
example of this being the Lane ward in Southwark which saw no less than 
seven minor party candidates competing the election with three Green, one 
Communist and three Socialist Alliance candidates battling for three seats. The 
Lane' does not have a history of much minor party activity, with only one Green 
candidate standing in 1998 and no minor parties contesting the 1994 election. 
However, in 2002 minor parties received 15.0% of the vote (an increase from 
6.6% in 1998) largely at the expense of the Liberal Democrats whose vote 
share dropped from 39.8% in 1998 to 22.3% in 2002. This drop is not reflected 
in the authority as a whole with the total borough vote share for the Liberal 
Democrats increasing from 34.1% in 1998 to 37.7% in 2002 resulting in the 
election of a Liberal Democrat council leader. 
There are clearly highly localised factors in this ward that have caused these 
party dynamics and they must have a temporal dimension as in 2006 (fig. 4.8) 
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the number of minor party candidates in The Lane' ward was reduced to just 
three Greens. This reduction in activity was evident across the whole borough 
with the total number of minor party candidates reduced from 72 in 2002 to 47 
in 2006. The Greens saw a large reduction of 17 candidates, despite their 
growth in Barnet and Kensington and Chelsea. The National Front and 
Communist party disappear completely in 2006 and the Socialist Alliance fields 
only a single candidate in a newly redistributed ward. The only new party to 
stand in 2006 is a stngle Respect candidate who came seventh in another 
newly redrawn ward. 
Fig. 4.8 - Number of Minor Party Candidates Contesting Wards in Southwark 
(2006 Election) 
Southward 2006 Elaction 
Niimb« ol Minor Pony CandMi 
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Why this sudden change when minor parties are on the increase in the 
previously discussed boroughs? One explanation is that there was a localised 
factor in Southwark that encouraged minor party activity in 2002, but that this 
issue subsided or was of less importance in 2006. The Lane ward could have 
been the epicentre of this, or it may have had an issue of its own that 
coincidentally occurred at the same time. There is little in the media to suggest 
why this should be the case, but the constituency annual report of Harriet 
Harman MP 2002/03 (source - www.harrietharman.org) reveals that the 
majority (36%) of her constituency casework in The Lanes for this period was 
concerned with immigration, although this is not notably higher than in other 
wards in her constituency. Apart from official statistics few sources makes direct 
reference to the Lane as an area and there is very little media reference to the 
electoral ward itself. However, a comparison between a map of electoral wards 
and a streetview map (for example www.maps.qooqle.co.uk) reveals that the 
Lane ward is located within the area more widely known as Peckham. When 
searching for Peckham a series of articles highlight the high level of crime and 
deprivation in the area in 2002 (www.telegraDh.co.uk 26'*" April 2002 - Statistics 
Tell the North Peckham Story), although there is no clear link between these 
issues and political party activity as with Kensington and Chelsea and Barnet. 
4.5 Summary 
Comparing the electoral histories of three London Boroughs reveals an 
apparent lack of appreciation of the historical perspective taken by minor party 
candidates. Minor parties do not necessarily build on their previous successes 
through placing candidates in areas with high support and they do not learn 
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from each other as to where small parties are likely to be successful. There are 
examples of what might be considered rational behaviour where areas with low 
support (as in Kensington and Chelsea) are abandoned, but there are also 
instances where multiple candidates from the same party stand in areas where 
support has previously been low (as seen with the Greens in Bamet). These 
apparently random contestation patterns illustrate the fact that the hse in minor 
party contestation rates in the London Boroughs is not universal across all 
authorities. In addition to this, the high levels of minor party contestation seen in 
some wards, such as the Lane ward in Southwark, reveal that there can be 
large within authority differences between wards that are not explainable at the 
local authority level. Alternatively wards within a particular authority, such as 
Barnet, may reveal uniform levels of minor party candidacy that may have an 
authority level explanation. Minor party activity is relative to a particular area 
and the 'local context' (Muller-Rommel and Pridham 1991) and it is not possible 
to offer a generalisable explanation or prediction of minor party activity even 
when the electoral history of a particular authority or ward is known. This 
observation also confirms that the administrative and electoral commonalities 
shared by London Boroughs have no clear exogenous effect on minor party 
contestation - thus authority type is not a useful indicator of the presence or 
success of minor parties. 
Furthemiore, any attempt to offer this 'local context', using media archives and 
information on websites, is problematic. In many cases areas in which an issue 
may be prevalent are not identified by their ward name making it difficult to 
source material e.g. searching for issues in the Lane ward in Southwark returns 
very tittle in the way of infonnation. This problem may be compounded by the 
length of time since the election itself and the fact that the local media most 
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likely to report on these issues do not have comprehensive online archives. An 
in-depth qualitative study of several wards and authorities may allow deeper 
understanding of the local dynamic that drives minor parties, but it would not 
offer a generalisable explanation for minor party activity - which is the aim of 
this thesis. 
There is, however, a different route of enquiry that may universally explain the 
apparent randomness of minor party activity (having ruled out historical 
electoral factors) that disaggregates the phenomenon further. It is possible that 
the recent increase in minor party activity is explainable at the candidate level 
and that minor party candidates are an emerging political class that can be 
characterised as different to major party candidates. If the explanation for the 
recent increase in minor party activity is at the individual level then the key to 
understanding is not based on where they stand but who stands for them. The 
testing of the hypothesis that individual-level analysis can aid us in 
understanding minor party activity is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Candidate Level Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
Analysis of patterns of minor party contestation offer little by way of explanation 
for the reasons that minor parties have recently become so numerous. Chapters 
3 and 4 explored the aggregate data on minor party contestation and success 
and established that it is not possible to predict where minor party candidates 
will contest elections based on either electoral histories or party systems. 
Indeed, candidates will stand in wards and authorities apparently randomly and 
are not deterred by previous electoral failure - it is these individuals who 
represent the minor parties that are at the forefront of the increase in 
contestation. But who are they and why do they stand regardless of their 
chances of success? What are their past experiences and motivations? Is it 
possible that this recent increase in the number of minor party candidates is the 
result of the emergence of a new political class, or are they indistinguishable 
from all other candidates? 
The idea that minor parties are substantially different to major parties has been 
the basis of attempts to develop a conceptual framework in which they operate. 
Smith (1991) identifies small parties as being detached, marginal or hinged and 
thus defines them based on their different ideological relationships with the 
mainstream parties. Alternatively Rochon (1985) refers to mobilisers that widen 
political debate and challengers which object to the hegemony of mainstream 
politics, whilst Copus et al. (2008) concentrate on the differences in 
organisational structure and policy audience of minor parties in relation to the 
major political groups (section 2.3 for details). Regardless of their different 
80 
Chapter 5: Candidate Level Analysis 
approaches all of these typologies emphasise tvi/o key points - that minor 
parties are different to major parties, and that there are subgroups within minor 
parties that can be grouped by their common characteristics. 
This chapter will test the hypothesis that minor parties are substantially different 
to each other and to major parties by looking at the candidates themselves and 
applying a series of bivahate tests. Using the typology developed earlier in the 
thesis, the analysis will investigate whether candidates from the same groups 
(major, small national, local and ultra local parties) have more in common with 
each other than with individuals from other groups e.g. small national party 
candidates are more similar to each other than they are to candidates from the 
other party groups. To inform this process, individual level survey data on 
demographics, experiences and backgrounds will be used to characterise group 
membership. If this characterisation process is successful then there is 
justification for the development of a detailed multivariate model to predict party 
group (as conslnjcted in chapter 7). 
Accordingly, sections 5.2 and 5.3 explain how the typological group of a 
candidate is assigned and explains the rationale behind the survey, section 5.4 
describes the individual level data collected and section 5.5 explains the 
methodology and statistical tests used to analyse it. In section 5.6 the results 
have been divided into broad subject areas with section 5.6.1 discussing 
demographic differences and similarities, section 5.6.2 looking at the 
experiences of candidates being involved with public and private organisations, 
section 5.6.3 reviewing the nature of support candidates receive from peers and 
organisations and section 5.6.4 exploring how candidates were selected and 
why. A discussion and summary of the findings is offered in section 5.7. 
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5.2 Classifying Minor Parties 
5.2.1 Applying The Typology 
Chapter 2 section 3 outlined a new typology for minor parties based on the 
notion of presence and geographical remit, as reproduced here in fig. 5.1. One 
of the aims of this thesis is to test whether classifying minor parties in this way 
is appropriate and whether the groups can act as heuristics for understanding 
shared characteristics of similar parties. However, before this can be tested 
individual parties need to be allocated a typological group based on their pattern 
of contestation. 
Fig. 5.1 - Diagrammatic Classification of Minor Parties: 
^OCAL (MICRO) PARTIE^ 
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^ Associations^ ^ 
— -* 
Wardl 
Ward 4 
Ward 2 
Authority D 
Wards Ward 4 
82 
Chapters: Candidate Level Analysis 
5.2.2 Data & Methodology 
Using the dataset from chapter 3, the 'minor party' category is brol^en down into 
its constituent parts and each individual party is given a unique label. As the 
Candidate Survey was distributed between 2006-2009 (as discussed in section 
5.3) and the purpose of this analysis is to allocate typological membership to 
respondents, the electoral data from outside of this period is discarded. Next, a 
record of the pattern of electoral contestation for every party is created for each 
year that the party contested. This allows minor parties to move between 
typological groups between years if they contest differently. For example, an 
ultra-local (nano) party may contest a single ward in one year but several wards 
in the same authority the next year, meaning that it is now a local (micro) party. 
Should this party then decide to contest elections in other local authorities then 
it becomes a small national party. Typological group membership is therefore 
assigned on a year by year basis. The three major parties (Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Democrat) also compete more than one authority but unlike 
small national parties their level of presence is high enough to make them 
dominant in both national and local government thus they are not considered to 
be part of the minor group of parties (Railings and Thrasher 1997, 2004). 
To identify ultra-local (nano) parties is relatively simple. Every ward has a 
unique ID and by collating a list of all the wards that such parties have 
contested it Is possible to compute two variables that calculate the maximum 
and minimum ward ID for all records relating to each individual party. This 
allows the subtraction of the minimum value from the maximum value to create 
a new variable based on the difference between the two IDs. By creating an 
aggregate dataset with summary information for every party this variable can be 
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computed for every case. If the difference between the two values is 0 then a 
party has only contested one ward and can be labelled as ultra-local (nano). 
Local (micro) parties can be identified using the same principle. They contest 
more than one ward but are limited to a single authority, thus allowing an almost 
identical procedure as with the ultra-local (nano) parties using the unique 
authority ID rather than ward ID. If the difference between the minimum and 
maximum values is 0 then this party only contested in one authority. This 
information has to be cross-referenced with the previous classification as all 
ultra-local parties wilt also have an authority ID differential of 0 by definition. 
Following this two-step procedure, small national parties can be identified as 
anything left in the dataset that is not Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or 
Independent. As the party affiliation of respondents to the Candidate Survey is 
recorded it can be cross-referenced with this dataset and a categorical variable 
labelled 'PartyGroup' is added to the individual level data (discussed in section 
5.5). This provides the typological group of each individual candidate and forms 
the basis of comparison for this chapter. 
5.3 Local Government Candidate Survey 
The Local Government Candidate Survey has been administered annually since 
2006 (a copy of the survey can be found in the appendix). The ethos behind the 
project is that typical surveys only provide information on the winners (i.e. 
elected councillors), who may or may not be a typical representation of those 
who stand for election (Railings et. al. 2010). Since minor party candidates are 
not typically winners' the survey provides an opportunity to study candidates 
who are not normally included In such surveys. 
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When pooled over the four year period (2006 - 2009) the dataset consists of 
4,646 cases with 486 variables. The local government electoral cycle operates 
on a four-year rotation, thus candidates from all local authority types were 
surveyed. The survey was administered throughout England and Wales but 
Welsh candidates will be excluded as they are beyond the scope of this thesis 
leaving 4,448 cases. Respondents were sampled at random from nomination 
lists provided by local authorities with around 3,000 surveys sent out each year 
in expectation of in excess of 1,000 responses. The questionnaires were sent 
by post to the home addresses of candidates with the intent of arriving 
Immediately after the election. Checks were conducted to ensure that the 
random sampling method produced a sample that was representative of the 
population, and it was accepted that the profile of respondents was an accurate 
demographic reflection of candidates currently contesting local government 
elections (Railings et. al. 2010). In addition to demographic information, the 
survey investigated the political background and experiences of candidates 
whilst competing for election. 
5.4 Data 
Each case in the dataset is the response from a single candidate and the first 
task is to identify which of the party groups each case belongs to {see section 
2.3 for details). Every candidate has a party label and a record of where they 
stood for election and using this data it is possible to cross-reference 
candidates with patterns of party support in The Elections Centre database, 
thus allocating group membership on the following principles: 
• Major Parties 
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o e.g. Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
• Small National Parties - contest in more than one local authority 
o e.g. Greens, UKIP and BNP 
• Local (Micro) Parties - contest multiple wards within a single authority 
o e.g. Southwark Alliance 
• Ultra-Local (Nano) Parties - contest a single ward in a single authority 
o e.g. Thames DittonAA/eston Green Residents Association 
Independents have been excluded completely from the analysts on the basis 
that they are not registered as political parties with the Electoral Commission. 
This reduces the number of cases in the dataset from 4,448 to 4,192. 
Because the data has been compiled over four years the typological group of 
any given political party may alter over this period. For example, a small political 
party that only contested a single ward in 2006 may be particularly successftjl 
and show authority-wide patterns of contestation in 2009. The party grouping 
variable has to reflect this change to measure accurately the differences 
between parties based on these geographical criteria. Table 5.1 shows the 
frequency of respondents (with rounded percentages) from party groups in the 
dataset whilst accounting for temporal changes in typological group. 
The lack of cases within the ultra-local (nano) party category Is problematic 
because it violates the assumptions of statistical tests appropriate for analysis. 
Accordingly, ultra-local (nano) parties are therefore excluded from the dataset. 
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Table 5.1 - Number of Respondents to Candidate Survey by Party Group: 
Frequency Percent 
Major Parties 3477 82.9% 
Small National Parties 672 16.0% 
Local (Micro) Parties 34 0.8% 
Ultra-Local (Nano) Parties 9 0.2% 
Total 4192 
5.5 Methodology 
The variable of interest, 'PartyGroup', is nominal and has the following 
categories; 'Major Parties'. 'Small National Parties' and 'Local (micro) Parties'. 
The purpose of the analysis is to investigate whether demographic and 
attitudinal data can be used to characterise these categories, thus this variable 
will be the subject of every test. 
The dataset contains interval (e.g. age), ordinal (e.g. 'strongly agree', 'neutral' 
and 'disagree') and nominal (e.g. sex) level variables and the analysis must 
utilise a series of statistical tests that are specific to the data type. Interval level 
data will be analysed using ANOVA (analysis of variance) which uses mean 
values to calculate whether differences between groups are statistically 
significant (Pallant 2005:215) e.g. does the average age of a candidate differ 
significantly between party groups? Ordinal and nominal data will be analysed 
using chi-square tests with 95% confidence intervals (relationships are 
significant at the 0.05 level) which measure the difference between expected 
87 
Chapter 5: Candidate Level Analysis 
and actual cell counts, thus indicating how groups differ to the sample as a 
vi/hole (Pallant 2005:286) e.g. is there a higher proportion of male candidates 
than average in a particular party group and is this difference statistically 
significant? The Pearson's chi-square test will be used by default but in cases 
where cell counts are less than five the test is undermined, thus the more robust 
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic will be employed. 
An alternative test to establish relationships is based on the linear-by-linear 
association between variables. This test is only appropriate in situations where 
both variables are ordinal and non-parametric linear trends in the data can be 
observed. As the party group typology {'PartyGroup') is geographically ordinal 
with local (micro) parties operating at the single authority level, small national 
parties operating at the multiple authority level and major parties displaying a 
more comprehensive level of electoral coverage again, this test is valid if the 
other variable is also ordinal. 
5.6 Results 
5.6.1 Who Stands For Minor Parties? 
Are minor party candidates actually different to major party candidates? Do any 
differences extend between the minor party subgroups? The Candidate Survey 
collected information on the demographics of candidates including: age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, occupation and whether a candidate lives in the ward that 
they contest. Table 5.2 summarises the responses for these vanables from 
each party group. 
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Looking at the age of candidates from different party groups the only notable 
difference is that the mean age of respondents from major parties is 
approximately 2.4 yeare more than from small national or local (micro) parties. 
An ANOVA test reveals this difference is statistically significant but only 
between major and small national party candidates. Leven's test for 
homogeneity of variance is violated {p<0.05). suggesting unequal variance 
across the party groups based on mean values. However the Welch and Brown-
Forsythe robust tests of equality of means are both significant, confirming that 
median values can be relied upon to produce a valid ANOVA. This changes 
when controlling for incumbency however and the relationship becomes 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the higher average age of major party 
candidates is related to experience of office. The age of a candidate is clearly 
not useful for differentiating between the minor party subgroups themselves. 
Table 5.2- Summary Results for Candidate Demographics and Party Group: 
Major 
Parties 
Small 
National 
Parties 
Local 
(Micro) 
Parties 
Sample 
Average 
Age (Average - Years) 
Female Candidates (%) 
Non-White Candidates (%) 
Highest Qualification (%): 
-Higher Degree 
-First Degree 
-A Levels (Or equivalent) 
-GCSEs (Or Equivalent) 
-No Qualifications 
Occupation (%): 
-Full/PartTime Employed 
-Self Employed 
- Retired 
-Other 
Lives In Ward (%) 
55,0 
32.2% 
3.6% 
20.6% 
33,3% 
21.9% 
16,6% 
7.6% 
41.7% 
16.0% 
32.9% 
9.4% 
53.2% 
52.6 
34.2% 
1.7% 
26.6% 
31.4% 
20.3% 
14.7% 
7.0% 
45.2% 
16.6% 
26.8% 
11.5% 
53.2% 
52.5 
26.5% 
0.0% 
12.5% 
31.2% 
21.9% 
25.0% 
9.4% 
33.3% 
21.2% 
39.4% 
6.1% 
54.5% 
53.4% 
32.4% 
3.3% 
21.5% 
32.9% 
21.6% 
16.4% 
7.5% 
42.1% 
16.2% 
32.0% 
9.7% 
53.3% 
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In a similar vein neither the proportion of male/female candidates, a 
respondent's occupational status nor the proportion of candidates living in their 
contested ward differ significantly between party groups, suggesting that the 
profile of candidates from across all political parties is similar with regards to 
these variables. 
Nevertheless, there are some notable differences. Comparing the proportion of 
white and non-white candidates in each party group using a Pearson's chi-
square test reveals a statistically significant relationship. A higher proportion of 
candidates than average from the major parties are non-white (3.6% n=123) 
whilst this group is underrepresented in small national (1.7% n=11) and not 
represented at all in local (micro) parties (0% n=0). However, when looking in 
more detail at the parties that form the small national group it becomes clear 
that the Green Party and the BNP both have lower than average numbers of 
non-white candidates. Interestingly UKIP have the same actual number of non-
white candidates as the test expects, leaving the final 'catch-al!' group of 
'Others' to over-represent this group of candidates by 3 respondents. Whilst 
these differences in numbere are small, there is statistically significant variation 
within the small national party category (p<0.05). Therefore whilst it is possible 
to define major parties as being more ethnically diverse than minor parties, the 
level of in-group variance within the small national party category shows that not 
all minor parties under-represent non-white candidates. 
The situation is similar when considering the highest educational qualification of 
candidates. Initially a Pearson's chi-square test does not identify any 
relationship {x^=14.92 8 d.f. p=0.06) but there is a significant linear-by-linear 
association {LLA=4.61 1 d.f. p<0.05) which warrants further investigation. As 
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illustrated in fig.4.2 small national party candidates are the highest qualified, 
followed by the major parties and local (micro) parties. The linear trend in the 
data is only clear when taking into account the number of cases attributable to 
each party group. For example, a higher than average number of small national 
party candidates have higher degrees compared to a lower than average 
number of major party candidates. Because the analysis only has 32 local 
(micro) party cases to work with across all the variable responses, it becomes 
clear that the statistical significance of this relationship is primarily due to the 
variance between major and small national parties. 
Fig. 5.2- The Highest Educational Qualification of Candidates by Party Group: 
Highest Qualrfrcation of Candidates by Party Group 
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Source; Local Government Candidate Survey, Elections Centre 
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Deeper analysis reveals that this relationship is more complicated as there is 
statistically significant in-group variance from the small national parties that 
questions the validity of using a candidate's highest educational qualification for 
characterisation. 40.9% of Green Party candidates have a higher degree 
compared to 9.6% for UKIP, 1.7% for BNP and 14.3% for all 'Other' parties. 
Clearly the Green Party is responsible for the high proportion of higher degrees 
in the small national party category. When removing all Green Party candidates 
from the analysis the difference between party groups increases in significance 
{the relationship is now identified by the Pearson's chi-square test also) and the 
direction of the relationship changes. The major parties now have the highest 
number of candidates with higher degrees (20.0%) followed by local (micro) and 
small national parties (8.3% and 8.0% respectively). 
The data examined so far suggest that there is little demographic difference 
between candidates standing on behalf of major, minor and local (micro) 
parties. Differences in age can be explained by the presence of incumbents 
among the major party candidates. Gender, occupation and whether a 
candidate lives in their ward do not differ between party groups. There are some 
differences based on the ethnicity of candidates which show that there are no 
non-white local (micro) parly respondents, but this could be a function of the low 
number of cases from this group. Small national parties do appear to under-
represent non-white candidates, but there is significant within-group variance 
which suggests that the picture is more complex. The education of candidates 
allows differentiation between party groups with small national party candidates 
being the most highly qualified, but it is Green Party candidates that are 
primarily responsible for this. 
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5.6.2 Previous Experience 
Can candidates from party groups be differentiated based on their previous 
experience of the political world? Does candidate involvement in certain types 
of organisation differ based on party group? This section tests the hypothesis 
that candidates from the same party group will have had shared experiences 
that can be used to differentiate them from other party groups e.g. local (micro) 
party candidates are more likely than other groups to have been involved with 
local organisations because of their local policy remit (see section 2.3). The 
Candidate Survey asks respondents whether they had previously stood for 
parliament or held a post in a range of organisations, some of which are related 
to the party political sphere and others to groups with a specific local focus. 
These posts and organisations include: local party office, charitable 
organisations, professional organisations, trade unions, women's organisations, 
public bodies, local pressure groups and local community groups. Table 5.3 
summarises the responses for these variables from each party group. 
Table 5.3 - Summary Results for Candidate Experience and Party Group: 
Candidate Experience Major 
Of {%): Parties 
Small 
National 
Parties 
Local 
(Micro) 
Parties 
Sample 
Average 
Parliamentary Candidacy 
Local Party Office 
Charitable Organisation 
Professional Organisation 
Trade Union 
Women's Organisation 
Public Body 
Local Pressure Group 
Local Community Group 
7.0% 
54.6% 
40.2% 
17,9% 
21.7% 
6.8% 
36.7% 
21.4% 
42.8% 
18.5% 
33.8% 
33.8% 
14.0% 
17.9% 
6.0% 
16.2% 
32.8% 
38.4% 
0.0% 
20.7% 
32.3% 
13.3% 
13.3% 
6.9% 
13.8% 
26.7% 
46.9% 
8,7% 
51.1% 
39.1% 
17.3% 
21.1% 
6.7% 
33.4% 
23.2% 
42.2% 
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Small national party candidates showed disproportionately high levels of 
parliamentary candidacy (18.5%) compared to the other party groups which ail 
displayed lower than average levels (major parties = 7.0%, local (micro) parties 
= 0%). No local (micro) party candidates stood for parliament, indicating that 
this independent variable may be useful for discriminating between small 
national and local (micro) party candidates. However significant levels of 
variance in the small national party category are present and require further 
investigation. The differences between the small national parties is statistically 
significant with UKIP candidates exceeding the expected count by n=13 and 
Green Party candidates falling below the expected count by n=13. For BNP and 
'Other' candidates the discrepancy between the two counts is minimal, 
suggesting that the significance of the relationship is primarily due to the 
interplay between the Green Party and UKIP. Thus whilst small national parties 
can be characterised as having higher than average levels of pariiamentary 
candidacy, it would be more accurate to use this observation to identify UKIP 
candidates specifically. 
There is a clear case for using previous experience of local party office to 
distinguish between groups, with 54.6% of major party candidates having held a 
local party office at some point in the past compared to 33.8% of small national 
and 20.7% of local (micro) parties. Whilst the relationship is significant, the fact 
that candidates from the major parties are more likely to have party political 
experience In this area is not particularly enlightening. What is interesting is how 
the proportion of candidates who have held this post decreases as the 
geographical remit of the party group shrinks (see section 2.3). 
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Similar geographical correlations can be seen regarding experience of holding 
posts in charities, local public bodies and local professional bodies (the latter is 
not observed by Pearson's chi-square but by the significance of the likelihood 
ratio test). The differences between the party groups are significant for all of 
these variables and in each case the proportion of candidates with experience 
reduces alongside the shift from major to small national to local (micro). In each 
case there is an unusually higher than average number of major party 
candidates with experience whilst the other party groups are always under-
represented and a have a lower than average number of cases. 
Despite these differences there are several areas in which candidates share 
similar experiences, such as holding posts in trade unions, women's 
organisations or local community groups. However they can be differentiated by 
pressure group activity which does not follow the previously discussed 
geographical trend. 32.8% of small national parties have held a position of 
responsibility in a pressure group compared to 26.7% of local (micro) and 
21.4% of major party candidates, and these differences are statistically 
significant. 
Looking In more detail at the distribution of pressure group experience in the 
small national party group reveals significant in-group variation using a 
Pearson's chi-square test. 7ab/e 5.4 illustrates the fact that Green Party 
candidates are notably more likely than average to have been involved in a 
local pressure group whilst candidates from the BNP and UKIP are notably less 
likely than average to have been involved in similar activities. The discrepancy 
between the average and actual figures for 'Others' is negligible, thus the nature 
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of the statistical relationship is characterised by the three discrete political 
parties that make-up the majority component of this typological group. 
Table 5.4 ~ Local Pressure Group Involvement for Small National Parties: 
Green 
UKIP 
BNP 
Others 
Total 
Count 
Expected Count 
% within Parties 
Count 
Expected Count 
% within Parties 
Count 
Expected Count 
% within Parties 
Count 
Expected Count 
% within Parties 
Count 
Expected Count 
% within Parlies 
In a local 
No 
185 
223.9 
55.6% 
123 
94.8 
87.2% 
53 
43.0 
82.8% 
32 
30.9 
69.6% 
393 
393.0 
67.2% 
pressure group? 
Yes 
148 
109.1 
44.4% 
18 
46.2 
12.8% 
11 
21.0 
17.2% 
14 
15.1 
30.4% 
191 
191.0 
32.8% 
Total 
333 
333.0 
100.0% 
141 
141.0 
100.0% 
64 
64.0 
100.0% 
46 
46.0 
100.0% 
584 
584.0 
100,0% 
In summary, it is possible to use previous experience of local party office, 
charity, public and professional bodies to differentiate between the typological 
groups. There is also a trend across these four variables for the proportion of 
candidate involvement to reduce as the geographical remit of the party group 
shrinks. Pressure group activity and experience of parliamentary candidacy are 
useful for group characterisation, but are problematic due to the large in-group 
variation of small national parties. In this sense they are better used as 
identifiers of components of the small national party group. 
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5.6.3 Channels Of Support For Candidacy 
Do candidates from different party groups differ in where they receive their 
support for candidacy? Candidates operating within particular types of parties 
(local, small national and major) will experience different pressures and have 
different policy agendas (see section 2.2), therefore interest and support for 
their candidacy may differ. Respondents were asked whether they received 
'Very Positive', 'Positive', 'Neutral', 'Negative' or'Very Negative' support from: a 
spouse or partner, other family members, personal friends, community groups, 
business associates, party members, party agents, local pressure groups, 
women's groups, trade unions and employers. To avoid low cell counts the 
responses were collapsed into the following categories; 'Very Positive' + 
'Positive' = Positive', 'Neutral' = Neutral' and 'Negative' + 'Very Negative' = 
'Negative'. Candidates were also offered the option of selecting 'Not Applicable' 
for any of these variables, although this category was excluded from all chi-
square tests. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 summarises the responses for these 
variables from each party group (tables have been split for reasons of space). 
Small national party candidates have the highest levels of pressure group 
Involvement {see section 5.6.2) and a higher than average number of 
candidates received positive support from this sector. However this only 
amounts to 27.7% of respondents, whilst 39.1% of local (micro) and 19.2% of 
small national party candidates reported similariy positive experiences. Initially it 
would appear that local (micro) parties receive higher levels of positive support 
from pressure groups despite the fact that they have had less contact with them 
than small national parties, but a closer look at the components of the latter 
group offers a different explanation. 
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Table 5.5- Summary Results for Candidate Support (Part 1): 
Spouse/Partner: 
- Positive 
-Neutral 
-Negative 
Other Family: 
- Positive 
-Neutral 
- Negative 
Personal Friends 
- Positive 
-Neutral 
-Negative 
Community Groups 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Business Associates 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Major 
Parties 
62.8% 
15.0% 
6.2% 
64.3% 
25.8% 
4.2% 
73.7% 
20.8% 
2.4% 
42.7% 
27.9% 
1.7% 
28.8% 
31.8% 
5.9% 
Small 
National 
Parties 
58.6% 
13.3% 
8.0% 
65.1% 
23.4% 
4.2% 
78.1% 
16.4% 
1.1% 
34.3% 
26.7% 
2.3% 
29.7% 
26.5% 
3.2% 
Local 
(Micro) 
Parties 
74.2% 
19.4% 
3.2% 
66.7% 
23.3% 
3.3% 
93.5% 
3.2% 
3.2% 
75.0% 
14.3% 
3.6% 
56.0% 
32.0% 
0.0% 
Sample 
Average 
62.2% 
14.8% 
6.5% 
64.5% 
25.4% 
4.2% 
74.6% 
20.0% 
2.2% 
41.7% 
27.6% 
1.8% 
29.1% 
31.0% 
5.4% 
Candidates from the Green Party were the most likely to have pressure group 
experience and they are also the most likely to receive positive support with 
32.7% of candidates compared to 19.0% of UKIP and 10.7% of BMP 
respondents. 'Others' also revealed high levels of pressure group involvement 
and report that 40.5% of candidates received positive support for their 
candidacy. 
Although this suggests a link between candidate involvement in specific groups 
and support for their candidacy, support from trade unions suggests otherwise. 
Whilst there were no significance differences between candidates from the party 
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groups in respect of their previous experience in trade union organisations (see 
section 5.5.2), 16.3% of major party candidates received positive support from 
this source compared to 4.4% and 5.9% for small national and local (micro) 
parties respectively. In contrast, the lack of any significant differences in past 
involvement in women's groups does correspond to no significant differences in 
the nature of support given to party groups. 
Table 5.6- Summary Results for Candidate Support (Part II): 
Party Members 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Party Agents 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
-Negative 
Local Pressure Groups 
-Positive 
-Neutral 
-Negative 
Women's Groups 
-Positive 
-Neutral 
- Negative 
Trade Unions 
-Positive 
- Neutral 
-Negative 
Employers 
- Positive 
-Neutral 
-Negative 
Major 
Parties 
95.2% 
2.8% 
0.5% 
85.3% 
5.9% 
0.7% 
19.2% 
25.3% 
1.9% 
10.1% 
20.2% 
1.8% 
16.3% 
17.4% 
2.7% 
16.2% 
27.9% 
9.5% 
Small 
National 
Parties 
96.2% 
1.4% 
0.2% 
85.7% 
2.7% 
0.5% 
27.7% 
19.8% 
3.1% 
7.5% 
19.1% 
1.7% 
4.4% 
18.4% 
4.4% 
12.1% 
25.9% 
4.1% 
Local 
(Micro) 
Parties 
85.7% 
3.6% 
0.0% 
76.9% 
3.8% 
0.0% 
39.1% 
30.4% 
4.3% 
15.8% 
31.6% 
0.0% 
5.9% 
23.5% 
0.0% 
38.1% 
9.5% 
0.0% 
Sample 
Average 
95.2% 
2.6% 
2.6% 
85.3% 
5.4% 
0.6% 
20.9% 
24.3% 
2.1% 
9.7% 
20.1% 
1.8% 
14.3% 
17.6% 
3.0% 
15.7% 
27.5% 
8.6% 
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Major party candidates receive much less support from personal channels and 
whilst family and spousal support for candidacy does not differ significantly 
between party groups, support from personal friends does. Table 5.5 reveals 
that it is the local (micro) party candidates that receive the most positive support 
from this source (93.5%). The difference between small national and major 
parties is barely 4%, however the trend suggests that positive support increases 
as the geographical remit of a party group shrinks. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the fact that there is no significant in-group variance between 
the small national parties. 
Local (micro) party candidates also receive the most positive support from local 
community groups (75.0%) trailed by the major (42.7%) and small national 
parties (34.3%). It is interesting to note that small national party candidates also 
receive the most negative support from this group (2.3%), but this trend is 
subject to significance within-group variance. A closer look at the data informs 
us that 14% of BNP and 2.8% of UKIP candidates had received negative 
support from local community groups. When controlling for these parties by 
excluding them from the analysis, the percentage of negative responses from 
small national parties' drops to 0.3% and positive support rises to 38.2%. UKIP 
and BNP candidates are thus responsible for most of the negative support 
towards small national parties. 
Business associates also seem to prefer local (micro) party candidates with 
56.0% of respondents reporting positive support compared to 29.7% for small 
national parties and 28.8% for major parties. A similar pattern can be discerned 
from employer support where levels of positive support were at 38.1% for local 
(micro) parties, 12.1% for small national and 16.2%for major party candidates. 
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Despite the apparent popular support for local (micro) parties, they receive the 
least amount of positive support from party members and party agents (85.7% 
and 76.9% respectively). In these situations it is the small national parties that 
come out on top with 96.2% positive support from party members compared to 
the 95.2% enjoyed by the major parties. Regarding party agents, 85.7% of small 
national party candidates relieved positive support compared to 85.3% of major 
party candidates. The differences are small, vi/ith the party agent relationship 
identified by a linear-by-linear association rather than a standard Pearson's chi-
square, but they are statistically significant. 
Analysis of channels of support has proved useful in characterising local (micro) 
party candidates who receive notably high levels of positive support from 
personal friends, local community groups, business associates and employers. 
Positive pressure group support is related to the typological groups, but most 
notably it is a characteristic of Green Party candidates - a subsection of small 
national parties. 
5.6.4 Selection 
In addition to knowing about different channels of support for groups of parties it 
is interesting to look at why the candidates themselves felt they were selected 
and to what level of competition they were subjected. Were candidates from 
particular typological groups subject to more rigorous selection procedures? Do 
candidates differ in their perceived likelihood of electoral success? Section 3.3 
revealed that minor party presence increases disproportionately to vote share, 
indicating that office-seeking behaviour may not characterise candidates from 
these groups. Respondents were asked whether they; experienced competition 
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for selection, applied for multiple seats, were asked to stand, were selected 
because they were likely to win, were selected due to their reputation and were 
paper candidates. Responses to these questions were binary {a box is ticked 
for 'Yes' and left blank for 'No'). Candidates were also asked to estimate the 
probability of winning their seat on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 = 'Highly 
Improbable' and 10 = 'Highly Probable'. Responses were re-coded into five 
categories: 0-1 = 'Very Low", 2-3 = 'Low', 4-6 = 'Medium', 7-9 = 'High' and 10 = 
'Very High' to avoid low cell counts. Table 5.7 summarises the responses for 
these variables from each party group. 
Table 5.7- Summary Results for Candidate Selection and Party Group: 
Major 
Parties 
Small 
National 
Parties 
Local 
(Micro) 
Parties 
Sample 
Average 
Competed For Selection 
Multiple Seats 
Asked To Stand 
Likely To Win (Selected) 
Selected For Reputation 
Paper Candidate 
Prob. Of Winning 
-Very Low 
-Low 
-Medium 
-High 
-Very High 
25.2% 
7.1% 
69.5% 
26.5% 
48.8% 
26.5% 
24.2% 
14.4% 
21.0% 
29.4% 
11.0% 
8.3% 
3.4% 
56.9% 
8.0% 
33.2% 
51.8% 
46.5% 
24.8% 
17.6% 
9.5% 
1.5% 
8.7% 
4.3% 
45.5% 
23.5% 
44.1% 
11.8% 
12.9% 
16.1% 
35.5% 
35.5% 
0.0% 
22.4% 
6.5% 
66.7% 
23.4% 
46.2% 
30.4% 
27.6% 
16.0% 
33.3% 
26.3% 
9.5% 
Experiences of being successfully selected as a candidate differ significantly 
between party groups. Of the major party candidates. 25.2% had to compete 
against other potential nominees for selection, compared to 8.3% for small 
national and 8.7% for local (micro) parties. Major party candidates were also 
more likely to apply to stand for more than one seat, with 7.1% of respondents 
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admitting to submitting multiple seat applications compared to 3.4% and 4.3% 
respectively for small national and local (micro) party candidates. Both of these 
statistically significant results suggest that there are higher levels of competition 
for major party than minor party candidacy. 
However the data reveals that the low levels of competition for small national 
parties is misguiding. For the BNP, 19.7Vo of candidates experienced selection 
competition and 7.0% applied for multiple seats indicating that these candidates 
are actually similar to those from the major parties. UKIP respondents also 
experienced higher levels of competition for selection than the aggregate 
grouping suggests, with 10.7% of candidates reporting having to compete to 
represent the party, yet the proportion of those who applied for multiple seats 
was lower at 2.4%. By contrast only 4.2% of Green Party candidates reported 
competitive selection procedures and only 3.1% applied to stand for more than 
one seat. 
How probable did candidates think their chances of winning the election were? 
Major and local (micro) party candidates were similarly optimistic about the 
electoral outcome with 40.4% and 35.5% of respondents respectively rating 
their chances as 'high' or 'very high'. This similarity is interesting considering the 
differences previously discussed. Small national party candidates particularly 
were pessimistic about their chances with 71.3% of respondents rating their 
chances as 'low' or 'very low', but this is not uniform across all the parties in this 
group as illustrated in fig.5.3. Most notably it is the Green Party candidates who 
rate themselves as the least likely to get elected with 86,7% of respondents 
reporting that they had less than a 'Medium' chance of success {'Very Low' and 
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'Low' categories combined). BNP candidates were more optimistic with 30.3% 
claiming to have a 'high' or 'very high' chance. 
Fig. 5.3- Estimated Probability of Electoral Success for Small National Parties: 
Small National Party Candidate Estimated Probabtlrty of Winning 
Component Parties: 
I Green 
• UKP 
D B N P 
DOttiere 
60.0%-
u 
40.0%-
t 
20.0%-
0.0%' 
Verybw Low Medium Hgh VeryHgh 
Estimated Probability of Winning: 
Source; Local Government Candidate Survey, Elections Centm 
Within the small national party group there are also differences regarding the 
proportion of respondents asked to stand for election. BNP candidates were the 
least likely to be asked, with only 50.0% of respondent being approached. 
67.6% of UKIP candidates were asked, compared to 68.8% of Green Party 
Candidates. 'Others' were even lower with 40.6% of candidates asked. As a 
comparison, 45.5% of local (micro) party and 69.5% of major party candidates 
were asked to stand (a higher proportion than any other group). Within the small 
national party category BNP candidates have high levels of competition for seat 
selection, they rate their chances of winning as higher than any other party in 
104 
Chapter 5: Candidate Level Analysis 
this group and they are the least likely to be asked to stand, in contrast, Green 
Party candidates are relatively unlikely to expehence selection competition, 
have a pessimistic view of winning the election and are more likely to be asked 
than other small national party candidates. UKIP candidates sit somewhere in 
the middle of these two parties at all of these points and the Others' follow no 
discernable trend. Major party candidates are much more likely to experience 
competition selection than any other group, are the most optimistic about their 
chances of winning and are the most likely to be asked to stand. Local (micro) 
party candidates did not experience as competitive a selection environment but 
were still optimistic, with only 45.5% asked to stand. 
For the major and small national parties there appears to be a relationship 
indicating that high levels of selection competition result in optimistic 
assessments of future electoral success. It wouldn't be unreasonable to 
theorise that competition for selection might well be high in areas that a party 
stands a chance of getting a seat thus explaining the relationship. However, 
being asked to stand has differing effects on the party groups. For the major 
parties it appears to be associated with high levels of competition, but for small 
national party candidates being asked is correlated with low competition. 
Despite the variance between parties in the small national group, there is an 
encompassing trend that characterises them. 
Local (micro) party candidates are similar to the BNP in the sense that a 
relatively low number of candidates are asked to stand and they are optimistic, 
but selection competition is low. This represents a different relationship between 
the variables to the major and small national parties, indicating that a different 
dynamic is at play in this typological group. Table 5.8 simplifies the discussed 
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trends in an attempt to characterise the typological groups and illustrate how 
candidate's experiences differ. 
Table 5.8- Summarising Candidate Selection Experiences by Party Group: 
Party Type: Competi t ion: Success: Prop. Asked: 
Major Parties HIGH OPTIMISTIC HIGH 
Small National Parties HIGH OPTIMISTIC LOW 
(two-way relationship) LOW PESSIMISTIC HIGH 
Local (Micro) Parties LOW OPTIMISTIC LOW 
Part of the explanation for this could be due to the differing proportion of paper 
candidates in each party group. The Green Party has a high proportion of paper 
candidates (65.5%) which might explain why competition and likelihood of 
winning is low. To explain, individuals stand as paper candidates to give the 
party a presence in an area in which generally there is little chance of electoral 
success, thus the seat may be less desirable to office-seeking candidates. This 
may lead to less selection competition and an acknowledgement of a low 
probability of success, although lack of electoral success may not be seen as a 
failure by minor party candidates (see section 2.3). In contrast to the Greens, 
24.4% of BNP candidates were put fonward for paper candidacy which offers a 
reason for the high levels of motivation and optimism that appear to be present 
in this party comparatively. This is a smaller proportion of paper candidates than 
from the major parties (26.5%), but it is the local (micro) parties who show the 
lowest levels with only 11.8% of candidates claiming paper candidacy. Low 
competition is synonymous with a high level of paper candidacy for small 
national parties, but not for local (micro) parties. 
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The qualities that candidates felt influenced their selection also differ 
significantly between party groups with only 8.0% of respondents from small 
national parties believing that they were selected because they were likely to 
win a seat. As a contrast, 26.5% of major and 23.5% of local (micro) parties felt 
the same which corresponds to the lower levels of paper candidacy and higher 
levels of optimism over the chance of electoral success associated with these 
two groups. This relationship can also be seen within the small national party 
group where 5.7% of Green Party candidates (high levels of paper candidacy) 
felt they were selected for this reason compared to 14.1% of BNP respondents 
(lower levels of paper candidacy). Green Party candidates also largely rejected 
the idea that their reputation was important, with 27.2% of respondents 
believing it to have been a salient factor whilst 48,7% of BNP candidates shared 
this sentiment. In their responses the BNP are very similar to major (48.8%) and 
local (micro) party candidates (44.1%) who place higher levels of importance on 
personal reputation. Thus there is clearly a negative and apathetic stance that 
characterises Green Party candidates that is the opposite to the BNP 
respondents. UKIP and 'Other' candidates tend to fall in the middle of this polar 
relationship and it would appear that much of the in-group variance for the small 
national party group is due to the interplay between the Greens and the BNP. 
5.7 Discussion 
The data from the Candidate Survey has been valuable in describing some 
differences and similarities of candidates from major, small national and local 
(micro) parties. Individual level data can be used to discriminate between these 
typological groups and the salient variables identified in this bivariate analysis 
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will provide sound basis for the construction of a multivariate model (see section 
7.1). 
However the appropriateness of the minor party typology is questioned by the 
consistently significant levels of variance within the small national party group. 
As this chapter has progressed there have been an increasing number of 
examples in which the three dominant components of this group (the Green 
Party, UKIP and the BNP) display significant heterogeneity. Thus whilst the 
small national party group is significantly different to major and local (micro) 
parties in many instances, this is often due to the influence of one of the three 
parties and aggregation hides this - the devil is in the detail. 
With this in mind, Table 5.9 summarises the findings of this chapter by 
typological group whilst also providing separate information for the Green Party, 
UKIP and the BNP. 'Others' have been excluded because they are clearly not a 
coherent parly group. Clearly there are many differences between the small 
national parties themselves, but there is very little that characterises UKIP 
candidates specifically (only equality of candidate ethnicity and high levels of 
parliamentary candidacy) suggesting that much of the variation is between the 
Greens and the BNP and that further data may be required to build up a more 
detailed characterisation of UKIP candidates. The collection of additional data is 
the focus of the next chapter. Local (micro) party candidates share several 
characteristics as a group but are most notable for the amount of positive 
support they receive from many sources, whilst other party groups have only a 
single source that they can be differentiated by. In contrast, major party 
candidates most differ to other party groups regarding their experiences of high 
levels of competition and selection. 
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Based on these observations it is clear that future analysis w\\\ have to take into 
account the large number of differences between the Greens, the BNP and 
UKIP by treating these small national parties separately. 
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Table 5.9 - A Summary of Differences Between Party Groups: 
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MAJOR 
PARTIES 
Mosi likely to field 
non-while 
candidates 
Uo5t likely to 
have held a 
previous party 
office 
SMALL NATIONAL PARTIES 
GREENS BNP UKIP 
Under represent non-whfle candidates as a group 
Unltkely to field 
non-white 
candidates 
Equal number of 
white and r>on-whhte 
candidates 
Highest qualified as a group 
High level of 
education Low levels of education 
Most experience ol parliamentary candidacy as a group 
Low levels of 
parliamentary 
candidacy 
High levels of 
parliamentary 
candidacy 
LOCAL 
(MICRO) 
Unlikely to field non-
white candidates 
Least likely to have 
held a previous party 
office 
Likelihood of having heid a post in a chanty, local body of local professional body decreases as geographical 
remit shrinks 
Most likely to 
receive positive 
support frorn trade 
Linians 
Most likely lo 
experience 
competition for 
candidacy 
MosI likely to 
appiy to stand for 
more t l ian one 
seat 
Disproportion alel y 
likely to be asked 
to stand for 
election 
Most likely to have been involved in a pressure group 
Likely to have 
been involved in a 
pressure group 
Most likely to 
receive positive 
support from a 
pressure group 
Unlikely to tiave been invcrived in a 
pressure group 
High levels of 
negative support 
from local 
community groups 
Most likely to receive positive support from party members and 
agents 
Low levels of competition for candidacy as a group 
Disproporfionately 
low levels of 
candidacy 
competition 
Disproportionately high levels o( 
candidacy competition 
Pessimistic over chances of winning as a group 
Disproportionately 
pessimistic Over 
ctiances of winning 
Most likely to be 
paper candidates 
Least likely to be 
asked to stand for 
election 
Least likely lo selected tjecause they can win a seat 
Di sp ro[XJrtionately 
unlikely to be 
selected tiecause 
they can w n a 
seat 
Most likely not to 
place salier>ce on 
reputation 
Likely lo receive 
positive support from 
personal friends 
Likely to receive 
positive support f rom 
local community 
groups 
Likely to receive 
positive support from 
business associates 
Likely to receive 
positive employer 
support 
Least iikeiy to be 
paper candidates 
Note: blank cells are not indicative of any relationship but a result of formatting 
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Chapter 6: Follow-Up Candidate Survey 
6.1 Introduction 
The Candidate Survey data analysed in chapter 5 provided a wealth of 
infomation on the characteristics of candidates and their party groups - where 
they differ and where they are similar. However there were several areas that 
the survey could not cover, for example candidates' policy agendas and their 
personal ideological positions relative to their own party. Ideological positions 
are a particularly important focus for analysis because of amount of research 
literature that classifies parties using the left-right dimension (e.g. Taylor and 
Laver 1973; de Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Castle and Mair 1984; Budge, 
Robertson and Hearl 1987 and Laver and Schofield 1990). In addition to this, 
UKIP candidates were particularly hard to characterise as a group using the 
paper Candidate Survey but It is unclear whether this is due to a lack of data 
from respondents or similarity with candidates from other party groups. Further 
primary data collection is necessary to address this deficit in the previous 
survey and to introduce additional variables to test for differences and 
similarities between party groups. 
The research literature generally treats minor parties as homogenous 
ideological groups and assumes that the policy preferences are unified within 
parties. Rochon (1985) defines two groups of parties, challengers and 
mobilisers, the first of which is interested in small changes in the policy 
positions of existing parties whilst the latter group operates outside of the left-
right paradigm. Copus et al. argue that the mobilisers "represent more a split in 
an ideological location than in a party" (2008:261) indicating that minor parties 
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are not simply splinter groups of existing parties. This is supported by an 
observation made by Thrandhart (1995) that the existence of small parties is 
due to a deficiency in the main parties' ability to formulate relevant policy. All 
these studies suggest that small political parties can be identified as having 
alternative policy preferences to the main parties, and these differences may 
either be relatively small deviations from the mainstream or significant moves 
aw/ay from the left-right hegemony. 
It should be possible therefore to distinguish between minor and major parties 
based on differences in policy positions, perhaps even to distinguish apart the 
minor parties themselves. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
policy positions of individual candidates and to lest whether they can be 
characterised based on party groups. The analysis will also test whether parties 
are ideologically homogenous by investigating the level of ideological deviance 
between candidates from the same party. Variables identified as being useful in 
discriminating between party groups at the individual level will inform the 
multivariate model in chapter 7. 
Accordingly, section 6.2 discusses the method, distribution and design of the 
survey including a rationale for the questions included. Section 6.3 discusses 
the implications of feedback received from the pilot survey and subsequent 
changes for the main survey. Section 6.4 presents the results, dividing the 
analysts into background and motivations (section 6.4.1), geographical 
relevance (section 6.4.2), electoral reform and party systems (section 6.4.3) and 
policy and ideology (section 6.4.4). Finally section 6.5 summarises the findings 
of this chapter. 
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6.2 Methodology 
6.2.1 Sample & Dissemination 
Candidates participating in the main Candidate Survey (chapter 5) were offered 
the opportunity to leave a contact email address should they wish to be involved 
in further research. Over the four years that the survey has been running the 
project has amassed a list of 2,235 individuals prepared to take part in a follow-
up project. Because the chosen method of future contact was by email, an 
online survey is the most appropriate method for examining these issues 
outlined above. 
Through the online survey hosting tool www.survevmonkev.com a list of all the 
respondent email addresses and names was compiled into an electronic mailing 
list. Using the website to manage contacts with the sample is useful as the 
website keeps track of who has responded or opted out as well as which email 
addresses bounce (i.e. address no longer in use) - this is essential for 
managing large samples and allows repeat requests for information to be sent 
out to non-responders. The website also enables the personalisation of an 
email invitation with custom fields, thus allowing the use of full names and titles 
of candidates (as recorded in the ohginal paper survey). This added personal 
dimension is intended to improve response rates. Importantly this process 
assigns an ID to every individual by generating a unique web link to the survey 
for each respondent. By using the ID tags from the original paper survey for the 
online respondents it is possible to link the two datasets together. Through this 
it is possible to allocate the party group membership of candidates based on 
previously processed information (see section 5.3 for details). 
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Due to the notable variance within the small national party group identified in 
the previous chapter this category will be disaggregated (see section 5.6 for 
justification). This results in the following small national parties being treated 
separately: The Green Party, The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
The British Nationalist Party (BNP) and a catch-all grouping of 'Others' for 
candidates with alternative political allegiances. 
6.2.2 Questionnaire Design 
The questions are designed to investigate issues that are either not addressed 
or are in need of clarification from the original paper survey and are concerned 
with the key themes of locality and geography, electoral reform and ideology. 
Due to the complementary nature of the project the online survey was designed 
to gather quantitative responses in a similar vein to the paper survey. The ability 
to generalize responses from the sample to the wider population is a vital part of 
confirming or refuting any party typology, thus a quantitative approach was 
essential (David and Sutton 2004). 
The importance of 'local' factors in allocating typological groups needs to be 
addressed. Respondents were asked whether they were bom in the local 
authority that they contested for election when originally surveyed. This was 
followed by a more specific question as to whether they were born in the ward 
that they contested for election when originally surveyed. 
In the original postal survey candidates were asked whether they would stand 
again. This issue was clarified in the online survey by asking which party they 
would stand for, allowing respondents to select as many alternative parties as 
they wish. This will test whether candidates would stand repeatedly for the 
114 
Chapters: Follow-Up Candidate Survey 
same party. Candidates were offered the following selection with a text box for 
the 'Other (please specify)' option: 
- The party you stood for when you were originally surveyed 
- The Labour Party 
- The Conservative Party 
- The Liberal Democrat Party 
- The Green Party 
- The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
- The British Nationalist Party 
- Other (please specify) 
To test for candidates as pure office seekers' (see Von Neuman and 
Morgenstem 1953, Riker 1962, Laver and Schofieid 1990) respondents were 
asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that they stood as a 
candidate to win the seat. Although paper candidacy was investigated in the 
previous chapter, it has been argued through the thesis that 'presence' may be 
more important for minor parties than electoral success. An additional question 
enquiring to what extent candidates agreed with the idea that standing is more 
important than winning seeks to investigate attitudes towards office-seeking 
behavior. 
All such attitudinal questions on the survey permitted five possible responses: 
'Strongly Agree, 'Agree', 'Neither Agree nor Disagree', 'Disagree' or 'Strongly 
Disagree'. This is the standard response set for such questions (David and 
Sutton 2004) and because candidates were not forced to give a response to 
progress through the survey a 'Not Applicable' option was not offered. 
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To assess how relevant candidates felt global, European, national and local 
affairs were to local government, respondents were asked to what extent they 
agreed with the following statements: 
- Global affairs are not relevant to local government 
- European affairs are not relevant to local government 
- National affairs are not relevant to local government 
- Local affairs are not relevant to local government 
Also included in this matrix of responses was the statement that 'party politics 
has no place in local government'. 
Following this is a series of questions designed to interrogate how the 
respondent feels about issues regarding the voting and party system. 
Candidates are asked to what extent they agree with the following statements: 
- The current local electoral system favors the mainstream parties 
- The current voting system (first-past-the-post) delivers strong local 
government 
- Voters should be able to rank candidates on a local ballot paper 
- Local government would be improved if a PR voting system was adopted 
- There should be a "none of the above' option on local ballot papers 
Candidates are next asked about their opinions regarding local elections 
coinciding with national and European contests. They are asked to what extent 
they agree with the following statements: 
- The evidence from previous elections suggests that holding a general 
election on the same day as local elections increases turnout in the local 
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contests. To what extent do you agree that this is a good reason for 
holding elections simultaneously? 
- In years where there are elections to the European Parliament the 
government decided in both 2004 and 2009 to move local eieclions to 
coincide with the European election to encourage more people to vote. 
To what extent do you agree with this? 
Finally the sun/ey asks candidates for their responses to a series of ideological 
principles. Initially candidates are asked to place themselves politically on the 
traditional left/right spectrum. This is represented as a nine-point scale with five 
labels; 'Left-Wing', 'Centre-Left', 'Centre'. 'Centre Right' and 'Right-Wing'. There 
is one unlabelled point between each of these headings to give the respondent 
flexibility. There is also the option to select 'N/A' for candidates who feel that 
they do not fit on the left/right spectrum (as expressed by Copus et al. 2008 -
section 6.1). 
Following Laver and Benoit (2007) respondents are given a series of 
statements which advocate a particular policy position on an issue. The 
statements are taken from the 'Experts Survey' (see also Laver and Hunt 1992) 
which asks academics in different countries and political systems to specify 
party political positions on said issues. By looking at the how people respond to 
these issue-dimensions it is possible to place parties on a lefl-right scale. Not all 
the Laver/Hunt statements were used as they were irrelevant to this project, but 
the following is a list of those deemed appropriate for this analysis: 
- Government should raise taxes to increase public services 
- Government should decentralize power to local authorities 
- Government should promote urban over rural interests 
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- Government should promote a cosmopolitan rather than English/British 
national consciousness, history and culture 
- Government should favour liberal policies on homosexuality 
The EU should be enlarged 
- Government should favour high levels of state regulation and control of 
the market 
The environment should be protected, even at the cost of economic 
growth 
- The government should favour policies designed to help asylum seekers 
and immigrants return to their own country 
- Government should promote the protection of civil liberties 
- The mass media should be completely free to publish any material they 
see fit 
' Government should favour liberal policies on euthanasia 
The method was adapted to investigate the discrepancy (if any) between where 
candidates place themselves on the left-right spectrum and where their 
responses to the 'Experts Survey' statements place them using the "Laver/Hunt 
metric' (Laver and Hunt 1992). The metric has been reduced from 20 points to 5 
points, thus candidates have the following options when reacting to a statement: 
'Strongly Agree', 'Agree', 'Neither Agree nor Disagree', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly 
Disagree'. Candidates also have a 'Not Applicable' option to cover this 
eventuality. Whilst a 20 point scale might be appropriate for expert respondents, 
it would offer excessive options for the sample which would result in candidates 
needing to spend a disproportionate amount of time considering their response. 
This would reduce response rates and is thus undesirable (see David and 
Sutton 2004:159 for further discussion). 
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The original 'Experts Survey' also asked academics to specify how important 
these issues were to political parties, again using a 20 point scale. This survey 
has adapted the question to ask individual respondents how important the issue 
in question Is to them personally to investigate whether there are significant 
levels of importance assigned to particular issues that define one party group 
from another. Candidates respond on a five point scale consisting of 'Very 
Important', 'Important', 'Neither Important nor Unimportant', 'Unimportant' and 
'Very Unimportant'. A 'Not Applicable' option is also offered. 
The order of responses to all the questions on the survey is randomised to 
avoid any response bias. The survey does not force candidates to answer 
questions by blocking progression unless an answer was given. An open 
response field is available on the final debrief page to allow respondents to offer 
feedback. 
The statistical techniques employed to interrogate the data are taken from the 
previous chapter on the Candidate Survey (see section 5.4), with the addition of 
measures of (xirrelation (Pearson's r) to analyse the strength of relationship 
between interval variables (Pallant 2005:114). 
6.2.3 Piloting The Survey 
The pilot survey was sent out to a sub-sample of 100 respondents a week 
before the final survey was issued. These respondents were selected based on 
a single condition that they participated in the 2006 paper Candidate Survey. 
The rationale for this selection method was based on the expectation that this 
group would be the least likely to respond because their last interaction with the 
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project was in 2006, thus creating a worst case scenario by gauging how low 
the response rate might be. The breakdown of responses was as follows: 
- 99 emails were sent out (one address wrongly formatted) 
- 30 emails bounced i.e. the addresses no longer existed 
- 26 participants responded - all of which completed the whole survey 
Including the emails that had expired, the pilot survey had a 26.3% response 
rate. Considering the response rate was expected to be low this is a satisfactory 
result. The response is particularly high when there was no incentive for 
respondents to participate other than to contribute to the research (Bryman 
2004:137). 
Respondents left specific feedback in the comment box at the end of the survey 
that led to modification of the questions. One made the following observation: 
"Section 3: one question seems disingenuously to avoid the issue of 
whether 'strong local government' is a good thing. Indeed what is 
'strong local government'? I suggest it's one which relates closely to 
local people's needs, ideas, etc and that can be well achieved via a 
coalition of parties..." 
Previous to this comment the survey made no mention of coalitions, thus an 
additional attttudinal statement was added to an existing matrix asking 
respondents to what extent they agree that 'coalitions are better for local 
government than single party majorities'. The issue of whether 'strong local 
government' is a good thing was considered, but the respondent identifies the 
problem with this concept with the rhetorical question over what 'strong local 
government' actually is. Any further change to the question was consequently 
rejected. 
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Another issue was identified by a different respondent with regards to the 
question over which political parties a candidate would stand for in future 
elections. The option of 'Independent' was originally omitted from the preset 
responses, although there was an 'Other (please specify)' option. Whilst it is not 
possible or desirable to list all the 200+ political parties that a candidate stood 
for, it was acknowledged that the omission of the 'Independent' option was an 
oversight and thus it was added as a formal preset response. 
The final piece of feedback came from a respondent who was critical of the 
survey generally: 
This survey forced me to say things I didn't really want to say. The 
binaries didnt always make sense. I'm not sure whether this was the 
intention of the survey creators..." 
It is unclear how the respondent was forced to answer anything unwillingly as 
they could quit the survey at any point. In addition to this none of the questions 
were made compulsory, however the respondent may be voicing concern over 
the rigid stmcture of the survey. Its quantitative nature means that respondents 
are very restricted as to how they answer the questions with a large majority of 
responses limited to preset values. This is especially the case for attitudinal 
statements which the individual can only agree or disagree with regardless of 
any complications they perceive with the question itself. This lack of flexibility is 
integral to the nature of the survey and, considering there were no other 
comments in a similar vein, the criticism will be ignored. 
The observation that "the binaries didn't always make sense" is odd as there 
are no binary questions. The only elements of the survey that are close to this 
description are the two questions that ask whether a candidates was born in 
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either the local authority or the ward that they contested when originally 
surveyed. The candidate has three preset options to this question consisting of 
'Yes', 'No' and 'Unsure'. Based on this either the respondent did not read the 
question correctly or they did not understand what was being asked. The latter 
being the case, the expectation would be that the respondent would select 
'Unsure' as this option has been built in as a safe-guard for this very purpose, 
thus this critique was ignored. 
6.4 Results 
The breakdown of responses for the final survey informed by the pilot (see 
Appendix II) and including these initial responses is as follows: 
- 2,235 emails were issued 
- 445 emails bounced i.e. the addresses no longer existed 
- 786 participant responded - all of whom completed the whole survey 
The following frequency table details the number of respondents from each of 
the constituent party groups: 
Table 6.1 - Frequency of Responses by Party Group: 
Major Parties 
Greens 
UKIP 
BNP 
Others 
Frequency 
663 
70 
29 
3 
9 
Local (Micro) Parties 10 
Ultra-Local (Nano) 
Parties 
Total 
2 
786 
Percent 
84.4 
8.9 
3.7 
.4 
1.1 
1.3 
.3 
100.0 
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The low number of responses for ultra-local (nano) parties, local (micro) parties, 
others and the BNP are a cause for concern. As with previous analysis the low 
number of cases impedes the robustness of the necessary statistical tests. With 
this in mind the analysis will continue with reference only to the major parties, 
the Greens and UKIP. Characterising these groups will still prove useful in 
identifying salient variables for the multivariate predictive model later in the 
thesis. Thus the categorical dependent variable in the following analysis is 
'PartyGroup' with the following three categories: 'Major Parties', 'Greens' and 
'UKIP'. 
6.4.1 Background & Motivations 
Table 6.2 summarises the results of this section. There is no statistically 
significant difference between candidates from the major parties, the Greens or 
UKIP with reference to whether they were bom in the local authority or ward 
which they were contesting when they completed the original paper survey. The 
'localness' of candidates cannot therefore be used to differentiate between 
these groups. 
However there are interesting differences regarding what parties' candidates 
would consider standing for in future elections. Table 63 shows the proportion 
of respondents from each party group that would be prepared to stand as a 
candidate for an alternative party. Respondents were permitted to select more 
than one response, thus the percentages are calculated from the total number 
of positive responses from each individual group per column. 
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Table 6.2- Summary Table for Background & Motivations of Candidates: 
Major „ „ „ „ ^ . .^,D Sample 
_ •.. Greens UKiP . Parties Average 
Bom in Local Authority 19.0% 8.6% 17.2% 17.9% 
Bom in Ward 5.3% 1.4% 6.9% 5.0% 
Stood to Win a Seat 
- Strongly Agree 76.5% 41.5% 65.5% 73.0% 
- Neutral 7.4% 23.1% 17.2% 9.2% 
- Disagree 16.1% 35.4% 17.2% 17.8% 
Standing More Important than Winning 
- Strongly Agree 17.4% 39.7% 40.0% 20.5% 
- Agree 32.8% 25.0% 20.0% 31.5% 
- Neutral 20.9% 17.6% 16.0% 20.4% 
- Disagree 21.4% 14.7% 24.0% 20.8% 
- Strongly Disagree 7.6% 2.9% 0.0% 6.8% 
Table 6.3 - Parties That Candidates Would Stand For In Future Elections by 
Party Group: 
Parties candidates would stand for in future elections 
Lab Con Lib Dem Green UKIP BNP Ind 
Major Parties 30.5% 28.8% 25.9% 2.7% 1.1% .5% 9.0% 
Greens 2.9% .0% .0% 81.4% .0% .0% 7.1% 
UKIP .0% 17.2% .0% .0% 89.7% 3.4% 17.2% 
Whilst the interplay between the three major parties might be worth commenting 
on it is beyond the scope of this analysis which is primarily concerned in 
differentiating between party groups. Ignoring incidents where candidates have 
positively responded to their own party group, it is interesting to note that major 
party candidates are more likely to stand in the future as an Independent (9.0%) 
than for the Greens (2.7%), UKiP (101%) or the BNP (0.5%). Green candidates 
display the same tendency, but unlike the major party candidates they show a 
higher level of loyalty with no candidates entertaining the possibility of standing 
for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, UKIP or BNP. A small number do 
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however consider standing as a Labour candidate (2.8%). By far the most 
interesting result to take from this table comes from UKIP candidates who show 
a notably high tendency to stand as a future Independent (17.2%) or 
Conservative (17.2%). This inclination could be used to discriminate UKIP 
candidates from the other party groups. 
There are also significant differences between the party groups regarding 
motivations for standing. When collapsing the original response categories to 
avoid low cell counts ('Strongly Agree' + 'Agree' = Positive, 'Neither Agree nor 
Disagree' = Neutral. 'Disagree' + 'Strongly Disagree' = Negative) there is a 
statistically significant relationship between party groups and whether 
candidates agreed with the statement that they stood to win a seat. 76.5% of 
major party candidates agreed that they stood to win, compared to 65.5% of 
UKIP and 41.5% of Greens suggesting that Green candidates are the least 
likely to report office-seeking behaviour. Unsurprisingly 35.4% of Green 
candidates disagreed with the statement, again with the major party and UKiP 
candidates showing similar levels of disagreement (16.1% and 17.2% 
respectively). Green candidates can be characterised by their lack of office-
seeking behaviour, but the similarities between UKIP and major party 
respondents should be noted. 
When candidates were asked whether they agreed that standing is more 
important than winning the three-point scale does not identify any statistically 
significant relationships. However by returning to the original five-point scale a 
relationship does become evident as illustrated in fig. 6.1. The relationship is 
due to the variance between groups in the 'Strongly Agree' category. Only 
17.4% of major party candidates selected this option, compared to 39.7% and 
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40.0% of Green and UKIP candidates respectively. This variable is potentially 
useful for discriminating major party candidates from the other two groups if the 
five-point response scale is used as it demonstrates a higher than average 
tendency for minor party candidates to display non office-seeking behaviour. 
This observation is supported by the disproportionate increase in minor party 
activity compared to vote share explored in chapter 3 and illustrates the 
importance of presence over electoral success to minor party candidates. 
Fig. 6.1 - Attitudes Towards 'Standing Being More Important Than Winning' by 
Party Group: 
Attitudes Towards Motivations for Standing by Party Group 
40.0%-
30.0%-
I 
C 20.0%-
0 . 
10.0%-
0,0%' 
Party Group 
• Kbjor Forties 
• &eens 
D U K P 
Strongly Agree Agree F^elher Agree Disagree Strongly 
nor Disagree Cteagree 
Standing is more important tiian winning? 
6-4.2 Geographical Relevance 
Table 6.4 present a summary of the findings of this chapter. None of the party 
groups differed significantly in their agreement that local and national affairs are 
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relevant to local government, but they can be differentiated based on their view 
regarding the relevance of global and European affairs. Not a single Green 
candidate agreed that global affairs were relevant to local government 
compared to 27.6% of UKIP and 21.1% of major party candidates. The similarity 
between the latter two groups does not remain constant as 48.3% of UKIP 
respondents disagreed that global affairs were not relevant in contrast to 65.3% 
from the major parties. The high proportion of negative responses from Green 
candidates (91.4%) suggests that this could be used as a variable that 
distinguishes this group apart from the rest. 
Table 6.4 - Summary Table for Geographical Relevance: 
Local Affairs Are Not Relevant 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
National Affairs Are Not Relevant 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
European Affairs Are Not Relevant 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Global Affairs Are Not Relevant 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Party Politics Is Not Relevant 
- Positive 
' Neutral 
- Negative 
Major 
Parties 
2.8% 
1.4% 
95.8% 
8.6% 
5.2% 
86.2% 
18.4% 
12.0% 
69.6% 
21.1% 
13.6% 
65.3% 
15.8% 
10.3% 
73.8% 
Greens 
2.9% 
5.7% 
91.4% 
2.9% 
2.9% 
94.3% 
5.7% 
11.4% 
82.9% 
0.0% 
8.6% 
91.1% 
10.0% 
20.0% 
70.0% 
UKIP 
3.4% 
0.0% 
96.6% 
0.0% 
10.3% 
89.7% 
20.7% 
3.4% 
75.9% 
27.6% 
24.1% 
48.3% 
37.9% 
3.4% 
58.6% 
Sample 
Average 
2.8% 
1.7% 
95.5% 
7.7% 
5.2% 
87.1% 
17.3% 
11.6% 
71.1% 
19.4% 
13.5% 
67.1% 
16.2% 
10.9% 
72.9% 
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Regarding the relevance of European affairs to local government the 
differences betw/een the party groups borders on statistical significance and the 
relationship is again due to variances caused by the Greens. Only 5.2% of 
Green candidates agreed that European affairs w/ere not relevant, compared to 
18.4% and 20.7% of UKIP and major party candidates. This difference is 
consistent with the proportion of candidates that thought European affairs were 
relevant (82.9% of Green, 75.9% of UKIP and 69.6% of major party 
candidates). This is another example of a vanable that distinguishes Green 
candidates from the two other party groups. 
Interestingly it is the UKIP candidates who stand out as statistically different 
when asked whether party politics has a place in local govemment. These 
candidates were much more likely to agree that local government should be rid 
of party politics (37.9%) and notably less likely to disagree with the statement 
(58.6%) than any other party (15.8% and 73.8% for major party candidates, 
10.0% and 70.0% for Green candidates respectively). UKIP candidates can 
therefore be characterised by their anti-party attitudes in local government. 
6.4.3 Electoral Reform & Party Systems 
Table 6.5 summarises the analysis for this section and reveals that there are 
significant differences between the party groups regarding electoral issues. 
Table 6.6 illustrates in more detail the variance in responses regarding whether 
the current voting system delivers strong local government. Unlike many of the 
previous crosstabulations, there is little similarity between any of the party 
groups. The differences are clearly significant with only 2.9% of Green 
candidates agreeing with the statement with levels agreement increasing as we 
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move from UKIP to major party candidates. The converse is tme for levels of 
disagreement where 70.0% of Greens feel this way, with the proportion of 
candidates from other party groups in this category reducing as we move from 
UKIP to the major parties. Unusually all the parties differ in their responses, 
thus they can all be defined by this variable. 
Table 6.5 - Summary Table for Electoral Reform & Party Systems: 
FPTP Delivers Strong Local Govt. 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
PR Would Improve Local Govt. 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Ballot Papers to Allow Voter Ranking 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
'None of the Above' On Ballots 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Current System Favours Major Parties 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Coalition Preferable to One Party Maj. 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Coincide Elections to Increase Turnout 
- Positive 
- Neutral 
- Negative 
Major 
Parties 
41.5% 
18.2% 
40.3% 
49.0% 
15.7% 
35.3% 
57.8% 
13.8% 
28.3% 
43.1% 
14.2% 
42.8% 
66.9% 
14.2% 
19.0% 
23.9% 
47.8% 
34.6% 
74.6% 
12.8% 
12.6% 
Greens 
2.9% 
27.1% 
21.4% 
94.3% 
5.7% 
0.0% 
82.9% 
12.9% 
4.3% 
62.3% 
11.6% 
26.1% 
97.1% 
2.9% 
0.0% 
47.8% 
47.8% 
4.5% 
70.5% 
23.0% 
6.6% 
UKIP 
28.6% 
21.4% 
50.0% 
71.4% 
14.3% 
14.3%. 
65.5% 
17.2% 
17.2% 
44.8% 
13.8% 
41.1% 
100.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
34.6% 
23.1% 
42.3% 
63.0% 
14.8% 
22.2% 
Sample 
Average 
37.4% 
19.2% 
43.4% 
54.1% 
14.7% 
31.2% 
60.5% 
13.9% 
25.6% 
44.9% 
13.9% 
41.2% 
71.0% 
12.6% 
16.5% 
26.5% 
27.1% 
46.4% 
73.8% 
13.8% 
12.4% 
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A similar picture emerges from candidates' attitudes towards whether a PR 
voting system would improve local government. 94.3% of Green candidates 
agree that PR would be an improvement, compared to 71.4% of UKIP and 
49.0% of major party candidates. Notably not a single respondent from the 
Green Party disagrees with this proposal ojmpared to 14.3% and 35,3% of 
respondents from UKIP and the major parties. 
Table 6.6- Assessment of 'Strong Local Government Being Achieved Through 
Current Voting System' by Party Group: 
Current voting system (FPTF) delivers strong local government 
Positive Neutral Negative Total 
Party Major Count 271 
Group Parties Expected Count 244.3 
% Party Group 41.5% 
Greens Count 2 
Expected Count 26.2 
% Party Group 2.9% 
UKIP Count 8 
Expected Count 10,5 
% Party Group 28.6% 
119 
125.2 
18.2% 
19 
13.4 
27.1% 
6 
5.4 
21.4% 
263 
283.5 
40.3% 
49 
30.4 
70.0% 
14 
12.2 
50.0% 
653 
653.0 
100.0% 
70 
70.0 
100.0% 
28 
28,0 
100.0% 
Total Count 281 
Expected Count 281.0 
% Party Group 37.4% 
144 
144.0 
19.2% 
326 
326.0 
43.4% 
751 
751.0 
100.0% 
The issue of whether voters should be allowed to rank candrdates on a local 
ballot paper split the typological groups with a large proportion of Green 
candidates supporting the idea (82.9%) followed by UKIP (65.5%) and major 
party candidates (57.8%). The biggest critics were respondents from the major 
parties (28.3%) closely followed by UKIP (17.2%). Only 4.3% of Green Party 
candidates said they would oppose the measure. 
The relationship between party group and attitudes towards a 'none of the 
above" option on ballot papers is statistically significant and the relationship is 
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due to the variance in responses from the Greens. Whilst support for the idea 
from major party and UKIP candidates was similar (43.1% and 44,8% 
respectively), Green candidates are notably more positive with 62.3% of 
respondents agreeing with the measure. Again the levels of positive support 
were proportionally reflected in the levels of disagreement for the idea (26.1 % of 
Green, 41.4% of UKIP and 42.8% of major party respondents). This variable is 
useful for distinguishing Green candidates from the other groups. 
It is the UKIP and Green candidates that give similar responses when asked 
whether the current local electoral system favours the mainstream parties. Not a 
single candidate from either group disagreed with the statement and only two 
candidates from the Greens claimed to be mutual (8.7%). In contrast 19% of 
major party respondents disagreed with another 14% remaining neutral. The 
relationship is significant and may be useful for differentiating major party from 
minor party candidates. 
There are also significant differences regarding attitudes towards coalitions. 
Whilst Green candidates are the most supportive of coalitions over single parly 
majorities in local government (47.8%), they are also the most neutral with 
exactly the same proportion of respondents sitting in the middle as supporting 
the measure. The other party groups are more polahsed, but generally the 
majority disagree with the statement; 51.0% of major party and 42.3% of UKIP 
candidates responded negatively. Only 2 cases differed between the positive 
and negative response for UKIP respondents, suggesting that this variable 
might be more useful for discriminating major party candidates for their rejection 
of coalitions rather than Green Party candidates for their support. 
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Despite the differences in attitudes towards electoral refomi, party groups 
cannot be individually characterised based on whether candidates believed that 
increased turnout is a good justification for holding General Elections on the 
same day as local elections. The same is true regarding whether local elections 
should have been moved in 2004 and 2009 to coincide with European electoral 
contests. 
6.4.4 Policy & Ideoloov 
Candidates from different party groups did differ in where they placed 
themselves politically on a one dimensional left-right spectrum. On the nine-
point scale (where 1 = left-wing, 5 = centre and 9 = right-wing) Table 6.7 shows 
that the Greens are the most left-wing party with the lowest mean (1.9), and 
UKIP are on the centre-right (6.6), The result for the major parties should be 
meaningless given its constituent parts and inherent ideological variance, but it 
is interesting to note that the standard deviation for the major party group (2.2) 
is less than the standard deviation for UKIP (2.4). This would suggest that there 
is more ideological coherence between candidates from the big three parties 
(Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat) than between candidates from 
UKIP alone. Green Party candidates are notably cohesive in comparison with a 
much smaller standard deviation and not a single respondent placing 
themselves anywhere on the right-hand side of the political spectrum (maximum 
value = 5). 
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Table 6.7 - Descriptive 
Position by Party Group: 
N 
Major Parties 595 
Greens 61 
UKIP 26 
Total 682 
Statistics 
Mean 
4.10 
1.92 
6.58 
4.00 
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for Candidates' Self-Described Left-Right 
Std. Deviation Minimum 
2.24 ,00 
1.22 .00 
2.39 .00 
2.32 .00 
Maximum 
9.00 
5.00 
9.00 
9.00 
A one-way ANOVA confirms that the differences are statistically significant, and 
although Leven's test for homogeneity of variance is violated the Welch and 
Brown-Forsythe robust tests of equality of means are both significant, 
suggesting that the assumptions of the test are not violated. Post-hoc tests 
show that these differences are significant between all three groups. A useful 
observations to be taken from this analysis is how ideologically diverse UKIP 
candidates are as a group and how ideologically cohesive Green candidates 
are as a group. 
However this is based on a respondents' own opinion on their political position. 
When given a set of policy statements, do the outcomes of these responses 
match candidates' own left-right positioning? The statements candidates were 
asked were worded in such a way that ail agreement displays left-wing 
tendencies and all disagreement displays right-wing tendencies (see Laver and 
Benoit 2007, Laver and Hunt 1992). To compute an aggregate left-right metric, 
responses were coded as follows: 
'Strongly Agree' = 2 
'Agree' = 1 
'Neutral' = 0 
'Disagree' = -1 
'Strongly Disagree' = -2 
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The coded responses of all eleven policy statements were then aggregated to 
create a 45 point left-right scale where a score of 22 indicates far left-wing 
tendencies and a score of -22 indicates far right-wing tendencies with 0 
indicating a preference for centre policies. Fig. 6.2 plots the results of this 
constnjcted metric against respondents own perception of where they belong 
on the left-right political spectrum, and because the two variables are interval 
level it is possible to use Pearson's r to measure the strength of correlation 
between the two measures. 
Overall there is a clear pattern in the plots that indicates a correlation between 
where respondents placed themselves and where their policy attitudes place 
them {fs = -0.48, p<0.05), however there is significant variation in correlation 
between the party groups. 
Because the major party candidates differ in their ideological positions due to 
the three constituent parties that form the group. It is not surprising that the 
points are scattered (although the ANOVA suggests an unexpectedly high level 
of cohesion). It is useful to see this as a control group which clearfy displays a 
trend in which a right-wing response on the x-axis generally corresponds with a 
right-wing response on the y-axis and vica-verea. It is also important to 
remember that despite the different parties, fig. 6.2 plots the responses of 
individuals - which would explain why the correlation is significant and of 
reasonable strength (fs = -0.41, p<0.05). 
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Fig. 6.2 - Comparing Candidates' Self-Described Left-Right Position with the 
Position Derived from Attitudes Towards Policy Statements: 
Plotting Self-Placed Against Constructed Leflff?ight Position By Party Group 
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Self-Placed Position on Left/Right Spectrum: 
Green candidates display the strongest correlation between the two measures 
of ideological positioning {rs = -0.44. p<0.Q5), and this can be seen in fig. 6.2 by 
the clustering of green markers left of the centre point on the x-axis (<5) and 
above the centre point on the y-axis (>0). This upper left quadrant is where 
candidates who claimed to be left-wing outright and gave left-wing responses to 
the attitudinal statements are located. 
In contrast to the coherent responses of these two groups, there is no 
statistically significant correlation between the two variables for UKIP 
candidates {rs=-0.07). A glance at fig. 6.2 shows that whilst UKIP respondents 
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tended to place themselves on the right of the political spectrum, the responses 
they gave to the attitudinal statements do not correspond to this. Whilst 
individuals may place themselves to the right when given the option, some of 
these appear on the left when their attitudinal motivations are investigated 
further. Correlations for major parties and the Greens advocate that the scale is 
valid, therefore UKIP candidates are by comparison ideologically diveree - an 
observation already suggested by the previous ANOVA. 
When asked about the personal importance candidates placed on these issues 
there was no significant difference between party groups regarding the following 
statements: 
- Government should raise taxes to increase public services 
- Government should decentralize power to local authorities 
- Government should promote a cosmopolitan rather than English/British 
national consciousness, history and culture 
- Government should promote the protection of civil liberties 
- Government should favour liberal policies on euthanasia 
However there were differences regarding protecting the environment at the 
cost of economic growth where 98.3% of Green candidates felt that this was an 
important issue to them, compared to 70.9% of major party and 66.7% of UKIP 
candidates. Not a single Green candidate felt that this issue was unimportant, 
but 18.5% of UKIP respondents felt this way. In contrast 21.0% of major party 
candidates claimed to be neutral. Unsurprisingly a high level of environmental 
importance can be used to characterise Green candidates, indicating that the 
policy agenda is specific to this party. 
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Opinion was also split regarding the importance of the government adopting 
liberal policies on homosexuality. Again Green candidates placed the highest 
value on such a policy with 78.0% reporting this as being important compared to 
50.5% and 34.6% of major party and UKIP candidates respectively. UKIP 
candidates were also the least likely to believe that this issue was important 
with 30.8% responding that it was unimportant. The results suggest that party 
groups can be characterised as either tolerant or indifferent towards the issue of 
a liberal agenda towards homosexuality. 
In contrast the Greens can be noted for their apathy towards the policy idea that 
govemment should promote urban over rural interest with 78.4% responding as 
neutral or unimportant. UKIP candidates thought the issue to be the most 
salient with 52.0% believing it to be important, followed closely by 41.7% of 
major party respondents. The importance for UKIP and lack of importance for 
Green candidates is demonstrated by this variable. 
UKIP candidates can also be characterised by the importance they place on the 
issue of whether the EU should be enlarged. 84.6% of candidates from this 
party felt the issue to be salient, nearly double the 44.9% from major parties and 
nearly quadruple the 22.0% of Green respondents. 
A similar trend can be seen regarding the policy statement that the govemment 
should favour policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return 
to their own country. 88.9% of UKIP candidates thought this to be an important 
issue, followed by 51.5% of major party and 37.9% of Green respondents. Only 
a single UKIP respondent felt this issue to be unimportant (3.7%), indicating that 
UKIP can be characterised as placing great importance on issues regarding 
asylum and immigration. 
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Table 6.8 reveals the difference in responses from party groups over the 
importance of the idea that government should favour high levels of state 
regulation and control of the market. Generally there are similar proportions of 
respondents believing the issue to be 'important' and the variation is in the 
'neutral' and "unimportant' categories. Only 3.7% of UKIP candidates remained 
'neutral' on the policy and only 3.4% of Green candidates felt that the issue was 
'unimportant'. The ability to classify UKIP respondents as the least likely to 
remain 'neutral' and Green candidates as the least likely to select 'unimportant' 
demonstrates the explanatory potential of this variable. 
Table 6.8- Importance of State Regulation by Party Group: 
Government should favour high levels of state regulation and 
control of the market {Personal Importance) 
Important Neutral Unimportant Total 
Party Major Count 391 
Group Parties Expected Count 395.9 
% Party Group 66.4% 
Greens Count 42 
Expected Count 39.0 
% Party Group 72.4% 
UKIP Count 20 
Expected Count 18.1 
% Party Group 74.1% 
103 
103.1 
17.5% 
14 
10.2 
24.1% 
1 
4.7 
3.7% 
95 
90.0 
16.1% 
2 
8.9 
3.4% 
6 
4.1 
22.2% 
589 
589.0 
100.0% 
58 
58.0 
100.0% 
27 
27.0 
100.0% 
Total Count 453 
Expected Count 453.0 
% Party Group 67.2% 
118 
118.0 
17.5% 
103 
103.0 
15.3% 
674 
674.0 
100.0% 
Finally candidates were asked vi/hether they thought it was important that the 
mass media should be completely free to publish and material they see fit. The 
variance between party groups can be seen in the interaction between 
'important' and 'neutral' responses where UKIP candidates responded with 
73.1% and 11.5% respectively. Major party candidates were more apathetic 
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with 63.5% seeing the issue as important and 20.0% remaining neutral in 
contrast to 44.8% and 39.7% for the Greens. 
6.5 Discussion 
The analysis has been a valuable exercise in describing the differences and 
similarities between major party, Green and UKIP local government candidates. 
As suggested by the literature (see section 6.1) parties can be differentiated 
based on policy agendas that are common between candidates of the same 
affiliation. However not all parties are ideologically cohesive with individuals 
from UKIP revealing within-party variability when asked to place themselves on 
a 9 point left-right spectrum, which supports the observation from the research 
literature that some minor parties create their own paradigms that do not fit 
within the traditional left-right framework (Herzog 1987, Arian and Shamir 1983 
- see section 2.2 for further explanation). 
Despite this apparent divergence of UKIP candidates in terms of ideology, it is 
still possible to differentiate these respondents from those of other parties 
based on their attitudes towards policies - notably including immigration and EU 
involvement. This indicates that UKIP as a party has a narrow policy focus 
around which its political agenda is built, but for issues it is less concerned 
about candidates can take their own stance. Thus whilst they can be referenced 
to the left-right policy spectrum (as argued by Smith 1991) on some issues, they 
are detached on others. This results in a level of autonomy for candidates 
regarding many issues, and this may explain why it proved difficult to 
characterise UKIP respondents in the previous chapter using demographic and 
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background data. For example, channels of support are particularly likely to 
change between individual candidates depending on their personal stance. 
The analysis of attitudes towards specific issues has identified several variables 
which may inform a multivariate model with the purpose of predicting party 
group membership. Table 6.9 provides a summary of these variables based on 
party group and topic (Note: blank cells are not indicative of any relationship but 
a result of formatting) and clearly demonstrates how useful this analysis has 
been in characterising candidates from the Green Party. Candidates from this 
group can be differentiated from the major and UKIP respondents on 16 
variables and the number of significant observations is likely to be a result of a 
reasonably large Green response (n=70). The lack of information on UKIP 
candidates in the previous chapter has also been addressed through the 
identification of nine commonalities shared by UKIP candidates that differentiate 
them from other party groups. However, six of these are related to the policy 
positions of UKIP candidates and this chapter has shown that this group is the 
least ideologically cohesive. In addition to this the number of UKIP respondents 
is low compared to the other party groups (n=29), suggesting that these results 
should be treated with caution when making generalisations from the sample to 
the population. The fact that major party candidates cannot be characterised 
based on ideology and policy positions is unsurprising considering that the 
category is an aggregate of three different parties, but clearly there is unrty 
between candidates regarding electoral reform and office-see king behaviour 
that is characteristic of mainstream party candidates. 
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Table 6.9-A Summary of Differences Between Party Groups: 
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MAJOR PARTIES 
Unlikely to stand for minor 
parties with tendency towards 
standing as an Independent 
Least likely to believe that 
star>ding is more important 
than winning 
Most likely to believe that 
global affairs are relevant lo 
local govemrrtent 
Most likely to agree that FPTP 
delivers strong local 
qovemment 
Least likely lo believe thai PR 
would improve local 
qovemment 
Least likely lo support ranking 
candidates on local ballot 
papers 
Least likely to support the 
notion of coalitions in local 
qovernment 
GREENS 
Unlikely to stand for any other 
party with tendency lowands 
standing as an Independent 
Least likely to report office-
seeking behaviour 
Least likely lo tjelieve that global 
affairs are relevant to local 
qovemment 
Most likely to believe Ihat 
European affairs are relevant to 
local government 
Least likely to agree that FPTP 
delivers strong local government 
Most likely to believe that PR 
would improve local government 
Most likely to support ranking 
candidates on local ballot 
papers 
Notably likely lo support 'none of 
the atiove" option on local ballot 
papers 
UKIP 
Just as likely to stand as a 
Conservative candidate in 
the fulure as an Independent 
Notably likely to oppose party 
politics in local govemment 
Similar levels of support for the notion ttiat the current electoral 
system favours the mainstream parties 
Most likely to support the notion 
of coalitions in local govemment 
Ideological coherence within the 
party 
Notably likely to place 
importance on protecting the 
environment at cost of economic 
qrowth 
Most likely to place importance 
on liberal policies regarding 
homosexuaiitv 
Notable apathy towards the 
importance of promoting rural 
over urban interests 
Least likely to place importance 
on stricter asylum and 
immigration policies 
Least likely to place little or no 
importance on high levels of 
government market regulation 
Most likely to be apathetic 
towards the importance of media 
freedom 
Ideologically disparate within 
the party 
Least likely to place 
importance on liberal policies 
regarding homosexuality 
Most likely lo place 
importance on promoting 
rural over urban interests 
Notable importance placed in 
issue of EU enlargement 
Most likely lo place 
importance on stricter asylum 
and immigration policies 
Notably apathetic towards 
importance of high levels of 
government market 
regulation 
Most likely to place 
importance on media 
freedom 
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Chapter 7: Modelling Minor Parties 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined differences between candidates from major parties 
and minor party subgroups using individual level postal and online survey data. 
This analysis showed that there are some statistically significant differences 
between the groups, but there are also many similarities. The continuing 
research question about similarities and differences between minor and major 
party candidates is the focus of this chapter which uses multivariate analysis to 
investigate the issue further. 
The research literature suggests that minor and major parties are different but 
the focus there is on the party as a unit, and not the individual membership. 
Smith (1991), for example, discusses the detached, marginal and hinged 
characterisation of parties from outside the mainstream while Copus et al. 
(2008) advocate a grass-roots approach that employs categories such as 
branch parties, local parties or political associations (see chapter 2, section 2.3 
for a detailed discussion). These studies, however, focus on parties as 
organisations and explain little about the people who stand for election. 
Notwithstanding differences of an organisational nature is it possible to 
distinguish parties apart in terms of typical membership characteristics? Could 
those differences be sufficiently large that it would allow an a priori grouping 
whereby once the characteristics of a person are known, it would be possible to 
estimate the likelihood of membership of a particular party i.e. to assign the 
individual to the party group with the highest probability? Answers to such 
questions might then provide some explanation about the growing incidence of 
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candidates representing minor parties discussed in chapter 3. The most 
appropriate approach for undertaking this task is a form of multivariate analysis, 
namely multinomial logistic regression. 
Accordingly, section 7.2 outlines and justifies the use of multinomial logistic 
regression as a predictive model whilst discussing the assumptions and 
requirements of the technique. The decision to develop two separate models is 
explained. Section 7.3 applies the method to the Candidate Survey data that 
was first discussed in chapter 5. There is a detailed discussion in sub-section 
7.3.1 on variable selection followed by model testing and refinement in sub-
section 7.3.2. The results are interpreted and discussed in subsection 7.3.3 and 
an alternative model to improve predictability is advocated in sub-section 7.3.4. 
Section 7.4 essentially repeats the process of variable selection, model testing 
and interpretation but instead uses the separate data collected from the Follow-
Up Candidate survey which was discussed in chapter 6. Sub-section 7.4,4 tests 
the effects of altering the reference category to increase predictive power and 
discusses the use of manual likelihood thresholds. The chapter concludes with 
section 7.5 which assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the model as a 
predictive tool of party membership. 
7.2 Model Selection 
The choice of an appropriate predictive statistical model is largely determined 
by the research question, the structure of the data and the nature of the 
dependent variable. Because the aim of the research is to predict group 
membership and the dependent variable is party group, a categorical and non-
143 
Chapter 7: Modelling Minor Parties 
ordered variable with several possible responses, the most appropriate 
approach to use is multinomial logistic regression (Pallant 2005:160). 
Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic regression that 
enables the simultaneous analysis of a dependent variable with more than two 
categories. The model can characterise party groups based on the individual 
responses of candidates, thus allowing the prediction of group membership if 
the characterisation is accurate. The technique uses one category of the 
dependent variable as a reference point by which all other groups are compared 
against. For example, with major parties as the reference category the model 
will indicate how the other party groups differ from them. A well defined 
multinomial model enables observations such as respondents that have been 
involved in a pressure group are more likely to be Green candidates than major 
party candidates, all other circumstances being equal', or even more precise 
claims like 'for those respondents that have been involved in a pressure group, 
the odds of being a Green candidate were increased by 74.7% points'. 
A condition of this predictive capability is that multinomial logistic regression 
does not make such compansons between subcategories of the dependent 
variable that are not identified as being the reference group. Although it would 
be desirable to alternate the reference category and run a series of models that 
cross-examines the data, the reference category must be of an appreciable 
size. Because of this all the initial models in this chapter will consider major 
parties as the reference category to ensure that the most robust model possible 
is used. 
There are assumptions and requirements related to the technique that must be 
realised to ensure a robust model. The first assumption is that of the 
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Independent Irrelevant Alternative (IIA), meaning that the removal of any 
subcategory of the dependent variables from the model should not alter the 
results. This assumption is tested for in each model and commented on if 
violated. 
The second assumption is that the predictor variables are not strongly inter-
correlated. Independent vanables should be strongly related to the dependent 
variable but not to each other as this leads to muiticolinearity (Pallant 
2005:161). This is discussed in detail for each model using colinearity 
diagnostics and bivariate tests to ensure model integrity. 
An additional requirement of the model relates to missing data within the 
independent vanables. Only cases in which all predictor variables contain valid 
data are included in the model, SPSS uses list-wise deletion of missing cases 
which removes cases from the model if any of the independent variables 
contain missing data. 
With these factors in mind, although it is possible to combine the First 
Candidate Sun/ey and Follow-Up Candidate Surveys into a single dataset 
(which would allow the design of a model that uses variables from both sources 
- see chapter 5 for details), it Is not desirable because the model will reject 
cases with missing values. The Follow-Up Candidate Survey has 762 cases 
and the First Candidate Survey has 4,192 and using variables from both 
datasets would therefore cause at least 3,430 cases to be excluded from the 
model. To avoid this, a separate model will be run for each dataset. 
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7.3 First Candidate Survey 
Analysis of the First Candidate Survey In chapter 5 identified 22 variables that 
could potentially be used to predict party group membership. These variables 
and their response codes can be viewed in Table 7.1 (for a more detailed 
discussion including the theoretical justifications of variable selection see 
chapter 5). 
The categorical dependent variable is 'PARTYTYPO' and refers to the different 
party subgroups with the following labels and values: major parties' = 1 
in=3479), 'Greens' = 2 {n=368). 'BNP' = 3 {n=78l 'UKIP' = 4 (n=171) and 'local 
(micro) parties' = 5 (n=34). The decision to continue to treat the small national 
parties as separate entities is based on previous observations of variance 
between the groups. The catch-ail category of Others' (n=53) has also been 
excluded for reasons of in-group heterogeneity (see chapter 5 for discussion). 
The ultra-local (nano) pari:y category (n=8) has been removed from analysis 
due to a lack of cases. 
7.3.1 Variable Selection 
Several of the predictors have high levels of missing data (see Table 7.1). One 
of the requirements in multinomial logistic regression is that none of the values 
of the independent variables are missing and to ensure this criteria is met the 
technique excludes any cases where data is missing from any of the 22 
predictors. The data is cleariy problematic as this results in only 390 out of 4130 
(9-44%) cases in the dataset being Included, with candidates distributed as 
follows: major parties {n=332). Greens in=36), UKIP {n=12). BNP {n=6) and 
local (micro) parties {n=34). 
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Table 7.1 - First Candidate Sun/ey (salient variables identified in chapter 4): 
Variable: 
ETHNIC 
HIGHED* 
PARLCAND 
PROFESS 
CHARITY 
LOCPARTV 
PRESSURE 
PUBLIC 
TRADEUN* 
NATPRES' 
NATCOMM* 
NATPERS 
NATBUSS' 
NATEMP* 
NATPARTY 
NATAGENT' 
SELECT 
MORESEAT 
ASKSTAND 
PAPER 
WINSEAT 
PERREP 
Description; 
Ethnicity of candidate 
Highest educational 
qualif ication 
Previously a parl iamentary 
candidate 
Professional association 
experience 
Charitable organisation 
experience 
Locai party experience 
Local pressure group 
experience 
Local public body 
experience 
Nature of support f rom 
trade unions 
Nature of support f rom 
local pressure groups 
Nature of support f rom 
communi ty groups 
Nature of support f rom 
personal friends 
Nature of support f rom 
business associates 
Nature of support f rom 
employers 
Nature of support f rom 
party members 
Nature of support f r om 
party agents 
More people seeking 
selection than seats in ward 
Applied for more than one 
seat 
Asked to stand 
Paper candidate 
Selected due to being likely 
to win a seat 
Selected due to personal 
reputat ion 
Parameters: 
(1= 'white', 2 = 'non-white') 
(1 = 'no qualificatior', 2 = 'GCSEs or 
equivalent', 3 = 'A-levels or equivalent', 4 = 
'first degree', 5 = 'higher degree'} 
(1 = 'yes', 2= 'no'} 
(1 = 'yes', 2- 'no'} 
(1 ='yes'. 2 ='no'} 
(1 = 'yes', 2 = 'no'} 
(1 = 'yes', 2 = 'no'} 
(1 = 'yes; 2 = 'no'} 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral'. 3 = 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 - 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 3 = 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive'. 2 = 'neutral', 3 = 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 3 = 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive'. 2 = 'neutral', 3 - 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 3 - 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 3 = 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'positive'. 2 = 'neutral', 3 - 'negative', 
4 = 'not applicable') 
(1 = 'yes', 2= 'no') 
(1 ='yes; 2 ^'no') 
{1 = 'yes'. 2 = 'no') 
(1 = 'yes', 2 = 'no') 
(1 = 'yes', 2 = 'no'} 
(1 = 'yes'. 2 = 'no'} 
Missing; 
136 
1171' 
375 
359 
282 
259 
344 
341 
3041* 
2634' 
1694* 
385 
1943* 
2446* 
295 
797' 
125 
108 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Note: All independent variables are categorical. All variables are nominal 
(cannot be naturally ordered) apart from 'HIGHED' which is ordinal {Agresti 
2002). TRADEUN \ 'NA TPRES \ 'NA TCOMM\ NATPERS'. 'NA TBUSS'. 
•NATEMP', 'NATPARTV and 'NATAGENT' will not be treated as ordinal as the 
'not applicable' category will be retained both to maximize the number of cases 
in the model and as an explanatory factor 
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Therefore a decision must be made over whether to retain all the independent 
variables due to their salience in the bivariate analysis, or whether a selection of 
these variables should be removed in favour of expanding the number of cases 
eligible for modeling. For this analysis it is deemed that the number of cases in 
the full model with 22 variables is far too low to assign characteristics to 
particular groups. For example, it is unreasonable to expect this model to make 
any predictions over the characteristics of BNP candidates with only 6 cases. 
As the aim of this model is to differentiate between these groups, variables with 
more than 500 missing values will be removed in favour of increasing the 
sample size. 
The revised model, excluding any variables where the number of missing cases 
exceeds n=500 (denoted by a '*' in Table 7.1), leads to the removal of the 
following: 
• HIGHED - highest educational qualification 
• TRADEUN - nature of support from trade unions 
• NATPRES - nature of support from local pressure groups 
• NATCOMM - nature of support from community groups 
• NATBUSS - nature of support from business associates 
• NATEMP - nature of support from employers 
• NAT AGENT - nature of support from party agent 
This results in 3098 out of 4130 (75.01%) cases being included in the model 
with the following party group breakdovm: major parties (n=2652). Greens 
{n=268), UKIP {n-111), BNP (n=50) and local (micro) parties {n=17). Even after 
the removal of seven problematic variables there are still too few local (micro) 
party candidates to devise a well specified and robust model. One solution 
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could be to merge this party group with another, thus increasing the number of 
cases, however chapter 4 illustrates that there are significant differences 
between candidates from minor party groups meaning that any merge is 
illogical. With this in mind, local (micro) party candidates will be excluded from 
the model. 
An additional assumption of the model is that all predictor variables are 
independent of each other thus avoiding the problem of multicolinearity. If two 
predictor variables are significantly correlated then the model is less robust and 
the significance tests for the regression coefficients are not valid. Principal 
component analysis identifies several instances where multiple variables are 
loaded onto the same dimension, thus suggesting colinearity between specific 
predictor variables. Using this information as indicative of potential problems, a 
series of chi-square tests were used to confirm or refute independence. 
This process reveals one example in which two variables are very closely 
related - whether a respondent was a paper candidate ('PAPER') and whether 
they believed that they were selected because they would win the seat 
('WINSEAT'). Of those who claimed to be paper candidates, only 18 (0.43%) 
thought that they were chosen based on a high likelihood of winning a seat. 
Because the nature of paper candidates is that they are token candidates for a 
party and not real contenders, it Is logical that they are not expected to win a 
seat. Clearly both of these variables cannot operate in the same model and the 
least useful variable should be discarded. Paper candidacy is deemed to be of 
more interest for this analysis and will be kept in favour of selection due to 
likelihood of winning. 
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After carefully selecting and interrogating the dataset the model now contains 
the following 14 independent variables: 
ETHNIC - Ethnicity of candidate 
PARLCAND - Previously a parliamentary candidate 
PROFESS - Profession association experience 
CHARITY - Charitable organisation experience 
LOCPARTY - Local party experience 
PRESSURE - Local pressure group experience 
PUBLIC - Local public body experience 
NATPERS - Nature of support from personal friends 
NATPARTY - Nature of support from party members 
SELECT - More people seeking selection than seats in ward 
MORESEAT - Applied for more than one seat 
ASKSTAND - Asked to stand 
PAPER - Paper candidate 
PERREP - Selected due to personal reputation 
7.3.2 Model Testing & Refinement 
The next step is to test whether these variables aid our model in predicting the 
party group of individual candidates. Regression models are particularly 
susceptible to over-fitting (see Thompson 1995 for further discussion) meaning 
that the final model provides a post hoc explanation for the existing data with 
poor genera Usability i.e. the model would not provide a good explanation of ttie 
phenomenon when applied to a new set of data with the same variables. One 
solution to this problem of over-fitting is to use cross-validation - the process of 
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dividing the whole sample into two random groups and cross-validating the 
significance of independent variables. A well specified predictor variable should 
have a significant explanatory effect on any subsection of the data, thus 
ensuring the integrity and validity of the model. However, the process of splitting 
the sample inevitably results in the loss of information {statistical relationships 
are harder to establish as sample size decreases) and as a result some 
significant but weak predictors may wrongly be excluded from the final model. 
Because of this complication, interpretation of significance must carefully be 
considered e.g. p-values of around 0.05 {rather than equal to or less than) may 
be retained. 
Using this process of cross-validation, the first 50% random subset of data 
{designated as 'Model A) includes 14 variables with 1579 cases. It is a 
significant improvement on an intercept only model {}^=305.77 48 d.f. p<0.05) 
and adequately fits the data according to the Pearson chi-square goodness of fit 
test {p=1.00) and deviance tests {p=1.00). The likelihood ratio tests in Table 7.2 
reveal which independent factors play a significant role in determining the party 
group of individual respondents. 
'ETHNIC (ethnicity of candidate), 'NATPERS' (nature of support from personal 
friends). NATPARTY' (nature of support from party members), 'PROFESS' 
(professional association experience) and 'MORESEAT' (applied for more than 
one seat) are insignificant and will be excluded from the next test model. 
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Table 7.2 - Evaluating the Significance of Variables in Model A (First Candidate 
Survey): 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect -2 Log Likelihood of Chi-Reduced Model Square df Sig. 
Intercept 8.685E2 
ETHNIC 870.319 
PARLCAND 909.642 
PROFESS 873.575 
CHARITY 898.683 
LOCPARTY 911.488 
PRESSURE 906.905 
PUBLIC 886,062 
NATPERS 876,359 
NATPARTY 876.027 
SELECT 896.322 
MORESEAT 873.158 
ASKSTAND 876.442 
PAPER 897.956 
PERREP 875.268 
.000 
1.855 
41.178 
5.111 
30.219 
43.024 
38.441 
17.598 
7.895 
7.563 
27.858 
4.694 
7.977 
29.492 
6.804 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
.603 
.000 
.164 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.001 
.246 
.272 
.000 
.196 
.046 
.000 
.078 
Table 7.3- Evaluating the Significance of Variables in Model B (First Candidate 
Survey): 
Model Fitting Chtena Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect -2 Log Likelihood of Chi-Reduced Model Square df Sig. 
Intercept 
PARLCAND 
CHARITY 
LOCPARTY 
PRESSURE 
PUBLIC 
SELECT 
ASKSTAND 
PAPER 
PERREP 
6.012E2 
655.992 
609.021 
663.517 
670.511 
643.258 
640.872 
612.649 
642.173 
602.928 
.000 
54.764 
7.794 
62.290 
69.284 
42.031 
39.644 
11.422 
40.946 
1.701 
0 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
.000 
.050 
.000 
.000 
,000 
,000 
.010 
.000 
.637 
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Running a second test model {'Model B') with a different 50% random sample 
in=1754) and with the aforementioned insignificant variables excluded, Table 
7.3 reveals which of the remaining 9 variables are influential in the model. 
There was a significant improvement from the intercept only regression 
{x^=355.57 27 d.f. p<0.05) and the model adequately fits the data according to 
the Pearson chi-square goodness of fit test (p=1.00) and deviance tests 
(p=1.00). Only 'FERRER' (selected due to personal reputation) falls above the 
p=0.05 level and because it was also not significance in the first test it will be 
excluded from the model. 'CHARITY' (charitable organisation experience) is 
close enough to significance to be retained. With the model refined and tested 
the following variables will form the basis of the final model ('Model C): 
• PARLCAND - Previously a parliamentary candidate 
• CHARITY - Charitable organisation experience 
• LOCPARTY - Local party expenence 
• PRESSURE - Local pressure group experience 
• PUBLIC - Local public body experience 
• SELECT - More people seeking selection than seats in ward 
• AS KSTAN D - Asl<ed to stand 
• PAPER - Paper candidate 
7.3.3 Results 
Model C was run with the whole dataset which included 3588 cases (87.60%) 
that met the missing data requirement. The party group frequencies were as 
follows: major parties {n=3077), Greens {n=316), UKIP (n=136) and BNP 
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{n=59). The model was a significant improvement on the intercept only 
regression {)^=635.60 24 d.f. p<0.05) and adequately fits the data according to 
the Pearson chi-square goodness of fit test {p=0.85) and deviance tests 
{p=1.00). The pseudo R-square measures ranged from 0.16 (Cox and Snell) to 
0.25 (Nagelkerke), indicating a relatively low level of explanation for the 
variance in the model, however in logistic regression a low R-square is the norm 
{see Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002 for a detailed discussion). All eight 
independent variables had had significant effect on the model. 
Interpretation of the model coefficients reveals how candidates from the minor 
party subgroups differ from those from major parties (see Table 7.4 for details). 
There are six significant coefficients {p<0.05) when comparing Green to major 
party candidates, seven when comparing UKIP and four when comparing BNP. 
'PARLCAND' (previously a parliamentary candidate) was significant for all three 
party groups. Respondents who had previously been a parliamentary candidate 
were more likely to be a Green candidate (odds=4, 1 d.f. Wald=44.07), or more 
likely to be a BNP candidate (odds=7, 1 d.f. Wald=23.23) or even more likely to 
be a UKIP candidates (odds=14, 1 d.f, Wald=105.74) than a major party 
candidate (all other things being equal). This supports the bivariate 
observations in chapter 5 that identified very high levels of pariiamentary 
candidacy for UKIP respondents and relatively low levels for those from the 
Green Party. It also shows that all minor party subgroups experience higher 
levels of parliamentary candidacy than major party candidates. 
'LOCPARTY' (local party experience) is also significant for all three party 
groups. For respondents who had local party experience, the odds of belonging 
to any of the minor party subgroups decreased compared to the odds of 
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belonging to the major parties. Respondents were less likely to be a Green 
candidate (by 68 percentage points, 1 d.f. Wald=59.12), less likely to be a BNP 
candidate (again by 68 percentage points, 1 d.f. Wald=11.83) and less likely to 
be a UKIP candidate (by 75 percentage points, 1 d.f. Wald=36.79) than a major 
party candidate. This is consistent with the observation in chapter 5 that major 
party candidates are the most likely to have local party experience, thus all 
minor party subgroups can be characterised by lower levels of experience. 
The final coefficient that was significant for all minor parties was related to 
'PUBLIC (local public body experience) which showed that a respondent with 
local public body experience was less likely to belong to any of the minor party 
subgroups compared to the major parties. Respondents were less likely to be a 
Green candidate (by 63 percentage points. 1 d.f. Wald=32.85), less likely to be 
a UKIP candidate (by 52 percentage points.1 d.f. Wald=8.48) and less likely to 
be a BNP candidate (by 83 percentage points, 1 d.f. Wald=9.17) than a major 
party candidate. The tendency for major party candidates to have experienced 
work on a local public body was identified in the previous bivariate analysis, but 
the differences between the minor party subgroups in ttie multivariate model 
demonstrates a significant impact even when other explanatory variables are 
held constant. 
'CHARITY' (charitable organisation experience) only showed a significant 
coefficient for BNP candidates which indicates that involvement in a charity 
decreases the likelihood of being a BNP candidate (odds decrease of 12, 1 d.f. 
Wald=12.04). This relationship, although apparently very pronounced, was not 
picked-up by previous bivariate analysis. 
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Table 7.4 - Parameter Estimates for First Candidate Survey - Model C 
Pafly group' 
Green Inlercept 
[PARLCAND^I] 
[PARLCAND=2] 
[CHARiTY=1J 
[CHARITY=2] 
[LOCPARTY=1] 
tLOCPARTY=2] 
[PRESSURE^II 
[PRESSURE=2] 
[PUBUC=11 
[PUBUC=2| 
[SELECT=1] 
[SELECT=2] 
[ASKSTAND=1,C}0j 
[ASKSTAND=2.00] 
[PAPER=1 00] 
[PAPER=2.D0j 
UKIP Intercept 
[PARLCAND=1] 
[PARLCAND=2] 
[CHARiTY=1) 
[CHARITY=2] 
[LOCPARTY=11 
lLOCPARTY=2] 
PRESSURE^I] 
PRESSURE=2] 
[PUBUC=1] 
[PUBLIC=2] 
[SELECT=11 
[SEI.ECT=21 
|ASKSTAND=1,00] 
[ASKSTAND=2,00] 
PAPER=1.001 
[PAPER=2 00] 
BNP Intercept 
[PARLCAND=1] 
[PARLCAND=2] 
[CHARITY=1] 
[CHARITY=2] 
[LOCPARTY=1] 
[LOCPARTY=2] 
[PRESSURE=1] 
[PRESSURE=2] 
[PUBUC=1] 
[PUBLIC=2] 
[SELECT=11 
(SELECT=21 
[ASKSTAND=rOO] 
[ASKSTAND=2.00] 
[PAPER=1.D0) 
|PAPER=2 00] 
8 
-2.315 
1.412 
D" 
.065 
0° 
-1.146 
0" 
1,443 
0" 
-.993 
0" 
-1.585 
O'^  
-.161 
0"^  
1.205 
0' 
-2.499 
2.637 
0" 
-^00 
0" 
-1.391 
0" 
-.652 
0" 
-.736 
0" 
-.973 
O'' 
-.661 
0° 
.956 
0= 
-2.778 
1.92D 
0" 
-2-527 
0" 
-1.144 
O" 
.256 
O" 
-1.831 
0" 
-.270 
0° 
-.535 
0° 
- ^ 3 
0" 
Std. 
Error 
.132 
.213 
.140 
,149 
.141 
.173 
-275 
.130 
.132 
.168 
.256 
.214 
.229 
.303 
.253 
.317 
.193 
.192 
.220 
.398 
.728 
.333 
.380 
.605 
.340 
.285 
.350 
Watd 
307.586 
44.071 
.215 
59,118 
104.218 
32.848 
33.107 
1.541 
83,602 
220,268 
105,739 
,877 
36,788 
4-623 
8.480 
9.413 
11,763 
24,710 
159,221 
23,230 
12,043 
11,834 
.454 
9.170 
,633 
3,531 
.373 
df 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
•JIIJ. 
000 
000 
643 
000 
000 
000 
000 
214 
000 
000 
000 
349 
000 
032 
0O4 
002 
001 
000 
000 
ODD 
001 
001 
501 
002 
426 
060 
542 
U A ^ H L j ; 
4.1D2 
1.067 
318 
4.232 
371 
205 
851 
3.338 
13.971 
818 
249 
521 
479 
378 
517 
2.600 
B.820 
060 
318 
1,292 
160 
763 
586 
808 
95% Confidence 
Interval Exp[B) 
Lower 
Bound 
2.704 
811 
.237 
3.208 
.264 
.119 
,660 
2,578 
8,452 
,538 
,159 
.288 
,292 
,203 
,354 
1.784 
3,124 
,019 
,166 
,613 
,049 
.392 
.335 
.407 
Upper 
Bound 
6,223 
1,403 
-426 
5.583 
,520 
,352 
1,098 
4,322 
23,094 
1,245 
.390 
,944 
.786 
,704 
,753 
3 790 
14,888 
.333 
.611 
2.722 
.524 
1.485 
1.023 
1,603 
a. The reference category 
b. This parameler is set to 
Is: Major Parties. 
zero because it is redundant. 
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ASKSTAND' (asked to stand) was also only significant for one party group -
UKIP candidates. UKIP candidates were less likely then major party candidates 
to have been asked to stand (odds decrease of 3, 1 d.f. Wald=11.76). This 
observation is in contrast to the bivahate analysis in chapter 5 which identified 
BNP candidates as being the least likely to have been asked to stand. Part of 
this discrepancy may be explained by the fact that the odds ratio for BNP 
candidates is very similar to that of UKIP candidates and the variable is almost 
significant (p=0.06). It is possible that had a higher number of BNP candidates 
been present in the data then the previous bivariate association would have 
been reflected in the multivariate mode!. 
The final set of significant coefficients was shared by Green and UKIP 
candidates, but the relationships with the reference category differ. 
Respondents who had previous been involved with a pressure group 
(PRESSURE') were more likely to be a Green than a major party candidate 
{odds=4, 1 d.f. Wald=104.22). In contrast, respondent involvement in a pressure 
group reduced the odds of being a UKIP candidate by 48% (1 d.f. Wald=4.62). 
This is consistent with previous bivariate analysis. 
Respondents that experienced competition for selection ('SELECT') were less 
likely to be a Green (odds decrease of 5, 1 d.f. Wald=33.11) and less likely to 
be a UKIP candidate (odds decrease of 2.6, 1 d.f. Wald=9.41) than a major 
party candidate. Paper candidacy (PAPER) was more likely for these two 
groups than for the major parties, with a positive response identifying a 
candidate as being more likely to be a Green (odds=3, 1 d.f. Wald=83.60) and 
more likely to be a UKIP candidate than a major party candidate (odds=2.5, 1 
d.f. Wald=24.71). Earlier analysis did identify the Greens as having low levels of 
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competition and high levels of paper candidacy, but it did not associate these 
characteristics with UKIP. 
7,3.4 Increasing Predictive Capability - An Alternative Model 
The model is clearly useful in charactehsing minor party subgroups with 
reference to major parties and identifies differences that previous bivariate 
analysis missed - this is a strength of the multivanate approach. However, 
despite all the information gleaned from interpretation of the coefficients, the 
predictive power of the model is limited. Table 7.5 reveals the proportion of 
cases allocated to the correct party group. 
Table 7.5 - First Candidate Sun/ey Model Classification of Predicted Party 
Group 
Predicted 
Observed Major Parties Green UKIP BNP % Correct 
Major Parties 3047 
Green 268 
UKIP 123 
BNP 59 
28 
48 
4 
0 
2 
0 
9 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
99.0% 
15.2% 
6.6% 
.0% 
Overall % 97.5% 2.2% .3% .0% 86.5% 
The fact that the model has failed to predict membership of a single respondent 
to the BNP category is a cause for concern. That all BNP candidates have been 
predicted to be major party candidates suggests that, as far as model is 
concerned, there is little difference between the two. Another possibility is that 
the numehc dominance of the reference category has reduced the predictive 
power of the model. Although a large reference category is generally 
considered a strength of logistic regression, this can prevent more subtle 
relationships between variables from being observed (a potential type 2 error). 
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To refine these predictive capabilities, an additional model was njn excluding 
major parties and identifying Green candidates as the reference category. The 
same predictor variables were used resulting in a total sample of 511 with the 
following party group frequencies: Greens (n=316), UKIP {n=136) and BNP 
{n=59). Table 7.6 shows that this results in an 9.8% point increase in correct 
prediction for UKIP candidates, an 8.5% point increase for BNP candidates and 
an 77.8% point increase for the Greens. 
Table 76- First Candidate Sun/ey Model Classification of Predicted Party 
Group (excluding major party candidates) 
Predicted 
Observed 
Green 
UKIP 
BNP 
Overall % 
Green 
294 
99 
47 
86.1% 
UKIP BNP 
17 5 
34 3 
7 5 
11.4% 2.5% 
% Correct 
93.0% 
25.0% 
8.5% 
65,2% 
The model was a significant improvement on the intercept only regression 
{)^=158.23 16 d.f. p<0.05) and adequately fitted the data according to the 
Pearson chl-square goodness of fit test {p=0.99) and deviance tests (p=0.99). 
The pseudo R-square measures ranged from 0.17 (McFadden) to 0.32 
(Nagelkerke), which is an improvement on the previous model. All independent 
variables had a significant influence on the dependent except for 'LOCPARTY' 
(local party experience), which is unsurprising considering that the higher 
likelihood of major party candidates to have had experience of a local party 
(shown in the previous model) becomes redundant when this reference 
category is removed. Minor parties do not differ in tiieir levels of local party 
experience compared to each other. 
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The number of significant coefficients is less for this model than when major 
parties are used as the reference category (see Table 7.7 for details). 
'PRESSURE' (local pressure group experience) is now significant for the BNP 
as well as UKIP and indicates that respondents with local pressure group 
expenence are less likely to be a UKIP (odds=10, 1 d.f. Wald=43.46) and less 
likely to be a BNP candidate (odds=4. 1 d.f. Wald=10.08) than a Green. This is 
in line with observations made in chapter 5 using bivariate techniques. 
Table 7.7- Parameter Estimates for First Candidate Survey - Alternative Model 
Party qroup^ 
UKIP Intercept 
[PARLCAND^I] 
[PARLCAND=2] 
[CHARITY=1] 
fCHARITY=2] 
[L0CPARTY=1] 
[L0CPARTY^2] 
[PRESSURE=1] 
[PRESSURE=2] 
[PUBLIC=1] 
[PUBLIC=2] 
[SELECT=11 
[SELECT=2] 
[ASKSTAND=1 00 
[ASKSTAND=2,00 
[PAPER^I.OO] 
[PAPER=2.00] 
BNP Intercept 
[PARLCAND=1] 
[PARLCAND=2] 
[CHARITY=1I 
[CHARITY^2] 
[L0CPARTY=1] 
fL0CPARTY=21 
PRESS URE=1] 
[PRESSURE=2] 
IPUBLIC=1] 
[PUBLIC-2] 
ISELECT=1] 
[SELECT=2] 
[ASKSTAND=1.00 
[ASKSTAND^2.00 
IPAPER=1.00] 
[PAPER=2.00] 
B 
-.039 
1.288 
0" 
-.190 
0^ 
-284 
0" 
0" 
.063 
0"= 
,786 
0" 
-.630 
O" 
-.391 
0" 
-.274 
.463 
0" 
0" 
-.148 
0" 
0" 
0" 
1.792 
0" 
-.550 
0" 
Std. 
Error 
222 
328 
258 
279 
339 
314 
449 
233 
231 
274 
467 
752 
383 
442 
670 
504 
331 
375 
Wald 
.031 
15.38 
.541 
1,038 
43.46 
.040 
3-067 
7.323 
2.877 
.998 
.984 
11.54 
.150 
10.07 
3,392 
12.62 
2,756 
1653 
df 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
Siq, 
860 
000 
462 
308 
000 
842 
080 
007 
090 
318 
321 
001 
699 
002 
066 
000 
097 
000 
Exp(B) 
3,625 
827 
,753 
.107 
1,065 
2.195 
,533 
.676 
1,589 
,078 
.862 
246 
,291 
6.000 
,577 
,218 
95% Confidence 
Interval Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
1.905 
499 
.436 
,055 
.575 
,911 
.337 
,430 
,636 
.018 
,407 
,103 
.078 
2,233 
,302 
.105 
Upper 
Bound 
6.900 
1.372 
1,300 
,208 
1.971 
5.290 
.841 
1,063 
3.966 
,339 
1,826 
,585 
1,082 
16.120 
1,104 
,454 
a. The reference category is: Green, 
b. This parameter Is set to zero because it is redundant. 
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The 'PARLCAND' (previously a parliamentary candidate) coefficient is only 
significant for UKIP candidates in this model, but it identifies the same trend -
that parliamentary experience is more likely in UKIP than Green candidates 
(odds=3.5, l.d.f. Wald=15.39). 'ASKSTAND' (asked to stand) was significant 
for only UKIP in the previous model and this is also the situation here, indicating 
that respondents who were asked to stand are more likely to be a Green rather 
than a UKIP candidate (odds=2, 1 d.f. Wald=7.32). 
The coefficient associated with 'CHARITY' (charitable organisation experience) 
is only significant for BNP candidates, as with the previous model. Respondente 
with experience of working for a chanty organisation are less likely to be BNP 
candidates rather than Greens (odds=12.5, 1 d.f. Wa!d=11.55). The final 
significant coefficient for BNP candidates refers to 'SELECT' (more people 
seeking selection than wards) and reveals that respondents who experienced 
selection competition are more likely to be BNP candidates rather than Greens 
(odds=6, 1 d.f. Wald=12.62). This is an observation that is consistent with 
earlier bivariate analysis, but which was missed by the previous model where 
BNP candidates were contrasted with major party candidates. 
It appears that whilst using Green candidates as a dependent reference 
category does enhance the ability of the model to predict minor party 
membership and fits the data better, a review of the coefficients demonstrates 
that the conclusions drawn by the two models are similar. With only two 
incidences of a type 2 error identified by running the second model (selection 
competition and pressure group experience for the BNP) it is clear that the use 
of the major parties as the reference category does not prevent previous 
statistical associations from being made. However, it is most probably these two 
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significant coefficients for BNP candidates in the adapted model that are 
responsible for the increase in predictive capability. This suggests that BNP 
candidates do differ significantly from the other minor party subgroups, but this 
difference is less pronounced when compared against major party candidates. 
To clarify, BNP candidates appear to have more in common with the major 
parties than the Greens or UKIP, or rather the differences between BNP and 
major party candidates are relatively small and difficult to detect. 
7.4 Follow-Up Candidate Survey 
Analysis of the Follow-Up Candidate Survey conducted in chapter 6 identified 
22 salient variables that were employed in bivariate tests to identify particular 
party subgroups. These variables with their coding values can be viewed in 
Table 7.8 (for a more detailed discussion including the theoretical justifications 
of variable selection see chapter 6). 
An additional variable that could be included is a measure of the deviance 
between where respondents placed themselves on a left-right political spectrum 
and their derived ideological position based on the computed value of 
responses to a series of policy statements (see section 6.4.4 for more details). 
Unfortunately the computation of this vanable would result in over 200 missing 
cases, thus it will be discounted from the outset. 
The categorical dependent variable is 'PARTYTYPO'. which refers to party 
subgroups. However due to a low number of cases from specific party groups, 
analysis of this dataset is restricted to 3 categories with labels and values as 
follows: 'major parties' = 1 {n=663). Greens' = 2 {n=70) and 'UKIP' = 3 {n=29). 
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Table 7.8- Follow-Up Candidate Survey (salient variables from chapter 5) 
Variable: 
CONSTAND 
INDSTANO 
STOODWIN 
STANDWIN 
GLOBAL 
EUROPE 
PARTYPOL 
FPTP 
PRLOCAL 
RANKVOTE 
NONEVOTE 
ELECMAIN 
COALITION 
ENVIRON 
LIBHOMO 
RURAL 
EUPERS 
IMMIPERS 
MARKPER5 
MEDIAPERS 
SUPRANAT 
Description: 
Would stand again as a Conservative 
Would stand as an Independent 
Stood to win a seat 
Standing is more important tf ian 
winning 
"Global affairs are relevant to local 
government" 
"European affairs are relevant t o local 
government" 
"Party politics has no place in local 
government" 
"First-past-the-post delivers strong 
local government" 
"A proport ional-representat ion voting 
system would improve local 
government" 
"Voters should be able to rank 
candidates on a ballot paper" 
"There should be a 'none of the above' 
opt ion on local ballot papers" 
"The current local electoral system 
favours mainstream parties" 
"Coalitions are better for local 
government than single party 
majori t ies" 
'The environment should be protected, 
even at the cost of economic g rowth" -
personal importance 
"Government should favour liberal 
policies on homosexuali ty" - personal 
importance 
"Government should promote rural 
over urban interests" - personal 
importance 
"The EU should be enlarged" -
personal importance 
"Government should favour policies 
designed to help asylum seekers and 
immigrants return to their own 
coun t r y " -pe rsona l importance 
"Government should favour high levels 
of state regulation and control of the 
market" - personal importance 
"The media should be completely free 
t o publish any material they see f i t " -
personal importance 
"Supranational affairs are relevant to 
local government" COMPUTED VAR -
see section 7.4.1 
Parameters: 
(1 = 'yes', 2 = 'no') 
fl = 'yes', 2 = 'no') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutrol', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3= 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3= 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 - 'neutral', 
3- 'negative') 
(1 - 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3= 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
(1 = 'positive', 2 = 'neutral', 
3 = 'negative') 
{1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
(1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
(1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
(1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 - 'unimportanf) 
(1 - 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
{1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
(1 = 'important', 2 = 
'neutral', 3 = 'unimportant') 
(2 = 'very positive', 1 = 
'positive', 0 = 'neutral', -1 = 
'negative'. -2 = 'very 
negative) 
Missing ('n'): 
0 
0 
22 
91 
15 
13 
14 
12 
15 
14 
22 
16 
40 
83 
90 
97 
92 
100 
94 
93 
15 
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7.4.1 Variable Selection 
A closer look at the distribution of responses for 'CONSTAND" (would stand 
again as a Conservative) reveals that no Green candidates would stand as a 
Conservative in a future election. This lack of variance in the dependent 
category undermines the model so this variable will be removed. 'ELECMAIN' 
(the current electoral system favours mainstream parties) is also problematic 
because not a single UKIP candidate disagreed or remained neutral on this 
issue, thus leaving zero frequencies in two out of three response cells for this 
dependent category. To avoid computational errors in the model it will also be 
excluded. 
Looking at Table 7.8 it is clear that missing data is a problem. The whole 
dataset contains 786 cases, but when entering the remaining 18 predictor 
variables into the model the missing data requirement is enforced and only 498 
(65.35%) cases are used with the following party group breakdown: major 
parties (n=434), Greens (n=44) and UKIP (n=20). However, because the 
number of cases is much smaller in this dataset than with the First Candidate 
Survey there is a smaller range in the number of missing cases and it becomes 
unclear at what point a variable should be excluded. As there is no obvious 
threshold, variables will be deleted one by one until 70% of the total number of 
cases is eligible for modeling. This results in the following elimination process: 
• Removing 'IMMIPERS' leaves 512 cases (67.19%) 
• Removing 'RURAL' leaves 524 cases (68.78%) 
• Removing MARKPERS' leaves 533 cases (69,95%) 
After these alterations the resulting reduced model increases the number of 
eligible cases in the dataset to 533 (69,95% - close enough to 70% to proceed) 
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with 15 predictors and the following number of cases for party groups: major 
parties {n=464), Greens (n=48) and UKIP {n=21). 
When checking for multicolinearity between these independent variables one 
strong relationship {x^=313.76 4 d.f. p<0.05) is identified between attitudes 
towards global affairs ('GLOBAL') and European affairs ('EUROPE'). This inter-
correlation suggests that respondents do not significantly differentiate between 
the two variables and this requires the removal of one variable or for both to be 
combined. Because the variables share the property of referring to 
supranational affairs a combined variable will be computed ('SUPRANAT'). 
Both original variables were attitudinal statements to which respondents were 
asked to elicit either a positive, neutral or negative response with numeric 
values of 1, 2 and 3 respectively. With this in mind the two variables will be 
recoded as follows: 
• Positive (old value=1, new va!ue=1) 
• Neutral (old value=2, new value=0) 
• Negative (old value=3, new value=-1) 
By aggregating these new values for the two variables a computed measure of 
how positive/neutral/negative respondents are to supranational affairs on a five-
point scale with the following coding: 'Very Positive' (2), 'Positive' (1), 'Neutral' 
(0). 'Negative' (-1) and 'Very Negative' (-2). 
After making these changes the following 14 variables remain in the model: 
• INDSTAND - would stand again as an Independent 
• STOODWIN - respondent stood to win a seat 
• STANDWIN - standing is more important than winning 
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• P ARTYPOL - party politics has no place In local government 
• FPTP - first-past-the-post delivers strong local government 
• PRLOCAL — a proportional representation voting system would Improve 
local government 
• RANKVOTE - voters should be able to rank candidates on a ballot paper 
• NONEVOTE - there should be a 'none of the above' option on local 
ballot papers 
• COALITION - coalitions are better for local government than single party 
majorities 
• ENVIRON - the environment should be protected, even at the cost of 
economic growth 
• LIBHOMO - government should favour liberal policies on homosexuality 
• EUPERS - the EU should be enlarged 
• MEDIAPERS - the media should be completely free to publish any 
material they see fit 
• SUPRANAT - supranational affairs are relevant to local government 
7.4.2 Model Testing & Refinement 
Initial tests reveal computational problems with the model which are due to zero 
cell frequencies in three of the predictor variables - 'PRLOCAL' (proportional 
representation would improve local govemmenl), 'ENVIRON' (the environment 
should be protected, even at the cost of economic growth) and SUPRANAT' 
(supranational affairs are not relevant to local government). To avoid the 
removal of potentially useful variables 'PRLOCAL', 'ENVIRON' and 
'SUPRANAT' will be treated as covariates rather than categorical factors. All 
166 
Chapter 7: Modelling Minor Parties 
three of these predictors are responses to attitudinal statements which allow 
candidates to respond to an ordinal scale and whilst such data can be entered 
as categorical in logistic regression, the computational errors can be avoided by 
treating them as covariates rather than factors. The justification for this is that 
these variables measure negative and positive trends, a typical characteristic of 
interval data. This approach will be taken for the rest of this model and for all 
variables with ordinal responses. 
Because the variables will be tested on a random 50% sample and the number 
of cases for minor parties is quite low in the dataset as a whole, the same 
variables will be tested on two different random samples i.e. non-significant 
variables will not be removed based on the first test. Any variable that is 
significant in either test will go through to the final model. For the same reasons 
significance will be observed at the p=0.10 rather than p=0.05 level. The 14 
variables are tested initially on a random 50% of the sample {n=268), with the 
consequent model ('Model D') showing a significant improvement on an 
intercept only regression ()^=175.48 28 d.f. p<0.05) and an adequate fit of the 
data according to the Pearson chl-square goodness of fit test {p=0.99) and 
deviance tests {p=1.00). 
The alternative 50% random sample model ('Model E', n=268) is also an 
improvement on the intercept only regression {x^=120.00 28 d.f. p<0.05) and an 
adequate fit of the data according to the Pearson chi-square goodness of fit test 
ip=1.00) and deviance tests ip=1.00). Table 7.9 shows the results of Model D 
and Table 7.10 of Model E. The only vanable insignificant at the p=0.10 level in 
both tests is 'FPTP' (first-past-the-post delivers strong local government) and it 
will be excluded from the final model. 
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Table 7.9 - Evaluating the Significance of Variables in Model D (Follow-Up 
Candidate Survey) 
Model Fitting Cnteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect -2 Log Likelihood of Chi-Reduced Model Square df Sig. 
Intercept 
STOODWIN 
STANDWIN 
PARTYPOL 
FPTP 
PRLOCAL 
RANKVOTE 
NONEVOTE 
COALITION 
ENVIRON 
LIBHOMO 
EUPERS 
MEDIAPERS 
SUPRANAT 
INDSTAND 
1.991E2 
202.430 
199.457 
201.709 
199.235 
205.966 
199.107 
200.621 
201.606 
206.383 
201.814 
207.989 
205.724 
205.722 
205.519 
.000 
3.324 
.350 
2.602 
.128 
6.860 
.000 
1.515 
2.500 
7.257 
2.708 
8.882 
6.618 
6.615 
6,413 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
. 
.190 
.839 
.272 
.938 
.032 
1.000 
.469 
.287 
.027 
.258 
.012 
.037 
.037 
.041 
Table 7.10 - Evaluating the Significance of Variables in Model E (Follow-Up 
Candidate Survey) 
Model Fitting Cnteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect -2 Log Likelihood of Chi-Reduced Model Square df Sig. 
Intercept 
STOODWIN 
STAN DW IN 
PARTYPOL 
FPTP 
PRLOCAL 
RANKVOTE 
NONEVOTE 
COALITION 
ENVIRON 
LIBHOMO 
EUPERS 
MEDIAPERS 
SUPRANAT 
INDSTAND 
1.015E2 
107.752 
106.874 
109.131 
105.612 
115.176 
114.210 
109.250 
111.937 
122.589 
110.992 
109.634 
111.272 
118.225 
102.121 
.000 
6.211 
5.333 
7.589 
4.071 
13.634 
12.668 
7.708 
10.395 
21.048 
9.451 
8.093 
9.730 
16.684 
.580 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
.045 
.070 
.022 
.131 
.001 
.002 
.021 
.006 
.000 
.009 
.017 
.008 
.000 
.748 
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Accordingly the following 13 variables will form the final model: 
• INDSTAND - would stand again as an Independent 
• STOODWIN - respondent stood to win a seat 
• STANDWIN - standing is more important than winning 
• PARTYPOL - party politics has no place in local government 
• PRLOCAL - a proportional representation voting system would improve 
local government 
• RANKVOTE - voters should be able to rank candidates on a ballot paper 
• NONEVOTE - there should be a 'none of the above' option on local 
ballot papers 
• COALITION - coalitions are better for local government than single party 
majorities 
• ENVIRON - the environment should be protected, even at the cost of 
economic growth 
• LIBHOMO - government should favour liberal policies on homosexuality 
• EUPERS - the EU should be enlarged 
• MEDIAPERS - the media should be completely free to publish any 
material they see fit 
• SUPRANAT - supranational affairs are relevant to local government 
7.4.3 Results 
The final model {'Model F') was run with the whole dataset which included 533 
cases (69.95%) that met the missing data requirement. The party group 
frequencies were as follows: major parties {n=464). Greens {n=48) and UKIP 
(n=21). The model was a significant improvement on the intercept only 
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regression {x^=151.57 26 d.f. p<0.05) and it fits the data according to the 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit test {p=0.99) and the test for deviance 
{p=1.00). The pseudo R-square measures ranged from 0.25 (Cox and Snell) to 
0.41 (Nagelkerke), indicating a good level of explanation for the variance in the 
model. Considering significance at the p=0.05 level, only 'STANDWIN' 
(standing is more important than vi^ inning) and INDSTAND' (would stand again 
as an Independent) had a non-significant effect on the model. 
Interpretation of the model coefficients reveals how candidates from the minor 
party subgroups differ from those from major parties (see Table 7.11 for 
details). PRLOCAL' (a proportional representation voting system would 
improve local government) was significant for both minor party subgroups. 
Support for proportional representation in local government was higher for 
Greens than candidates from the major parties (odds=9, 1 d.f Wald=11.14). 
UKIP candidates were less in favour of reform, but were still more likely to 
support such a change in the voting system than respondents from the major 
party category (odds=2.5, 1 d.f Wald=4.74). This is consistent with the 
observations made through bivariate analysis in chapter 6. 
Unsurprisingly 'ENVIRON' (the environment should be protected, even at the 
cost of economic growth) was significant for Green candidates who were much 
more likely to agree with this statement than major party candidates (odds=16, 
1 d.f. Wald=7.33). This coefficient was also significant for UKIP but indicated a 
converse relationship in which candidates from this party group were more likely 
to oppose environmental protection over economic growth compared to major 
party candidates (odds=2, 1 d.f. Wald=3.78). 
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'EUPERS' (the EU should be enlarged) was the final variable to report a 
significant coefficient for both minor party groups. Green candidates were 
slightly more likely to see EU enlargement as less important to themselves 
personally than major party candidates {odds=1,5, 1 d.f. Wald=4.46). In contrast 
the issue of EU enlargement was personally more important to UKIP candidates 
than to respondents from major parties (odds=3, 1 d.f. Wald=8.15), a 
relationship identified in earlier bivariate analysis. 
There were six coefficients that were significant for Green candidates only, and 
thus differentiate this group from UKIP as well as the major parties. Negativity 
over the statement that the candidates stood to win a seat' ('STOODWIN') was 
more likely for Green respondents than major party candidates (odds=1.5, 1 d.f. 
Wald=6.56). They were also more likely to support the notion of coalitions 
governments ('COALITION') more than major party candidates (odds=2.5, 1 d.f. 
Wald=10.30). These low levels of office seeking behavior and inclinations 
towards coalition arrangements are consistent with observations in chapter 6. 
Green candidates cared less about media freedom than their major party 
counterparts ('MEDIAPERS'} and were more likely to view this as more 
unimportant than major party candidates (odds=2, 1 d.f. Waid=11.33). They 
were also more likely to disagree more than major parties that supranational 
affairs are relevant to local govemment ('SUPRANAT' odds=3, 1 d.f. 
Wald=8.08). Looking back at bivariate analysis of the two variables that were 
combined to make 'SUPRANAT' shows that the Greens agreed the least with 
the notion that global affaira are relevant to local government, but they agreed 
the most with the idea that European affairs are relevant to local government. 
The fact that the Greens are pro-European and anti-global has been lost in the 
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merging of the two variables, suggesting that the multicolinearity between the 
two variables that justified the merge was due to a party other than the Greens. 
Table 7.11 - Parameter Estimates for Follow-Up Candidate Survey - Model F 
Party Group* 
Green Intercept 
STOODWIN 
STAN DW IN 
PARTYPOL 
PRLOCAL 
RANKVOTE 
NONEVOTE 
COALITION 
ENVIRON 
LIBHOMO 
EUPERS 
MEDIAPERS 
SUPRANAT 
[INDSTAND=1,00] 
[INDSTAND=2.00] 
UKiP Intercept 
STOODWIN 
STANDWIN 
PARTYPOL 
PRLOCAL 
RANKVOTE 
NONEVOTE 
COALITION 
ENVIRON 
LIBHOMO 
EUPERS 
MEDIAPERS 
SUPRANAT 
llNDSTAND-t.OO] 
tlNDSTAND=2 00] 
B 
.628 
.550 
-.265 
.296 
2.168 
1.019 
-.501 
-.884 
2.887 
-.353 
.549 
.821 
-.776 
1.098 
0" 
1.224 
.182 
-.336 
-.728 
-.926 
.345 
-.127 
-512 
.667 
.700 
1-082 
-.183 
.241 
.796 
0" 
Std. 
Error 
1 853 
.215 
.238 
.327 
.649 
.396 
.214 
.275 
1.066 
.289 
.260 
.244 
.273 
.662 
1.687 
.301 
.309 
.301 
.426 
.396 
.272 
358 
.343 
304 
.379 
339 
.169 
.646 
Wald 
.115 
6.563 
1-238 
.820 
11.14 
2 
6-614 
5.458 
10.30 
1 
7334 
1.490 
4.463 
11.32 
7 
8 084 
2.751 
.526 
.367 
1,182 
5.863 
4.735 
.757 
.218 
2.043 
3.776 
5288 
8.151 
.291 
2.021 
1.518 
df 
0 
0 
Sjq. 
.735 
,010 
.266 
.365 
.001 
.010 
.019 
.001 
.007 
.222 
.035 
.001 
.004 
.097 
.468 
-545 
-277 
.015 
.030 
.384 
.640 
.153 
.052 
.021 
,004 
.590 
.155 
.218 
Exp(B) 
1.734 
.767 
1.345 
.114 
2.771 
.606 
.413 
.056 
.703 
1.731 
2.273 
.460 
.334 
1.200 
.715 
.483 
.396 
1,412 
.880 
1.669 
1.948 
2.013 
.339 
833 
1.272 
2-217 
95% Confidence 
Interval Exp(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
1.138 
-481 
.708 
.032 
1.274 
.398 
.241 
.007 
.399 
1.040 
1.409 
.270 
.091 
665 
.390 
.266 
,172 
.649 
.516 
.827 
.994 
1,109 
-161 
,429 
.913 
-625 
Upper 
Bound 
2.642 
1.224 
2.554 
409 
6.026 
922 
.709 
.450 
1.238 
2.880 
3.667 
786 
1.221 
2.164 
1.309 
.870 
,912 
3.071 
1.502 
3.367 
3.816 
3.656 
.712 
1.618 
1 772 
7.868 
a. The reference category Is: Major Parties 
b. TTiis parameter is set lo zero trecause it is redundant. 
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Green candidates had mixed views on electoral reform. Support towards the 
notion of including a 'none of the above' option on ballot papers ('NONEVOTE') 
was more likely to be a characteristic of Green respondents, with candidates 
more likely to agree with this statement more than major party candidates 
(odds=1.5, 1 d.f. Wald=5.46). However, they were more likely to disagree more 
with the notion of ranking candidates on ballot papers ('RANKVOTE' odds=2.5, 
1 d.f. Wald=6.61) than major party candidates. This latter observation is 
contradictory to the analysis in chapter 5 which suggested that the Greens were 
the most supportive party group for ballot paper ranking. One explanation for 
this could be that bivariate relationships change when entered into a 
multivariate model due to the interplay of other explanatory variables - this is 
why early hypothesis testing is considered indicative of possible relationships 
and used to inform, but not specify, more advanced models. Alternatively there 
may be cases that have been excluded in the analysis because of missing data 
and due to the small size of the party group the removal of a handful of cases 
will affect the relationship significantly. 
There were only two significant coefficients that were exclusive to UKIP as a 
party group. The first refers to 'PARTYPOL' (party politics has no place in local 
government) and reveals that UKIP candidates are more likely to agree more 
with this statement than major party candidates (odds=1.5, 1 d.f. Wald=5.86). 
The interpretation of 'LIBHOMO' (government should favour liberal policies on 
homosexuality) shows that UKIP candidates were more likely to view this as 
more unimportant than major party candidates (odds=2, 1 d.f. Wald=8.15). Both 
of these results are consistent with the bivariate analysis in chapter 6. 
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7.4.4 Increasing Predictive Capability - Custom Thresholds 
Interpreting coefficients provides an insight into the differences between minor 
party subgroups the major parties, but the model itself is weak in predictive 
power. Table 7.12 shows that the model has had limited success in classifying 
candidates correctly, although unlike the previous First Candidate Survey model 
it has not misclassified Green candidates as UKIP candidates and vica-versa. 
This suggests that both minor party groups have more in common with the 
major parties than each other, which raises questions over how different 
candidates between the minor and major parties actually are. 
Another reason for low levels of correct classification for minor parties could be 
due to the way in which multinomial logistic regression assigns group 
membership. Using the predictor variables, the model generates the likelihood 
of each respondent belonging to each of the dependent categories (where the 
total probability across all groups is equal to 1) and assigns membership based 
on the highest likelihood. Table 7.12 illustrates the point that for most cases in 
this model, the highest likelihood resided within the major parties category. 
However, it is possible to increase predictive power by manipulating the 
threshold at which group membership is assigned for the minor parties. 
Table 7.12 - Follow-Up Candidate Survey Model Classification of Predicted 
Party Group 
Predicted 
Observed 
Major Parties 
Greens 
UKIP 
Overall % 
Major Parties 
456 
32 
20 
95.3% 
Greens 
8 
16 
0 
4.5% 
UKIP 
0 
0 
1 
.2% 
% Correct 
98.3% 
33.3% 
4.8% 
88.7% 
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To explain, the model produces three values for each case wfhich show the 
likelihood of group membership to any of the three dependent categories. 
Looking at actual Green party candidates only it is clear that in most cases the 
highest probability was given to the major party dependent category. Clearly 
consideration of the highest probability value results in type 1 errors (false 
positives), so instead the model could use a threshold value based on the 
probability of these candidates being predicted correctly, although this risks 
increasing the number of type 2 errors (false negative i.e. major candidates 
misctassified) . For Green candidates, the mean likelihood of being a Green 
(according to the model) is 0.09 and for UKIP candidates the mean likelihood of 
being from UKIP (according to the model) is 0.04. 
Table 7.13 - Follow-Up Candidate Survey Model Classification of Predicted 
Party Group Using Custom Likelihood Thresholds 
Predicted 
Observed 
Major Parties 
Greens 
UKIP 
Overall % 
Major Parties 
445 
24 
14 
63.4% 
Greens 
91 
41 
0 
17.3% 
UKIP 
127 
5 
15 
19.3% 
% Correct 
67.1% 
58.6% 
51.7% 
65.7% 
Using these mean likelihood values the model was re-specified to identify a 
candidate as Green or from UKIP if these thresholds were exceeded. Table 
7.13 shows the results. There is a clear improvement in the ability of the model 
to predict Green and UKIP party membership with correct classification 
increasing by 25.3% and 46.9% respectively, but this is at the cost of wrongly 
assigning major party candidates to these categories. 
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7.5 Discussion 
Has multivariate modeling using multinomial logistic regression allowed the 
identification of individuals as members of party groups? The answer is clearly 
'no'. Although interpretation of the model coefficients offers an insight into the 
differences between party groups, the predictive capability of the models is poor 
even when changing the reference category or utilising likelihood thresholds. 
The first model, using the First Candidate Survey data, explored the differences 
between candidates from different party groups based on demographics, past 
experiences and selection for candidacy. A majority of the variables identified in 
the previous bivariate analysis in chapter 5 were removed due to missing cases, 
multi CO linearity and non-statistically significant effects on the model. In the final 
model there were some variables that differentiated all minor parties from the 
major party subgroup, albeit to different degrees, and others that identified 
characteristics of particular party subgroups. Despite the significance of these 
independent factors they were not powerful predictors of party group. Removing 
major party candidates from the dataset and changing the reference category to 
the Greens aided model classification of minor parties, but overall the model 
saw a comparative decrease in successful classification of 21.3%. 
The Follow-Up Candidate Survey data used in the second model explored 
differences in attitudes and policy positions between party groups. Of the 21 
variables identified through the bivariate relationships explored in chapter 6, 
only 13 were suitable for use in the final model. This could explain why it had 
difficulty in classifying candidates as belonging to either of the minor party 
subgroups. The introduction of artificial likelihood thresholds increased minor 
party classification but at the cost of the correct classification of major party 
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candidates, reducing successful prediction by 23.0%. As with the First 
Candidate Survey model it is clear that attempts to refine prediction were 
counter-productive. 
There are two possible reasons why the models performed so poorly. The first 
is that many of the bivahate relationships between party groups identified in 
chapters 5 and 6 proved to be non-significant in the multivariate model or had to 
be disregarded due to missing data, thus reducing the number of explanatory 
variables. Although each mode! began with many hypotheses regarding 
differences between the groups, the gradual and rational reduction of 
explanatory variables meant that these differences were not realised or did not 
exist. In the multivariate environment it is not unusual for previously established 
bivariate relationship to disappear as they interact with each other. It is likely 
that earlier analysis exaggerated the differences between party groups. 
Another possible explanation for the tack of predictive power may be related to 
the variance within the reference category. Because there are so many major 
party candidates in each model there will be greater within-group variance, thus 
it is theoretically possible for Green candidates to be more similar to some 
major party candidates than to UKIP respondents. At the same time it is also 
possible that UKIP candidates may be more similar to major party candidates 
than to Greens. 
Either way the similarity of candidates between parties is striking. The individual 
level analysis was driven by the hypothesis that the recent rise in minor party 
activity may have been a function of the emergence of a new political class, yet 
what this thesis has shown is that there is cleariy a 'political class' associated 
with candidates that is common across all parties. The same type of candidates 
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with similar backgrounds, experiences and demographics stand for minor 
parties as for major parties. Minor parties may generate a new politics (Copus 
et al. 2008) and mobilise voters othenwise apathetic towards to hegemony of the 
major parties (Rochon 1985, Herzog 1987), but the candidates from these 
organisations cannot be differentiated from those who stand for the major 
parties that they are attacking. The impact of this observation on the typology 
designed and tested by this thesis is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapters: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
Typically minor parties have been neglected by the research literature because, 
by definition, their vote share is small and they seldom influence power (Sartori 
1976). However academics interested in minor parties suggest that the simple 
fact that minor parties contest elections can influence the outcome (for example 
see Huntingdon 1968, Herzog 1987, Panebianco 1988). Recent empirical 
studies have led to the observation that minor party contestation rates appear to 
be increasing (Copus et al. 2008) and minor parties are thus becoming "a topic 
that is widely acknowledged as being of increasing significance and yet about 
which we still have little authoritative knowledge or serious understanding" 
(Game 2007: 3). 
In response to this recent increase observed in the literature, this thesis had two 
general aims: to quantify the contestation of minor parties to establish temporal 
trends and to propose a new analytical framework in which they can be studied. 
These aims are addressed by synthesising new electoral datasets and using 
national candidate level survey data to provide insight Into the activities of minor 
parties and the characteristics of those who compose them. Minor parties have 
thus been quantified for the first time on the basis of presence whilst being 
disaggregated from Independents - something that previous studies have been 
unable to do. A typology based on presence and patterns of contestation has 
been synthesised with reference to the literature and rigorously tested using 
survey level data and multivariate models. 
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This chapter brings together the various strands of this multi-method approach 
and evaluates whether it has been successful in achieving these aims and what 
has been learnt that can be added to the existing body of literature. Accordingly 
section 8-2 discusses the aggregate data and trends in minor party 
contestation. Section 8.3 evaluates the typology and discusses how it has been 
developed and modified as the thesis progresses. Section 8.4 addresses how 
the modified typology was tested using two multinomial logistic regression 
models and what the impact of the findings are. Finally section 8.5 summarises 
the contribution of this thesis to the wider body of knowledge on minor parties in 
English local government. 
8.2 Patterns of Minor Party Contestation 
The increase in minor party contestation across England is anecdotally 
discussed on the literature, but never quantified beyond vote share which 
reveals a steady but slow rise in fortunes (see section 2,3). Often these studies 
were mired by a lack of data or an inability to separate 'Others' and 
'Independents' from the aggregate statistics. Before commencing any study of 
minor parties it was necessary to quantify electoral success and presence. How 
has minor party presence altered over time? Is the recent increase in presence, 
identified by the literature, supported by quantitative evidence and is it 
unprecedented or reminiscent of a past trend? Are patterns of contestation 
homogenous or do they vary between electoral systems and/or authority types? 
To answer these questions a unique dataset was constructed containing the 
details of electoral ward contests between 1973 and 2008 (excluding by-
elections) and indicating the proportion of wards contested by minor parties 
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each year. The national trend revealed high levels of volatility between years, 
although there was a clear increase in contestation from 1998/1999 onwards 
that led to the highest levels of minor party presence throughout the 35 year 
period -justifying the observations made in the literature. Comparing the peaks 
and dips to general elections years revealed no pattern but when overlaying the 
trends with district all-out elections it became clear that minor party contestation 
dropped during these years, suggesting that authority type may influence the 
likelihood of minor parties contesting elections. 
Separate analysis of local authority types revealed that there are differences in 
the proportion of wards contested, but all authority types have experienced an 
unprecedented increase in minor party presence since 1998/1999. This trend is 
consistent regardless of the different electoral systems in place such as all-out 
multi-member wards in London, the shire counties and some district and unitary 
authorities or elections by thirds in metropolitan boroughs and some district and 
unitary authorities. In the past 10 years minor party contestation has increased 
regardless of the high or low trends that charactensed authority types earlier in 
the period of analysis, meaning that the ability to differentiate between groups of 
authorities has diminished through time. 
Further analysis tested for the homogeneity of authority-type classifications and 
discovered high levels of In-group variance. All authority groupings contained a 
spread of authorities, some of which had always experienced high levels of 
minor party contestation whilst others never had and were completely 
unaffected by the recent increase. It became clear that understanding minor 
party contestation at the authority type level was too simplistic an approach. It Is 
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individual authorities that experience varying levels of presence and any study 
of minor parties must take this into account. 
A comparative case study of three local authorities was conducted which 
investigated whether the electoral history of a council can be used to predict 
minor party presence and success. The three authorities were all London 
Boroughs, thus they all used the same electoral system, but were chosen due 
to their differing patterns of minor party contestation in the 2002 local 
government elections: Kensington and Chelsea had the lowest minor party 
contestation rates of all the London Boroughs in 2002, Bamet had the most 
consistent with a single minor party candidate standing in every ward and 
Southwark had very high levels of presence with one ward contest involving 
seven minor party candidates. The studies found that it is misleading to explain 
minor party activity at the individual authority level in some cases, such as in 
Southwark where ward level factors were present, but the presence of a single 
Green candidate in every ward in Barnet in 2002 indicates some validity in this 
approach. However it is unreliable to use electoral histories to predict minor 
party presence or success as they do not necessarily build on previous 
triumphs, they do not appear to learn from the strategies of other minor parties 
in the area and they will sometimes increase the number of candidates in an 
area despite a distinct lack of previous electoral success. 
The sum of these observations regarding minor party activity is the conclusion 
that it is random, at least from a quantitative point of view. What such a study 
cannot take Into account is the Importance of local context (as suggested by 
fyiuller-Rommell and Pridham, Copus et al. 2008). Indeed, when searching for 
media sources to explain minor party activity in some of the London Boroughs 
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there were a series of local issues that appeared to be influential. The main 
problem with this qualitative approach is that the source material in electronic 
archives is limited and reference is seldom made to the ward in which an issue 
may be prevalent. For example, analysis indicated that there are very few 
media references to the electoral ward in Southwark called the Lane, but by 
comparing electoral and area maps it became clear that the Lane was located 
within the area of the borough labelled Peckham. A search for media articles 
involving Peckham returns many more results than for the Lane, suggesting that 
local issues are hard to link to specific electoral wards. 
Conducting qualitative research in areas that have interesting patterns of minor 
party contestation would surely be a more effective method of understanding 
the local party dynamics, but that was not the purpose of this thesis. Through 
quantitative data we illustrated that there is no higher explanation for minor 
party activity and no quantitative formula that can predict where minor parties 
may appear in the future. However, this process has provided the groundwork 
from which qualitative empincal studies can now proceed by establishing 
beyond doubt that the recent increase in minor party contestation is 
unprecedented, not proportionally related to vote share and not a function of the 
electoral system. The analysis has also questioned the use of authority type 
groupings for comparative party system analysis (Railings and Thrasher 1997) 
and provided a sampling framework based on levels of presence that any 
empirical case study approach should consider. 
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8.3 Developing The Typology 
A typology is a heuristic - a mental shortcut which can be used to simpltfy 
components by grouping them based on similarities and dividing them based on 
differences. Thus for minor parties, the development of a typology is not only an 
attempt to draw links between disparate political organisations but also to 
differentiate between them. The research literature has a tendency to treat 
minor parties as residuals of little importance within the party system, often 
grouping them with Independents into the category labelled 'Other' (as 
exemplified in Railings and Thrasher 2003) - a group which Game (2007) calls 
"the ubiquitous 10%", referring to their aggregate national vote share. However 
residuals are often indicative of significant heterogeneity and other hidden 
structures in the data and should not be ignored. 
Such heterogeneity is certainly possible with 141 political parties contesting the 
May 2007 local government elections in England (139 of which would 
traditionally be classified as 'Others') including everything from nationally 
present parties such as the Greens and the BNP to parties that only contest a 
single-ward in a single authority such as neighbourhood associations. These 
parties differ not just in their vote share, but in their policy remit and their ability 
to wage election campaigns (see section 2 for further discussion). In summary, 
the creation of a typology is an important step In disaggregating this residual 
'Other' category and drawing attention to the differences between minor parties. 
After demonstrating that minor party contestation is now at unprecedented 
levels, there is a clear need to unpick the phenomenon and deconstruct the 
traditionally marginalising definitions. 
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Previous attempts to classify minor parties have been based on their 
relationship with the left-right political spectrum (Smith 1991). with other parties 
(Rochon 1985, Herzog 1987) or their organisational nature (Copus et al. 2008), 
however all of these typologies require significant knowledge of the individual 
parties themselves to be applied which will inevitably result in subjective 
assessments of group membership. To avoid relativism and advance the study 
of minor parties in an objective manner, this thesis constructed an a priori 
typology based on an individual party's pattern of contestation. Using this 
approach, the typology can be applied universally based on the following 
criteria: a party that contests a single ward is considered to be an ultra-locat 
(nano) party; a party that contests multiple wards in a single local authority is 
considered to be a local (micro) party; a party that contests multiple wards 
across multiple authorities is considered to be a small national party. The three 
major parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) act as a control 
group. Section 2.3 offers a series of justifications for this classification based on 
the literature. 
The validity and usefulness of a typology is measured by the fact that the 
components of each group are more similar than components from different 
groups, thus an analytical approach was constnjcted to test the ability of the 
typology to differentiate between ultra-local (nano), local (micro), small national 
and major parties. Using individual-level data from a series of recently 
conducted Candidate Surveys, this thesis investigated whether candidates from 
minor parties differed to those from the major parties and whether the 
subgroups within the typology could be characterised based on candidate level 
information. The purpose of this analysis was to investigate whether the recent 
increase in minor party activity was the result of a new political class - thus 
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providing some explanation for the aggregate trends identified in the first part of 
the thesis. 
Using the typological group of candidates as a categorical dependent variable, 
a senes of bivariate tests measured the significance of differences between 
candidates from the different minor party subgroups. The secondary data 
analysis of the paper Candidate Survey focused on demographics, experience, 
support and selection whilst an additional online Follow-Up Survey conducted 
primary data collection regarding background and motivations, geographical 
relevance, electoral reform, party systems, policy and ideology. The goal of this 
process of identifying salient differentiating independent variables was to inform 
the selection of factors that could be used to build a multivariate predictive 
model. Thus the ultimate test of the power of the typology would be whether 
typological group membership could be assigned by a statistical model if a set 
of individual characteristics of a candidate are known. 
It became clear whilst analysing the paper Candidate Survey data that the 
typology needed modification as whilst it was possible to allocate the original 
groups characteristics, the within group components displayed significant 
heterogeneity. For example, it was possible to statistically differentiate small 
national parties from the other minor party subgroups as being higher qualified. 
However analysis of the components of this group revealed that this was due to 
Green Party candidates being exceptionally well qualified whilst those from the 
BNP and UKIP tended to have lower qualifications. Similar observations were 
made throughout the analysis regarding several independent variables which 
led to the small national party group being disbanded and the parties being 
treated separately when investigating the online Follow-Up Survey data. There 
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may also have been significant within-group variation in the local (micro) party 
group, but due to the high number of constituent components (often resulting in 
only a single candidate response from each party) it was impossible to check for 
this. 
Testing of the typology was also hindered by a low number of cases. There 
were too few ultra-local (nano) party candidate responses to analyse the group 
in the paper Candidate and the online Follow-Up Survey. In the latter of which 
there were even too few local (micro) party and BNP candidates, resulting in the 
characterisation of respondents only from the major parties, the Greens and 
UKIP. Many of these problems stem from the fact that there are notably more 
candidates from small national parties than the other two minor party groups 
and although the typology attempted to disaggregate the traditional 'Other' 
grouping, the typological groups themselves are still aggregations of parties. 
Inevitably the richness of the data will be reduced by grouping parties, but an 
analytical framework that treats every minor parly as an individual adds little 
understanding and is certainly not heuristic in nature. 
The result of problems with the typology was that ultra-local (nano) parties could 
not be characterised as there were too few cases in the dataset, thus the 
existence of this group could not be tested in a multivariate model. Small 
national parties were also to be treated separately by being disaggregated into 
their constituent parts - the Greens, UKIP, and the BNP. This modification 
questions the validity of using geographical patterns of contestation to group 
minor parties if subgroups within a category are so readily differentiated. It also 
raises questions over whether the typology can be effectively tested if the 
number of respondents from local (micro) and ultra-local (nano) parties are so 
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few. Returning to the aggregate electoral data reveals that the proportion of 
wards contested by these two groups has barely nsen above 5% between 1998 
and 2008, thus the lack of respondents is not simply due to under-sampling but 
the fact that there are so few of these candidates in the population. 
Nevertheless progression to a multivariate model could potentially vindicate part 
of the typology, such as the similanty of candidates from the Green Party, Such 
an observation would require a rethink of the basis for minor party classification 
but could form the basis of further research. Alternatively the model may reveal 
something contradictory to the bivariale analysis - that in reality candidates 
from all minor parties are not that different to each other, or even to major party 
candidates. If this is the case then the thesis has at least demonstrated that the 
recent rise in minor parties is not due to the emergence of a new political class. 
This observation would actually be strengthened by the disaggregation of the 
small national party category and the removal of typological constraints as it 
results in more components to compare. 
8.4 Testing The Typology 
Using the modified typology a multinomial logistic regression model was 
constructed to establish whether salient variables identified in the paper 
Candidate Survey could be used to predict membership of the following groups: 
major parties, the Greens, BNP and UKIP. Due to missing data constraints local 
(micro) parties had to be excluded fnDm the analysis - the last of the original 
typological groupings was thus discarded. After a rigorous variable selection 
procedure testing for multicolinearity and lack of significance, the model was 
successful in fitting the data and a series of observations about the likelihood of 
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group membership based on individual characteristics could be made. Despite 
this the ability of the model to predict group membership was poor with only 
15.2% of Green Party and 6.6% of UKIP candidates correctly classified. None 
of the BNP respondents were correctly identified as they were misclassified as 
major party candidates. An alternative model in which major parties were 
excluded and the reference category was changed to Green Party candidates 
fared better classifying 93% of Green, 25% of UKIP and 8.5% of BNP 
candidates correctly. However the removal of major party candidates and the 
subsequent increase in differentiating capability indicates that in reality there is 
much similarity between major and minor party candidates and that UKIP and 
BNP candidates have more in common with the Greens than the bivariate 
analysis first suggests. 
A similar situation could be seen in the results of the model based on the online 
Follow-Up Survey data, which due to missing data constraints could only be 
constructed to differentiate between major party, Green and UKIP candidates. 
The model predicted 98.3% of major, 33.3% of Green and 4.8% of UKIP 
candidates correctly suggesting that it is particularly hard to differentiate UKIP 
respondents from those in major parties. An alternative model that manipulated 
the allocation thresholds improved the successful prediction of minor party 
membership with the correct classification of 58.6% Green and 51.7% UKIP 
candidates although there was an increase in major party error with only 67.1% 
correctly predicted. 
Thus although the multivariate models were intended as a test for the typology. 
In reality none of the typological groups could be maintained throughout the 
analysis. The model therefore answered a different question - is there any 
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difference between minor party candidates from any party and major party 
candidates? The answer is clearly no. Although the bivahate analysis of the 
survey data indicated statistically significant differences between typological 
groups and minor parties (in relation to each other and major party candidates), 
these differences were not large enough to actually predict group membership. 
Candidates from any party group are essentially similar demographically, have 
shared similar experiences of candidacy and have similar motivations for their 
political activities. 
8.5 Contribution To Knowledge 
The typology does not aid our understanding of minor parties, but the journey 
taken to realise this has produced a series of important observations. Firstly, the 
realisation of significant in-group variance within the small national party 
category led the thesis to consider these components separately in relation to 
major parties. This allowed richer multivariate models to develop that 
demonstrated how similar candidates from the Green Party, the BNP, UKIP and 
the major parties actually are. Studies that attempt to differentiate minor parties 
from each other and the mainstream three-party hegemony endeavour to find 
reasons for why these parties have come into existence. This thesis has shown 
that the people who contest elections on behalf of these groups are no different 
to those that stand for minor parties. Thus the explanation for the increase in 
minor party contestation since 1998/1999 is not a function of the emergence of 
a new political class. 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this thesis is the quantification of 
minor parties and the presentation of comprehensive evidence that the recent 
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proportion of wards contested is unprecedented. Previous to the creation of this 
dataset the evidence of such a trend was anecdotal or based on inadequate 
data, but using the notion of presence (supported by the literature) the rise in 
minor parties has been firmly established. Disaggregating this trend led to the 
observation that it is inappropriate to study minor parties at the national level 
and that the traditional authority-type comparison is also invalid. The case 
studies of the London Boroughs showed that minor party contestation can be 
understood at authority and ward level, but that every area has its own story to 
tell and numeric analysis cannot be relied upon to provide an explanation. Local 
factors are the key to understanding minor parties, not candidates or election 
results - a conclusion that will prevent much hard work and labour for future 
studies on minor parties in English local government. 
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Local Election Candidate Survey, 2008 
^c^^itmMSt 
LOCAL ELECTION CANDIDATE SURVEY, 2008 
We are conducting this survey to collect information from candidates to learn more about 
the people who stand at local elections, their experience of selection and their opinions of 
the process. All replies will be treated confidentially. 
1. Firstly, could you tell us whether you were elected or not at the 2008 election 
Elected Di Not elected Do 
2. We'd also like to learn about your previous political and local community activity. 
Prior to the 2008 election, 
2.a) Had you ever been a candidate in metropolitan, district, unitary, London 
borough and /or county council elections? 
Yes a, No Do 
If 'Yes' how many times? and. when was the first time? 
2.b) Had you ever been elected to metropolitan, district, unitary, London borough 
and / or county councils? 
Yes D, No Do 
If'Yes', how many times? and, when was the first time? 
2.c) Please tick in the 'Yes'column below for any of the activities that apply to you 
and also tick the 'before standing' column if this occurred before you first 
stood as a local election candidate: 
ii 
iii 
iv 
V 
vi 
vii 
viii 
ix 
Stood as a Parliamentary candidate 
Held a local party office 
Held office in a charitable organisation 
Held office in a professional association 
Held office in a trade union 
Held office in women's organisation 
Served on a local public body 
Had a position of responsibility in a local pressure group 
Had a position of responsibility in a local community group 
Yes 
lick, 1, 
blank. 0 
Sefcire 
standing 
tick, 1, 
blank 0 
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YOUR EXPERIENCE OF BECOMING A CANDIDATE FOR THE FIRST TIME 
3. Why did you FIRST stand as a candidate in a local election?^ 
1 wanted to support my party 
1 was asked to stand 
1 ttiougtit 1 could win 
Dissatisfaction with previous councilior(s) 
1 wanted to do something to improve this area for the residents 
1 knew people on the council who encouraged me to stand 
1 felt very strongly about particular issues / or a single issue and 
wanted to do somethinq 
Please tick 
those that 
apply 
Resoonsacode 1 
Other reasons, please specify 
Some people may receive encouragement from those around them when they decide to 
stand for public office, whilst others may expehence indifference or disapproval. How 
positive or negative were the following people in encouraging you to become a 
candidate the FIRST TIME you stood for election? {Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
Your spouse or partner 
Other family memt>ers 
Personal friends 
Community groups 
Business associates 
Party members 
Party agents 
Local Pressure Group 
Women's groups 
Trade unions 
Employers 
Others 
ResDonse code 
Very 
Positive 
1 
Positive 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Negative 
A 
Very 
Neqative 
Not 
Applicable 
5 1 6 
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5. Thinking about your experience of standing for the first time, was the initial decision to 
put yourseif forward for selection? ... (Please tick ONE} 
a) 
b) 
entirely your own decision 
consequence of being approached or encouraged by others 
1 
2 
Please now answer EITHER 5a OR 5b 
5. a) If entirely your own decision was this because: (please tick ONE that most applies) 
You saw \t as an important step in lieginning a career in politics 
You felt strongly that you could make a difference 
You did rt for general volunteering reasons 
You knew someone else who was serving on the council 
5.b) If consequence of being approached or encouraged by ottiers was it because 
you were approached by: (please tick OWE that most applies) 
A serving councillor 
A member of the local political party 
A friend/neighbour 
A memt)er of a local trade union 
A member of a local community group 
A memt>er of a local club, e.g. rotary club 
Other (please specify) 
YOUR EXPERIENCE OF SELECTION 
To be answered by candidates for registered political parties only 
If you stood in 2008 as a non-party or Independent candidate, please go to Question 11 
6. Are you a party member? 
Yes Di No Do 
If 'Yes' for approximately how many years have you been a member? 
7. Before the 2008 election were there more people seeking selection for your party in this 
ward than there were available seats? 
Yes D, No Do 
8. Did you apply for more than one seat in 2008? 
Yes D, No Do 
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9. In your opinion why were you selected to contest this particular seat? 
Incumbent 
Previously a counciHor 
Local resident 
Likely to win this seat 
Good reputation 
The only volunteer 
Prepared to stand as paper candidate 
Resryinse code 
Tick those that 
apply 
1 
Any other reasons?. 
10. To what extent do you think these factors contributed to your successful selection? 
(Please tick ONE box in each row) 
Your previous political experience 
Your previous community involvement 
Being known to members of the selection committee 
Your gender 
Your ethnicity 
Your age 
Your current or previous employment 
Your reputation 
Response code 
Very 
much 
1 
Quite a 
lot 
Not very 
much 
2 3 
Not at all 
A 
To be answered by all candidates 
11. When you stood for the 2008 election what was your estimation of the probability of 
winning this seat on a scale of 0 -10? (Please circle the appropriate number.) 
Highly improbable 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Highly probable 
12. Do you currently live in the ward for which you stood at the recent election? 
Yes Di No Do 
13. Did you personally choose to stand for this seat? 
Yes D, No Do 
If 'No' why are you standing in this ward? 
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THE RECENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
14. During your election campaign did you contact any of the local media in order to 
publicise your campaign? 
Yes D i No Do 
If 'Yes', were you successful in obtaining a media response 
Yes D i No Do 
15. Some candidates publish information leaflets to be delivered to the residents of their 
ward. In this recent campaign: 
Did you produce a campaign leaflet for distribution? 
Yes D i No Oo 
If 'Yes', go to Question 16 tf Wo', go to Question 19 
16. Did you deliver the campaign leaflets? 
Yes Di No Do 
If 'Yes', approximately how many hours a week did you spend delivering campaign 
leaflete? 
17. Was your leaflet delivered to all addresses in your ward? 
Yes D i No Do 
If 'No', how were the addresses selected? 
18. In your campaign literature how important was it to include the following information 
for voters? 
Your personal background 
Your previous political experience 
Your record of local community 
involvement 
Your competency for public office 
Comment on the record of other parties / 
councillors 
Your party's local priorities 
Your parly's national policies 
Political party information to increase 
membership 
ResDonse code 
Very 
Important 
1 
Quite 
Important 
2 
Not Very 
Important 
3 
Not At All 
Important 
4 
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19. Thinking back to the recent campaign, do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
The campaign received sufficient 
coveraqe by the local press 
The campaign received sufficient 
coveraqe by local radio 
Local newspaper coverage of the 
campaign was fair 
National issues and not local issues were 
allowed to dominate the campaign. 
National party leaders should keep a low 
profile and let local elections be decided 
by local factors alone 
ResDonse code 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
4 5 
20. Did you campaign in other wards? 
Yes D, No Do 
If 'Yes', why did you campaign in those wards? 
21. Overall, did you enjoy campaigning? 
Yes D, No 
22. Would you be prepared to stand as a candidate for local election again? 
Yes D, No Do 
Questionnaire continues on next page.. J 
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HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE 
23. Almost all adults are eligible to become local councillors, yet relatively few come 
foRA/ard to be candidates. Do you agree or disagree with these possible reasons for 
the non-involvement of most citizens? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
B«ng a councilior is too time consuming 
Councillors don't have ttie power to make 
a difference 
Strongly 
Agree 
Councillors are insufficiently paid 
Once elected councillors receive 
insufficient support from the council 
Most people are not interested in local 
government 
Intrusive media coverage of personal life 
may discourage some people from 
standing 
There is a general lack of public 
knowledge about local qovemment 
Political parlies dominate iocal 
govemment and this discourages people 
who don't want a party allegiance 
Political parties should recruit some local 
candidates wfio are not party memtjers 
ResDonse code 1 
Agree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree 
i 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
24. One of the aims of recent modemisation initiatives in local govemment is to attract a 
greater cross-section of people to serve as councillors. Do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
There should be more women as 
councillors. 
There should be more younger (18-35 
years) people as councillors 
There should be more Black, Asian and 
minority ethnic people as councillors 
Greater social diversity amongst 
councillors would improve the public 
image of local government. 
Greater social diversity amongst 
councillors would increase voter turnout 
Wwnen and men have different life 
experiences and so bring distinctive 
insights to the work of a council. 
In general, women councillors have 
different policy priorities than men. 
Rasnonse code 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
Agree Neutral 
3 
Disagree 
A 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
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25. There are a variety of ways to publicise the role of councillors and to encourage more 
people to stand as candidates. Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
Local authorities should provide more 
public information about ttie worK of 
councillors. 
It is ttie responsibility of the political 
parties to recruit candidates 
Councillors are in the best position to 
recruit new candidates 
Local authorities should advertise for 
candidates 
Local authority websites should contain 
information about becoming an election 
candidate 
Local authorities should enclose leaflets 
about becoming a candidate with the 
council tax notification 
National parties should do more to 
project positive images of local 
councillors 
There should be a national advertising 
campaign to attract local election 
candidates from outside the political 
parties 
ResDonse code 
StrongI 
Y Agree 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
26. Do you agree or disagree with the following general explanations of why there are 
relatively few women in local politics? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
Women... 
are not interested in politics 
don't have the confidence for politics 
put their families above a political career 
don't like the confrontational style of politics 
are put off by the councillor stereotype of 
white, male and middle aged 
In general, local parties don't do enough to 
recruit women candidates 
In general, too few women come forward to 
be candidates 
Resoofise code 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
Questionnaire continues on next page.. J 
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27. Do you agree or disagree with the following general explanations of why there are 
relatively few people from Black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds in local 
politics? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
Black, Asian and minority ettinic people... 
are not interested in poirtics 
don't have the confidence for politics 
put their families above a political career 
don't like the confrontational style of politics 
are put off by the councillor stereotype of 
white, male and middle aqed 
In general, local parties don't do enough to 
recruit Black, Asian and minority ethnic 
candidates 
In general, too few Black, Asian and minority 
ethnic people come fonward to be candidates 
RespDnse code 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
Agree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree 
4 
Strongly 
Disagree 
5 
28. Do you agree or disagree with the following general explanations of why there are 
relatively few younger people (18-35 years age group) in local politics? (Please tick 
ONE box in each row.) 
Younger people... 
are not interested in politics 
don't have the confidence for politics 
put their families before politics 
don't like the confrontational style of politics 
are put off by the councillor stereotype of 
white, male and middle aqed 
In general, local parties don't do enough to 
recnjit younger people 
In general, too few younger people come 
forward to be candidates 
ResDonsecode 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
^gree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
A 5 
Queslionnaire continues on next page.. J 
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29. It is sometimes argued that local government needs new blood and this may mean 
encouraging long-serving councillors into retirement. Do you believe that: 
29 a) Councillors should be forced to stand down at the election immediately 
following their 70"" birthday 
Yes D i No D. Don't Know Dg 
29 b) There should be a restriction on the number of consecutive four-year 
tenris that a councillor can serve 
Yes Di No Do Don't Know Dg 
If'Yes', how many consecutive four-year terms 
29 c) If legal limits were introduced do you believe that councillors forced to 
stand down should receive some financial compensation 
i) For retiring at age 70: 
YesD, No Do 
ii) For reaching term limit: 
Yes D i No Do 
Don't Know Dg 
Don't Know Dg 
30. In your opinion which of these reasons account for councillors standing down after 
just one four-year temi? 
Ttiey have actiieved what they set out to do 
Please tick those that 
apply 
Being a councillor is too time consuming 
Find it difficult to get time off work for council meetings 
Can't balance family commitments with council duties 
Councillors don't have the power to make a difference 
Councillors are insufficiently paid 
Councillors receive insufficient support from the council 
Intmsive media coverage 
Party political domination 
Resooose code 
Questions 31 - 33 should be answered only by those who had experience as a 
councillor, PRIOR to the 2008 election. Otherwise please go to Question 34 
31, Approximately how many hours a week did you spend on council duties? 
Hours 
32. In your capacity as a councillor did you have additional responsibilities e.g. leader of 
the council, or other portfolio holder? 
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33. Approximately how frequently were you involved in the following activities relating to 
your position as a councillor? (Please tick ONE box in each row.) 
Hold ward surgeries 
Circulate newsletters 
Receive letters from residents 
Receive telephone calls from 
residents 
Receive emails from residents 
Contact an MP on behalf of a resident 
Attend community evenls 
Attend party meetings 
Contact local media to publicise ward 
news 
Approached by local reporters to give 
interviews 
ResDoise code 
More than 
once a 
week 
1 
More 
than 
once a 
month 
2 
About 
once a 
month 
3 
Less 
than 
once a 
month 
4 
Never 
5 
FINALLY, A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU 
34. Are you ? Male n , Female D; 
35. What was your age last birthday? years. 
36. Ethnic origin (please choose ONE from section A- E. then tick the appropriate box) 
A White 
British 
Irish 
Other White (please specify) 
C. Mixed 
White and Black Caribbean 
White and Black African 
White and Asian 
Other Mixed (please specify) 
E. Chinese or other ethnic group 
Chinese 
Any other (please specify) 
O3 
Da 
•10 
•12 
• ,7 
B. Asian 
Asian British 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Other Asian (please specify). 
D. Slack 
Black British 
Caribbean 
African 
Other Black (please specify). 
• 4 
Or 
•13 
•14 
D,6 
37, Educational qualifications: (Please tick the highest that you have obtained.) 
No qualrficatrons ! 
GCSEs or equivalent 
'A*' levels or equivalent 
First degree 
Higher deqree 
t 
? 
3 
4 
s 
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38. Which of these best describes your current occupation? (Please tick ONE.) 
40. 
41. 
In full time paid employment 
In part-time paid employment 
Self-employed 
Permanently sick or disabled 
In voluntary occupation 
Registered unemployed 
Full-time student 
Retired 
Looking after home / family 
\ 
7 
3 
* 
s 
fi 
7 
R 
s 
O t h e r (please specify) 
39. If currently employed, what is your occupation, or if unemployed/retired what was your 
previous occupation? 
How vrtJuld you describe your cun-ent or previous occupational status? (Please tick ONE.) 
Professional occupation 
Managerial and / or Technical occupation 
Skilled occupation, non manual 
Skilled occupation, manual 
Partly skilled occupation 
Unskilled occupation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
? 
Which of these additional public activities applies to you? 
A school governor 
Member of a health care trust or similar 
Member of a public board or committee 
Carry out unpaid, voluntary/charity work 
Other {please specify) 
1 
? 
3 
4 
5 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your responses are much 
appreciated and will contribute enormously towards our aim to reflect the opinions of as 
many candidates as we can in our report. Please feel free to add any observations of 
your own about the experience of being a candidate or elaborate on your answers to 
our questions. 
If you would be willing to take part in a follow-up interview please write in a telephone 
numtier or email address. 
Telephone No;. 
Email address: 
Mary Shears, Research OfTicer. 
LGC Elections Centre 
University of Plymou&i 
OFFICE USE: 
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FOLLOW-UP ONLINE SURVEY 
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1. Section 1) Introduction 
ybiElections Centre 
• A 
E W ' i . ' i l S t u f t e i 
TharA v m fat • f a w i g to ufe« n v i ^ ih i i j u B a i d i prti|*d 
irygpuipopT tf ^^l^DrilnBgllMll^•'^^^^1al^ tfi»TmBiprriq*»Mwifrrifw«afc«Mi|ftam»*Mr*wi miwty 
llttn 4a9ci feetfbK^ WB •ecuvcd IraTk cw^didiHeB Lq thr od^^ l l Btieali:v>Pllir« 
Thil Hirvvy kHU akm you no knoor than tO irtmrtH to ecfrpEalt 
T h n •• ^HKs •( A a Bnd to TsDdnl mf at yav cwiwrmttm abtmn E&a w r v c i n ma r n w i w p i v i a d h a a 
i y e u n i r 4 a n v 4 V * i a Q f i * i t c u l t M » u r v « t p l v d H contact hiftfl i lDviVphvniNthJcjjk 
Unnani l r ctf Plrmoulh 
mrw filYTnaBi.K.iiL'tiaaam 
Sow* flf t h * q i M t f U a f HuN 
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2 . S e c t i o n 2) C a n d i d a c y 
1. Were you bom in the Local Authori ty area that you were contesting for election 
when you were originally surveyed? 
o-
2. Were you bom in the ward/division that you were contesting for election when you 
were originally surveyed? 
o-
3. Would you ever stand agafn as a candidate for any of the following (please t ick all 
that apply) 
I T)w paiTv you M006 tar HrtiHii yai mmn «tgn»ly vjrtmrtt 
I I Tt» LIMur PiftT 
I T)it C t n w A b H Pirtr 
I I Tf« Le t™ D«iio«i»t P in t 
I I TtwOraenFMlr 
I | -n i .Ur imaKngi lantnJ«( i l r fMt-Pwl|r tU>IPI 
I vn* Bt l j ih NmboRjl Pirty 
I I OBm I p U H w « A ] 
] 
4. To what extem do you agree with the fo l lowing statements? 
0 0 0 0 
S W g l r DL»4r«« 
I iHHHf H • nnd4 i t« to 
StHitftfigrt mora 
ini(]Drtwl thvt vinnmg o o o o 
o 
o 
207 
3. Section 3) Geographical Relevance and Electoral Reform 
SUcngI)' Agi» 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
EdM^BAi a f f tm • • * nol 
ra lHam tn >>eal 
QOvBrnll'Mnl 
MamnH ^tmn i rv i i f l 
rfelBvanl I D ^ool 
Qpn^imnitT 
L H H I ad i i r i V * nat 
rvlavHt in t m t 
Pflrt) poUim l i u no D I * I * 
mloGtl aev«rmnsnt 
GMitof i f f t n • » not 
r a j n u d (D local 
gpvffiinvni 
2. To what extent do you agre* with the following statements in res|wct oT voting at 
LOCAL electjons? 
TT4 turrHm rdori tfKtaviir 
•y i lvnfavaini Iha 
m M t t w n pAnat 
I D ^ ^ w u i M H i t S u n 
•ingia pvEy ma|oribeb 
VoMFi ibOHM be abi* la 
f Hifc canttdalH on m l a o t 
hallDt|iap«f 
JtiBn B^culd ba • norre 
d tn* abirrD QplMin o i 
meal bauot pjper^ 
L D C ^ gnainniyHir would 
ba IfiAfflvcO r1 • PR 
iroBnfl tr^ttfn awi adopiad 
Th* rairraai vaofy^ ijnrani 
ffmiMai'thB ptaBj d«div«i« 
MmnO Focat gowamiTHinl 
Slrringly Agrna 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
* 9 » 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
E>BBva« 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Dibflfr** 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Sltofiglv D<«*t^ 
o 
o 
O 
o 
o 
o 
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4. Section 4) Policies 
1. Where would you place yoursetf, polHically speaking, on the traditional left/right 
spectrum? 
CEfflr? Car*» RIgni 
o o o o o o o o o o 
2. Below are a series of statements. Using the drop-down menus please tel l us to 
what extent: 
• the party that you stood for (when you were f irst surveyed) agreed with the 
statement 
• how important these issues were to you personally 
For example, your party may strongly agree with the statement that "government 
should favour liberal policies on euthanasia" and you may personalty th ink that this 
issue is "Vary Important" 
AHematively your party might disagree with the statement " the EU should t>e 
enlarged" but you may personally think that th is issue is "Not Important" 
You may select 'Not Applicat)le' for any statement if you wish 
prvnot« ms preOcOflt D< 
crviE i b m « 
Gov*mm«fii tncwia 
'•WDur bbwi i policial oo 
auSianai'B 
GDvamirHnl mhoid^ 
rcwJT' I 4 n l pt f ioat w i 
h g n m r u ^ a y 
T h i E U i i w i d b * 
VnlATOMl 
TTi« g m h n i i v n l nfiokri^ 
b hdp Hy i in i H A « n 
• n ^ VT¥TV[pintt r«lumto 
ttiw n ^ i cavnry 
T h * BivB-nnmant Knould 
b« prolscjid. •¥«> M mo 
ca«J tf «caiDnkc ^Dwlh 
^n-ammanl tf>cifltf 
fflv-JUE high I B I I ^ tJ tMa 
rtgutaUDfi infl cofiuol • ( 
ihvmahxrf 
(amrBrnnwrn ihauld ( • • • • 
1»tCt ID il^lJeSK piifillC 
_ _ _ * 
m 
a 
sd 
u 
d 
u 
J H 
P«qafilll mpotJopcB 
H 
13 
13 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
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Gowinwnl AOMUI J j M | fl | 
ofDLnv 
n»B TUflH meflia ihoi^d f ttl I g j 
ba GomtiitfBrf Er*B Is 
publali ant mtlviBl itieif 
EMM 
dacHibaki* ponrvr In 
I m l nulhontin 
GnvninflnT iiiould 
promrie U^BP DVV rural 
1] I — a 
~M r—n 
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5. Sec t i on 5) C o i n c i d i n g E l e c t i o n s 
1 . The evidence from prevwus elections suggests that holding a general electron on 
the same day as local elections increases turnout in the local contests. To what 
extent do you agree that Ihis is a good reason for holding elections simuHaneously? 
Q SBiir.^ D I U J H 
2. In years where there are elections to the European parljmtient the government 
decidsit in botti 2DD4 and 2009 to move the local elections to coincide with the 
European election to encourage more people to vote. To what extent do you agree 
with this? 
211 
6. Section 6) Debrief 
1. Thank you for completing the survey. If you have any further commanlB to make, 
please do BO in the feedback box below. 
212 
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